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finishing this dissertation as soon as possible, especially when my energy was about to run 





In the spring of 2007, I was attending a course entitled “Islam and Transnationalism” at 
Utrecht University, as a supplement to my MPhil study at the Department of Turkish Studies 
at Leiden University, which was in progress at the time. Being the only Turkish citizen in this 
course, on April 26 many of my classmates congratulated me on the presidency of Abdullah 
Gül, whom they considered president although the first round of the election had yet to take 
place. On the one hand, I politely reminded my friends that the elections were yet to come 
and their congratulations were kind, but a bit premature. On the other hand, they did remind 
me that the deadline for the candidacy had nearly passed, and Gül was the only candidate at 
the end with his party’s parliamentary majority support. In the end I truly wished my worries 
to be put to rest, and I hoped that the presidential election process in Turkey would run 
smoothly and without incident. However, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, 
TSK) once again confirmed my anxiety and continued its tradition of intervening in politics.  
 
Such incidents have unfortunately occurred once every decade, with the only exception being 
a military intervention in the beginning of 1990’s, in which the TSK later revisited with the 
extensive February 28 Process in 1997. By the e-memorandum published from the its official 
website, the TSK declared that “reactionary danger”1 arose in the presidency election process 
similar to the 31 March, Sheik Said and Menemen incidents and other military interventions 
in the Republican era. Also, according to the Kemalist discourse the same anti-republican, 
anti-secularist and backward stream of reaction was active in all of these cases. However, a 
critical historical and sociological analysis can raise some question marks about the 
underlying socio-political and economical power conflicts.  
 
For example, consider the 31 March Incident in which the main demand of counter 
revolutionists who opposed the Second Constitutional Period in 1908 was the restoration of 
Shariah. Rebels organized around Dervis Vahdeti’s Volkan newspaper started an armed 
insurrection in Istanbul for the restoration of Shariah. The rebels also demanded the dismissal 
of many statesman and officers that had supported the constitution and secular reforms. The 
movement of the counter-revolutionaries was successful and their demands were more or less 
fulfilled initially until the Action Army, Harekat Ordusu, which was organized by the 
Committee of Union and Progress, Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, from the empire’s Balkan 
                                                            
1 From now on naming practices of Kemalist discourse will not be expressed in brackets and this will not mean the 
writer’s acceptation of the discursive weight of the concepts.  
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territories, occupied Istanbul and suppressed the rebellion. After the occupation of the city, 
martial law was introduced and two martial courts were established, executing a large number 
of rebels.  A deeper analysis, which goes beyond the discourse of the official history, will 
mention that the main reason behind the acts of the counter-revolutionists, considerable 
number of whom were the ranker, alaylı, officers of the military, ulema and other civil 
servants, was not the abolition of the Shariah, but rather the government’s policy of 
diminishing the number of civil servants in order to stop overstaffing in the bureaucracy.2 
This presented a real conflict for the alaylı officers whose primary source of income was from 
the government. Akşin also mentions that the discourse of the restoration of the Shariah was 
utilized during the revolt in spite of the fact that the general circumstances during the revolt 
were far away from a return to Islamic Rule.3 However, the discourse on reaction, irtica, 
inherited from the 31 March Incident, was so deep and intense that even Akşin changed the 
title of his book in later editions to suggest fundamentalism as the true culprit even though his 
writing supported the opposite view.4                       
 
The Sheikh Said Rebellion also demonstrated the manipulation of the so-called anti-secularist 
actions to maintain the status quo and power relations. The rebellion that broke out in 
February 1925 was a result of growing Kurdish discontent in the southeastern regions of 
Turkey. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Kurds were far from getting the autonomy they had 
been promised during the independence struggle. Furthermore, with the abolition of the 
caliphate in the course of the secularization of the state by the Kemalists, the ties that bound 
Kurds and Turks together were also dissolved. At the same time, the nationalist polices of the 
republic, aimed at creating a national identity, were increasing. Under such circumstances, the 
outbreak of a rebellion in the Kurdish regions was not surprising.  Although it was a rebellion 
motivated mostly by the Kurdish nationalist ideals more than any other, it was introduced as a 
reactionary movement and used for the repression of an emerging political opposition group, 
namely the Progressive Republican Party. The Progressive Republican Party was founded in 
1924 by a group of parliamentarians who split from the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). The new party was also secular and nationalist, but it 
adopted a more liberal opposition against the centralist, statist and authoritarian policies of the 
CHP.  The Kemalist regime used the rebellion as an excuse to oppress political opposition 
and to introduce the antidemocratic Law of Maintenance of Order, Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu, 
although the Progressive Republicans fully supported the government in the suppression of 
                                                            
2 Zürcher, E. J. (2005). Turkey: A Modern History. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 95-9. 
3 Akşin, S. (1972). 31 Mart Olayı. İstanbul: Sinan Yayınları, p.290-2. 
4 Zürcher, E. J. (2002). “From Empire to Republic: Problems of Transition, Continuity and Change,” Turkology 
Update Leiden Project Working Papers Archive, accessed February 18, 2007,  
http://tulp.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/wap/fromtorep.pdf, p.25.  
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the revolt,5 and the revolt was more or less suppressed before the introduction of the law.6 As 
a result, The Ankara Independence Tribunal, Ankara İstklal Mahkemesi, which was martial 
court founded by the Law of Maintenance of Order, closed the Progressive Republican Party 
because of the accusation that the term “being respectful to religious ideas and faiths”, “efkar 
ve itikadi diniyeye hürmetkar,” in the party program was very suitable for the political 
exploitation of religion.7 The story of the Progressive Republicans ended very dramatically, 
but the motto of, “political exploitation of religion” was inherited as one of the most 
frequently used slogans of the Kemalist establishment.   
 
Five years later, the rising danger of reaction was seen elsewhere in Menemen, a town close 
to Izmir. According to the official history, on December 23, 1930, reactionary members of the 
outlawed Nakshibendi Sufi order8, one of Turkey’s most influential and widespread Sufi 
orders, arrived in Menemen from Manisa. Dervishes, members of the sufi order, led by 
Mehmet, started an uprising against the secular state with demands for the restoration of 
Shariah and the caliphate. After this outbreak, a group of gendarmes led by Mustafa Fehmi 
Kubilay, a young teacher and reserve officer in the army, attempted to force the rebels to 
surrender. However, Kubilay was unsuccessful and he was beheaded by the rebels. In short 
time, the additional gendarmerie units repressed the uprising. The incident would have been 
considered an ordinary criminal case if crowds in Menemen had done anything more than just 
watched the incident. The silence and non-protesting attitude of the inhabitants of Menemen 
was a real shock for the Kemalist leadership due to the fact that the silence of the inhabitants 
of Menemen was considered to be a silent and implicit support for the incident.9 As a result, 
the government took harsh measures in the aftermath of this incident, arresting many people 
and declaring martial law. Although several years passed since this incident, the memory of 
Menemen is still alive in Turkey, as a demonstration of the Kemalist establishment’s usage of 
the incident as a theme of the rising reactionary danger. Azak mentioned that despite the 
Kemalist determination of keeping Kubilay’s memory alive, the incident and Kubilay were 
more or less forgotten in the late 1930’s and 1940’s.10 However, the memory and image of 
Kubilay was revived in the 1950’s as a result of the Kemalists losing power due to the 
transition into a multi-party system.11 From the second popularity wave of Kubilay in the 
                                                            
5 Zürcher, E. J. (1991). Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party 
1924-1925. Leiden: E.J.Brill, p.81. 
6 Zürcher, E. J. Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic, p. 85. 
7 Sezgin, O. &  Saylan, O. (1984).”Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası,” in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, vol.8, Murat Belge (eds). İstanbul: İletisim, p.2043.  
8 For an analyses of perception of Nakşibendis in the official ideology see; Şeker, F. M. (2007). Cumhuriyet 
İdeolojisinin Nakşibendilik Tasavvuru: Şerif Mardin Örneği. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.  
9 Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 179. 
10 Azak, U. (2008). “Kubilay Icon of Secularism,” ISIM Review, 21, p. 38. 
11 Azak, U. Kubilay Icon of Secularism, p. 38. 
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1950’s onwards, the image of Kubilay served as the major medium for the Kemalists in 
secularism discussions. 
 
Religious reaction, and the political exploitation of religious feelings, became the rationale 
behind a series of military interventions by the TSK that began with a military coup d’état in 
1960 and continued with the recent April 27 Process. Although these rationales became the 
bedrock of the TSK’s agenda, the tactics that the TSK used to address and justify their 
interventions to society evolved. In May of 1960, it was the creaking voice of colonel 
Alparslan Türkeş, who later founded and lead the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP) told Turkish citizens that the TSK took over power in the country in order to 
liberate it from the grips of ambitious politicians who would most certainly lead the country 
into disaster. Furthermore, the military junta claimed that they took over power in order to re-
establish democratic rule and also to cease the rising reactionary danger. The military junta 
began legislating itself with the introduction of the National Unity Council, Milli Birlik 
Komitesi, as the administrative body of the country. Meanwhile, the task of preparing a new 
constitution that would prevent ambitious politicians from leading the country into disaster 
again was entrusted to university professors. The military junta sought to transform the army, 
universities and the country’s cultural life in accordance with the ethos of the military 
intervention; that is, limiting the effectiveness and power of civilian politics. The 
interventionist aims of the military junta were embodied in the National Security Council 
(Milli Guvenlik Konseyi, MGK), which was established as an advisory council to the 
government in internal and external affairs. In practice, the council worked as the basis for 
legitimizing the TSK’s future interventions in civil politics, as in the cases of the February 28 
and April 27 military interventions. Finally, the executions of overthrown Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, were the 
other legacies of the intervention that have always been remembered in the context of 
civilian-military relations in Turkey.  
 
On the 12th of March, 1971, the TSK “was forced” to make an intervention by issuing a 
memorandum to the government. TSK announced, again by radio, the necessity of their 
intervention in order to stop fraternal fighting, a chaotic environment, but with the ultimate 
aim of fixing the so-called required conditions for a democratic rule. During the days prior to 
the TSK’s memorandum, violence on streets and campuses had increased. The TSK asked the 
prime minister to establish a strong government that would be able to end the anarchy in the 
country. Upon receiving the memorandum, Prime Minister Demirel resigned and Nihat Erim, 
a CHP deputy, was appointed as the new prime minister in conformity with the TSK’s will. 
Under the rule of Erim’s technocrat government, the MGK increased its power both legally 
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and practically and started a war against terrorism by declaring martial law. During the witch-
hunt that was operated by the MGK, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) of 
conservative politician Necmettin Erbakan and many leftist organizations were closed and 
many intellectuals and politicians were arrested and tortured.   
 
Later, the TSK counterbalanced the low scale memorandum of 1971 and formed a coup d’état 
on the 12th of September, 1980. In the beginning of three year junta rule, which was marked 
with numerous instances of torture and murder, General Kenan Evren explained the 
justification behind the intervention, but this time from official state television channel; the 
TSK “was forced” once again to intervene in order to stop fraternal fighting, a chaotic 
environment, but once again with the ultimate aim to fix democracy in the country. 
Furthermore, the theme of rising reactionary danger also featured as a legitimizing element, 
as in the case of the Jerusalem Meeting organized by Erbakan’s National Salvation Party 
(Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) in Konya a few months before the military intervention.12 The 
basic aim of the military junta was to save country from politicians, who junta leaders 
regarded as wicked by nature. To achieve this aim, all parties were closed, the parliament was 
dissolved and all mayors were replaced with military personnel. The MGK increased its 
power under martial law and many intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, trade unionists, 
politicians and academicians were arrested and tortured. The “excuse” behind the mass arrests 
and torture was the fight against terrorism, in which the junta became successful to a certain 
extent. After three years of junta rule, the new constitution was put to a referendum at the end 
of which the constitution was accepted with 91.4 percent of the vote. The constitution 
increased the power of the MGK, limited basic liberties, granted legal immunity for the acts 
and members of the junta and appointed junta leader Evren as the new president with a 
temporary clause. 
 
When it came to the 1990’s, although ten years had passed since the last intervention, Turkey 
was far from the possibility of a repeated military intervention. It was widely believed that 
because of Turkey’s established entrance to the global economic system, military 
interventions would completely cease. It was even claimed that with the advancement of 
communication and media technology, means to form a coup d’état by controlling strategic 
communication and media facilities such as television, radio stations, and post offices would 
not be possible. Indeed, such arguments at the time made sense to some extent. However, 
what was not foreseeable was the TSK’s ability to rebuild its interventionist policy due to the 
                                                            
12 Jeremi Salt considered the meeting as the “last straw” for the military intervention. Salt, J. (1995). “Nationalism 
and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, 31(1), p. 14-5.  
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general transformations the country was experiencing. The post-modern military intervention 
of the February 28 Process became the key indicator of the TSK’s capacity and ability of 
transforming its avenues into intervention, also demonstrating the possibility of military 
intervention without the use of guns, but by simply using the influence of its civilian allies. 
The military intervention was dubbed “post-modern” by the deputy chief of general staff with 
reference to the TSK’s capacity and ability to transform its means and methods of 
intervention. The military’s familiar way of making military interventions -- with the use of 
guns – was regarded as the modern way of making military intervention. Thus, due to a 
superficial understanding of postmodernism -- regarding postmodernism as simply the next 
stage after modernism -- military intervention without guns was deemed post-modern.  
Announced as the peak point of the tension between TSK and government about rising 
reactionary danger several months before by newspapers and televisions, during an ordinary 
February 28th meeting of The National Security Council the TSK and its allies broadcasted an 
intervention live for the Turkish people to watch. The results of this type of intervention 
exercised through the civil domain was much more destructive in terms of civilian psyche 
than a typical one in the political domain.   
 
The same optimistic point of view of my classmates was again shared on the eve of the 
presidential elections in 2007. “Never Again,” was the instant answer in response to questions 
about the possibility of a military intervention against the election of a Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) member as the president, which was 
regarded as a potential sign of rising reactionary danger. However on the night of April 27 
during the first round of the presidential election, the TSK issued an e-memorandum from its 
official web site. Giving the various examples of reactionary acts from some corners of 
Turkey, the TSK again warned against rising reactionary danger. What made the April 27 
Process unique was not only TSK’s usage of the internet technology, but also another 
memorandum that warned the TSK about its duties and responsibilities against government; 
the government’s counter memorandum to the TSK. 
 
What was this reaction and who were these reactionaries who insistently worked for  
the restoration of shariah rule from 1908 onwards in spite of the changing political regimes, 
social, cultural and economical conditions in the course of the transition from Empire to 
Republic and transition in the course of Republic as well? Roughly speaking, these people 
were the religiously conservatives13 of Turkey including masses, politicians, poets, sufi 
                                                            
13 From now one “conservative” will be used instead of “religiously conservative.” Conservatism in Turkey has 
more religious tones rather than political. For a more detailed discussion about conservatism in see; Frey, F. (1956). 
The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, p.329-330, 378, 411. 
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circles, writers, artisans, and craftsman masses. They were intellectuals and politicians who 
opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress, claiming that its rule was more 
authoritarian than Abdulhamid II; they were Kurdish conservatives, who were unsatisfied 
with the nationalist and secular modernization policies of the Kemalists in the Sheik Said 
rebellion; they were villagers that were economically exhausted as a result of endless 
demands of the Kemalist regime; he was the local imam who organized the National Struggle 
in his town but later was expelled to the margins of society because of his traditional 
conservative ideas and lifestyle; they were the conservative youngsters and their families who 
wanted their children to be educated in official, mass education institutions of state – and 
therefore took its share from the modernization of the country – and receive religious 
education as well and as a result preferred İmam-Hatip Schools; they were Sufi Sheiks who 
occupied the posts of deputy presidents of First Grand National Assembly; he was Mehmet 
Akif Ersoy, the writer of the national anthem of Republic but later self exiled himself in 
Egypt; they were the whole population of Anatolia – but not urban dwellers and bureaucrats 
of the new regime – that were culturally, politically and economically marginalized by 
Kemalists and saw the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) as a medium of opposition 
against Kemalists; they were socially and economically handicapped new inhabitants of large 
cities and conservative rural people that voted for the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP); and 
of course they were some marginal radical groups who demanded a so called Islamic State; 
but in total they were the mass majority of Turkey that expressed its politico-economical 
demands with a conservative religious tone, and used every opportunity to resist against the 
Kemalist hegemony.  
 
This dissertation aims to examine the story of these conservatives and their demands in 
1990’s and 2000’s to some extent and also the hegemonic Kemalist groups’ ways of 
suppressing these demands, of taking back the positions conservatives gained, and of carrying 
back the achievements conservatives gained as a result of their struggle against the Kemalist 
hegemony. For facilitating such a research project, the current academic literature has some 
specific strengths and weaknesses. To begin with strengths, one should count the plenty of 
resources from many different theoretical schools that are devoted to understanding the 
“secularism discussion”14, the “rise of political Islam”15, and “Islam”16 in Turkey. Aside from 
this general literature, there also some examples of academic work that are specifically 
                                                            
14 For example see: Çınar, A. (2005). Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Somer, M. (2007) “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in 
Turkey,” Third World Quarterly, 28(7), 1271-1289. 
15 For example, see: Yavuz, H. (2003). Islamic Political Identity In Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Salt, 
J. (1995). “Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, 31(1), 13-27. 
16 For example, see: Kara, İ. (2009). Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi’nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam. İstanbul: Dergah 
Yayınları; Mardin, Ş. (2007). Din ve İdeoloji. İstanbul: İletişim; Duran, B. (2005). “Cumhuriyet Dönemi 
İslamcılığı,” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık, Yasin Aktay (eds.), 129-156, Istanbul: İletişim. 
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focused on the February 28 and April 27 Processes.17 However, the literature has so far not 
addressed the hegemonic perspective of the conflict between Kemalists and conservatives. As 
will be explained in the coming chapters, although the conflict between Kemalists and 
conservatives has ideological, cultural, and economic dimensions, none of these domains is 
explanatory on its own. To cover the conflict comprehensively, a combined hegemonic (using 
Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony) and historical (using Mardin’s center-periphery 
conceptualization) approach is required. At this point, the works of Cihan Tuğal18 and Necmi 
Erdoğan19 should be mentioned as samples of a hegemonic perspective. Tuğal tries to 
understand the conservatives and their transformation within a hegemonic perspective; his is a 
thought-provoking and path-breaking approach, but one that differs from what this 
dissertation tries to do. On the other hand, Erdoğan examines the Kemalist NGOs’ 
contribution to the reproduction of Kemalist hegemony and such a perspective has made a 
significant contribution to this research. 
 
Another gap in the existing literature on the February 28 and April 27 Processes is in the 
media and discursive perspective. Although there are a limited number of works on the 
political-economy of the Turkish media20 and its discourses21, a joint perspective that focuses 
both on the political economy of the media and media discourse, while also taking into 
account the ideological and hegemonic position of the media, is missing. This is a gap the 
present research project aims to fill. 
 
After this introductory chapter, the second chapter will be about the theoretical background. I 
will make use of two theoretical bodies; Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Şerif 
Mardin’s application of center-periphery analyses to the Turkish case. I do not consider the 
cleavage between the Kemalist elites and the conservative masses as a unidirectional one that 
only originated religiously or economically. Instead, the weight of religious, cultural, 
economical and social differentiations between the Kemalist elites and conservative masses 
are equal, and every single element constitutes a motivating factor for the other elements.  
                                                            
17 For example see: Cizre, Ü.& Çınar, M. (2003) . “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of 
the February 28 Process,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102(2/3), 309-332; Çarkoğlu, A. (2007). “A New 
Electoral Victory for ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New Centre-Right’? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon 
in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey,” South European Society and Politics, 12(4), 501-519. 
18 Tuğal, C. (2009). Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism. Stanford University Press, 
California; Tuğal, C. (2007). “NATO's Islamists: Hegemony and Americanization,” New Left Review, 44, 5–34. 
19 Erdoğan, N. (2000). “Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations: Troubled Elites in Defence of a Sacred 
Heritage,” in Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey, 
Gunter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff (eds.), 251-282. Istanbul: Orient-Institut. 
20 For example see: Adaklı, G. (2006). Türkiye’de Medya Endüstirisi: Neoliberalizm Çağında Mülkiyet ve Kontrol 
İlişkileri. Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi; Tılıç, D. L. (2009). Utanıyorum Ama Gazeteciyim: Türkiye’de ve 
Yunanistan’da Gazetecilik. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları. 
21 For example see: Heper, M. & Demirel T. (1996). “The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey,” 




Due to this aspect, the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony offers tremendous 
theoretical opportunities for these analyses. As will be explained in the coming chapter, the 
conceptual subsets of hegemony give the opportunity of bringing non-economical factors to 
the discussion; (1) the “consent” and “coercion” subset is explanatory for the role and 
function of the different actors’ of Kemalist hegemonic group and urban middle class’ 
mobilization against conservatives; (2) “civil society” and “political society” explain the 
different realms through which hegemonic power was exercised over conservatives in the 
February 28 and April 27 Processes; and finally (3) the differentiation between “organic and 
traditional intellectuals” and the “intellectual and moral leadership” function of the traditional 
intellectuals offer an explanatory theoretical base for locating the role of media. Also, 
“Historic Bloc” is a good theoretical tool for the analyses of the alliance of different elements 
of Kemalist elites despite their conflicting interests.  
 
Mardin’s center-periphery account will be the second theoretical framework I will use for the 
analyses of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. The main function of Mardin’s theory 
will be localizing the meta-analyses of center-periphery relations for Turkey. As the 
Gramscian explanation of hegemony is derived from Gramsci’s general reading of Italian 
history and the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy, Mardin further helps in adopting 
the Italian case to the Turkish one. Mardin also emphases the continuity between the Ottoman 
and Republican period and that will be helpful in building the next steps of continuity; the 
February 28 and April 27 Processes. Another strength of Mardin’s center-periphery analyses 
is how it encompasses both cultural and economical aspects of the cleavage between the 
center and periphery, and that will be essential in displaying both the cultural and economical 
aspects of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Finally, the contemporary character of the 
center-periphery analyses will be one of the basic pillars behind the theoretical analyses of my 
cases.  
 
At the end of the theoretical framework chapter, I will make a conceptualization for the 
analyses of the February 28 and April 27 Processes: the “Historic Hegemonic Center”. The 
combination of these two concepts helps both to eliminate their weaknesses and combine 
their strengths. As a result of merging these two concepts, both Mardin’s historical depth and 
Gramsci’s analytic functionality are preserved. The static character, theoretical limitations, 
and geographical dependency of Mardin’s center-periphery analysis are overcome by 
Gramscian hegemony’s analytical and theoretical depth and functionality, as in the concept 
sets of consent and coercion, and civil society and political society. On the other hand, the 
class-dependent analysis and the significance of economic factors in Gramscian hegemonic 
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analysis are overcome by the historicity and inclusion of non-economic factors in Mardin’s 
center-periphery analysis.    
 
 
After theoretical explanations, the historical account will take the floor. In this context, I will 
firstly focus on the February 28 Process. The account of the February 28 Process will start 
with the explanation of the rise of the RP, and the dynamics that made the RP the electorate’s 
first choice. By focusing on the rise of the RP and seeking out the factors that made the RP 
the winner of the 1995 elections, the interrelatedness of ideological, social, political and 
economic factors of the conflict between the conservative masses and historic hegemonic 
center will be elaborated. In so doing, the RP will be situated in its place in the history of 
Turkish politics. After that the chapter will continue with the RP’s story and its coalition 
government with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) will be the focus. The RP’s 
eagerness to participate in a coalition government, its search for legitimacy through ruling the 
country, and its ideological compromises with the TSK will explain the RP’s will to fill the 
political gap in the center of Turkish politics. As the discussion on the rising danger of 
reaction started after the RP’s coalition, it will also take its share in the analyses. In this part, 
major reactionary incidents will be analyzed. The primary focus will not be on the nature of 
the events, but on how such incidents were manipulated for the sake of military intervention. 
Then, the focus will shift to the historic hegemonic center’s reaction to the rising danger of 
reaction, and the MGK and its briefings. The key role played by the MGK and how it was 
effective in the formation of the front against the RP will be the main subject of this section. 
As a result of the MGK’s activities, the mobilization of the urban middle class masses will be 
told under the title of “Civil’ Society at Work.” The functions of Gramscian civil society and 
how it made a military intervention possible without the use of guns will be elaborated. The 
media’s manipulation of the Susurluk case and attempt to build support against the RP 
through Susurluk will be explained as crucial tasks of civil society in the February 28 Process.  
As a last word about the February 28 Process, the hegemonic character, and the aims of the 
intervention will be analyzed in the frame of “The Process Lasts, Ad Infinutum”. The way in 
which the ‘ad infinutum’ character of the February 28 Process aimed to destroy the social, 
political, and economic bases of conservative politics in Turkey is the major question that will 
be answered.  
 
The story of the April 27 Process will be the following chapter after the chapter about the 
February 28 Process. The chapter on the AKP will start with an account of social and political 
atmosphere on the eve of the 2002 general elections. The account of the social and political 
atmosphere on the eve of the 2002 general elections will be explanatory about the rise of the 
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AKP in 2002 elections. Like the rise of RP in the previous chapter, the rise of the AKP will 
also be analyzed through the conjunction of both economic and non-economic factors. After 
the explanation of rise of the AKP, the focus will shift to the conflict between the AKP and 
the historic hegemonic center and how this conflict peaked with the presidential election 
process and further materialized with the e-memorandum. In this section the importance of 
the election of a president from the ranks of the AKP and its danger for the existing historic 
hegemonic center will be the main focus. It will be shown that the election of a president from 
the AKP’s ranks was not only about losing one more front to the AKP, but that it also had a 
symbolic and effective role in hegemonic relations. Contrary to the handling of the RP, the 
reading of the rise of the AKP will continue with a literature review. From a Gramscian 
perspective, this thesis argues that although all existing orientalist, modernist, political-
economic, social movements, and modernity and civil society explanations have points in 
explaining the rise of the AKP after 2002 to some extent, they offer very limited information 
about the period between 1997 and 2002, a time in which the true reasons of the rise of the 
AKP should further researched. Therefore, a search for an alternative account will take place 
after the review of existing literature about AKP. An alternative account that attempts to 
explain all aspects of the case that are not covered by the existing explanations should be 
based on the political and social atmosphere following the February 28 Process: that is, the 
developments of the period between 1997 and 2001. By doing so the relationship between the 
February 28 Process and the April 27 Process and the ways in which these processes reflected 
the hegemonic crisis of the existing historic hegemonic bloc will be analyzed. 
 
The fifth chapter will be the scene of research results and a focus on the analyses of 
newspaper discourse during the February 28 and April 27 Processes. The chapter will start 
with a brief introduction to the discourse analyses model chosen for the study. Among many 
different approaches, Norman Fairclough’s attention to text as well as discourse, his 
methodological inquiries, and the scope he provides for society-power relations seem to make 
his model the most appropriate. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for critical discourse 
analysis -- focusing on text, discursive practice and social practice -- will be the 
methodological tool of this study.  After that, the justification of sample newspapers at that 
time period will appear in addition to criteria of inclusion and exclusion. In this discourse 
analysis, Milliyet will be examined for its representation of the modern industrial bourgeoisie, 
Cumhuriyet for its hardcore Kemalist, statist, and elitist discourse, Sabah for its liberal 
attitude targeting the urban middle classes and white-collar workers, and, finally, Akşam, for 
its insights into the mobilization of the urban poor, artisans and craftsmen.  After some brief 
information on the fundamentals of selected methodology, a chapter will evolve with two 
structurally identical subtopics, respectively reserved for the February 28 and April 27 
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Process. Each of these subtopics will start with a textual analysis. In this part, textual 
characteristics of newspapers’ discourse on basic incidents in these Processes will be 
displayed through their coverage. The February 28 Process is rich in controversial incidents, 
such as the establishment of the Refahyol government, the Susurluk scandal, the Fadime 
Şahin incident and various military briefings, that enable the observation of different textual 
practices. The newspapers’ coverage of the TSK’s memorandum will be the major object of 
analysis with regard to textual practices in the April 27 Process. Also, a discursive practices 
section that contains three subcategories will follow the textual analyses. The discursive 
practice is one of the mediums through which different social practices become possible and, 
therefore, each subcategory will cover a dominant discursive practice, a grand narrative, in 
the newspapers’ coverage during the Processes; Good vs. Bad Muslims, Moderate and 
Creeping Islamization, and Islamic Revolution. Each subcategory, each grand narrative, also 
aims to create a social practice. For example, in the case of the Good vs. Bad Muslim 
discursive practice, the very aim of defining the true version of Islam is to label, define, and 
then repress a false or bad version of Islam. In this section grand narratives, i.e. explanations 
and ideas that are generated for explaining history and for generating generalizations, will 
also be included in the discourse analysis, as they gave some idea of how conservatives are 
made to be associated with international and historical examples of religious reaction.  In the 
light of these textual analyses and discursive practices, the social aspect of discourse will be 
explained in the social practices section. In this part, the contribution of different civil society 
actors to these processes and their discourses will be analyzed through each newspaper’s 
coverage. The results derived from these textual and discursive practices will be identified in 
the hegemonic analysis of the two military intervention processes, with a special focus on the 
activities of other members of the historic hegemonic bloc. 
 
In the closing chapter, I will compare the results of the February 28 and April 27 Process. 
This final comparison will lead me to analyze the retreat of the historic hegemonic center, and 
to the argument that at this point the conservative national popular begins to replace the 
regressing historic hegemonic center. Finally, under the light of this argument, I will propose 
further research questions that will focus on the emerging conservative national popular.  
 
Finally, I should state that some parts of this dissertation were submitted as a part of 





2. Theoretical Framework: Hegemony and Center-Periphery 
2.1. Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony  
 
There is a common tendency to treat great theories as perfect prescriptions which are 
applicable to every condition. However, the greatness of a theory or more generally of an 
intellectual concept, is not its ability to work in every condition, rather its ability to provide an 
intellectual basis for one of the possible specific explanations it pertains to. Furthermore, 
treating intellectual concepts in this fashion saves social scientists from being in a position in 
which quality controllers stigmatize intellectual concepts as good or bad. This in turn will 
assist social scientists, by increasing the number of possible theoretical frameworks which 
can be used for answering specific questions. 
 
Such a treatment of great theories, by using them as not ultimate theories, leads to a decrease 
in the expectation of social scientists from the theory and an increase in the practicality and 
inspiration of the theory. To illustrate, analyzing the Marxist theory by this framework gives 
us the chance of using it for problems of the contemporary world. Originally, Marxist theory 
was a historical model which claimed to explain the world from a historical-economic 
perspective. Blaming Marxist theory as useless as a result of its determinism and failure of its 
foresights is one extreme, the other of which is trying to find class positions that are 
exclusively and exhaustively determined by the economy. However, it is not so difficult to 
find a moderate way to understand and use Marxist theory. Taking into account the conditions 
of the industrial revolution and its practice in England, is key to a moderate application of 
Marxist theory. Taking into consideration the extreme working conditions of the textile 
industry in England such as long work days, no means of work place security, and the non-
existence of any kind of social security regulations can somewhat justify the relative 
extremeness of Marx’s theory. 
  
Throughout the twentieth century, social scientists from different disciplines have understood 
and used Marxist theory. Particular figures tried to eliminate particular shortcomings of the 
theory and also modified certain parts of the theory according to their intellectual positions. 
Among many scholars, Althusser tried to elaborate on the concept of ideology and false 
consciousness, whereas figures like Lukacs and Korch introduced a more super-structural 
Marxist interpretation, and Gramsci is one of the few who tried to break the vicious cycle of 
economic determinism and class reductionism in Marxist theory. 
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As some scholars such as Mouffe and Laclau have mentioned, the Gramscian interpretation of 
Marxism, a philosophy of praxis in his own words, is still problematic in the spheres of 
economics and class reductionism. However, his openings in the sphere of the superstructure 
of the Marxist theory made it possible to use his explanations in various other disciplines of 
social sciences. His key concept of hegemony served as the basic tool for scholars from 
international relations to cultural studies and even from media studies to politics.  
 
Roughly speaking, hegemony is a type of leadership, which is based on securing the consent 
of the subordinated through the intellectual and the moral leadership in the sphere of civil 
society. The conceptualization of hegemony is based on three binaries, namely (1) consent 
and coercion, (2) civil society and political society, and (3) organic and traditional 
intellectuals. Therefore an analysis of these binaries has a leading role in understanding the 
Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony. However, there is a basic methodological 
difficulty in this analysis. These three concepts and hegemony are so intertwined that it is 
nearly impossible to make a particular analysis for one of them without referring to the others. 
For example, it is impossible to talk about organic and traditional intellectuals without 
referring to hegemony, or vice versa. Yet, because I need a starting point to draw my 
theoretical framework, I will start with the analysis of binaries, although such an analysis has 
the potential danger of stabilizing and schematizing the theory. The way I can overcome this 
potential danger is by simply making frequent references to other sets of Gramscian concepts 
in every step of the explanation. 
 
2.1.1. Consent and Coercion 
 
The relationship between the ruler and the ruled has been one of the most discussed issues of 
socail sciences. The questions of why the ruled people accept the domination of a ruler and 
what kinds of dynamics prevented them from rising against domination have been popular 
questions of political sociology. Generally speaking, we can categorize explanations in a 
range of one extreme at which there stands physical domination, to another that is based on 
psychological factors. However, the sphere of domination is a complicated issue and cannot 
be explained in simple terms. Furthermore, there is a common innate acceptance of the fact 
that people should naturally resist or try to resist domination, but they cannot do so as a result 
of the inexistence of certain motivations, conditions and means.  
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Political scientists do not bear in mind that ordinary people do not have as many problems 
with domination as they themselves do. There is a chance that people simply are not 
interested in resistance as a result of their attempts to build their own living, or simply are not 
capable of considering a different type of organization of society.22 That is the point Gramsci 
tried to elucidate with the concept of consent. His question was simple: he observed the 
conditions of both the agrarian population in the south of Italy and also the proletariat of the 
north. As a result of his observations, he concluded that the conditions and standards of 
subaltern people in Italy were so awful that they were on the edge of starting a revolution, as 
Marx suggested. However, during his political activism and prison years, he unfortunately 
observed the rise of the fascist movement with the support of the agrarian and working 
population, which was originally expected to support the revolution according to the 
suggestions of Marx. Unfortunately, the facts were not fitting the theory. It is at this junction 
that Gramsci chose to change or modify his theory instead of manipulating the facts as many 
in his position often do.  
 
There was a consent-based relationship between the ruled and the ruling classes in Gramsci’s 
Italy, and this specific kind of relationship was the real reason for the subaltern people’s 
support of the fascist regime instead of a revolution. Although the fascist regime of Italy used 
coercion as a means of domination from time to time, it was impossible to lead the whole 
nation, which consisted of different and conflicting interest groups, only by coercion. 
However, the two, of course, are related and are parts of a division of labor in the rule of 
society. At this point, before focusing on the relationships and positions of the two in the rule 
of society, it is more practical to elaborate on these concepts. Gramsci defines consent and 
coercion as “the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” which 
consist of  “ the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; that is, consent 
is “historically” caused by prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group 
enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production,” and “the apparatus of 
state coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline on those groups who do not 
“consent” either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of 
society in anticipation of the moments of crisis of commands and direction when spontaneous 
consent has failed.”23 It is very clear from this definition that consent and coercion are two 
sine qua non components of hegemony and political government. The routine is the 
consenting of the subaltern classes to the historically prestigious dominant fundamental group. 
However, the existence of ordinary and mundane consent does not exclude the potential for 
                                                            
22 Strinati, D. (1996). An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture. London and New York: Routledge, p.174. 
23 Gramsci, A. (2005). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart, p.12. 
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coercion or need for coercion, because consent may cease to exist as a result of moments of 
crisis.  
 
One potential and frequent failure in the analysis of relationships of consent and coercion is 
considering them in a linear and hierarchical order in which consent is considered as the next 
step of coercion. In other words, it is the idea of gaining consent as the next and more 
developed tool of domination after having monopoly of coercive power. This kind of 
interpretation of consent and coercion or leading and domination was rejected by Gramsci 
himself. As he mentioned, a dominant group must have the ability to lead before it grasps 
governmental power, and furthermore it must continue to grasp it resolutely during its era of 
domination.24 In Gramsci’s terminology, leading is in the sphere of consent, and domination 
is in the sphere of coercion. Therefore, we can practically convert this sentence to: a dominant 
group must gain consent before it holds the coercive power, and continue to have consent 
after it gains coercive power. Consequently, contrary to what is supposed, coercion and 
consent are not opposites of each other in Gramsci’s conceptualization; rather, coercion is 
imminent to the organization of consent.25 
 
After clarifying the relationship between consent and coercion, we can focus on the necessity 
of consent for a hegemonic relationship. Domination based relationships without the active 
and passive consent of the subaltern groups are subject to collapse. Each social group in some 
way can practice leadership over some others and gain their consent. However, universalizing 
this domination, securing it regardless of time and respondents is only possible with the 
gaining of consent. Local and limited domination is usual and has nothing to do with 
hegemony. As Gramsci wrote, “Although every party is the expression of a social group, and 
of one social group only, nevertheless in certain given conditions certain parties represent a 
single social group precisely in so far as they exercise a balancing and arbitrating between the 
interest of their group and those of other groups, and succeed in securing the development of 
the group which they represent with the consent and assistance of the allied groups-if not out 
and out with that of groups which are definitely hostile.”26 Hegemony is more than simply 
dominating or representing one group. Organization of more than one social group with 
conflicting interests- and their conflicting interests are more than a simple power relationship- 
is only possible with consent. To achieve hegemony, the dominant group should gain the 
consent of its allied subaltern groups even when acting against these groups’ interests. Then 
the question is the possibility of consent and if it is possible, the means of securing consent. It 
                                                            
24 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 57-8. 
25 Ives, P. (2004). Language and Hegemony in Gramsci. London: Pluto, p. 64. 
26 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 148. 
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is possible according to Gramsci and the means of securing consent is something very much 
related to ideological and moral leadership which will be explained in a detailed fashion in 
the following parts. However, for now it is efficacious to mention that: the hegemonic group 
does not intrinsically have consent nor does it demand it from its subalterns. It ‘educates’ its 
subalterns to gain consent.27 
 
What is the effect of consent in the survival of a system? What is the role of consent in a 
hegemonic system? What is the centrality of consent in the establishment of hegemony? 
Answers of these questions are mostly left to the general discussion about hegemony. But it is 
possible to have an idea by looking at some characteristics of a hegemonic system. Gramsci 
presents democracy28 and the ability of becoming a popular religion29 as sine qua non 
conditions of a hegemonic system and these functions of a hegemonic system are only 
possible with consent. In a consent-based hegemonic relationship, the ruled people should be 
in a condition of complete illusion of determining or resisting on their part. Under such 
conditions, it is the very activity of consent which reproduces the hegemonic system even 
when people think that they are resisting the hegemony. It is the activity of consent which 
makes a hegemonic system a popular religion due to the fact that the subaltern groups do not 
even realize that they are living in a sphere of hegemony and are tied to this hegemonic 
sphere by consent. As a result, consent in the Gramscian sense is a continuous process of 
developing consent without being recognized as such, and civil society is the medium of this 
process. 
 
2.1.2. Civil Society and Political Society 
 
The distinction between civil society and political society is another contribution of Gramsci 
to Marxist theory. Up until the time of Gramsci, the characteristics of civil society or the 
functions of civil society had been always attributed to the superstructure. That is why many 
Marxist scholars did not care about civil society as they treated it as a superstructural issue 
which is not more than a reflection of the base structure. In this respect, Gramsci’s quest for 
civil society is totally outside of Marxism. However, there is another way to appreciate the 
place of Gramsci's concept of civil society in Marxist theory. A retrospective search for the 
roots of the concept of civil society leads us to Hegel who had a considerable influence on 
                                                            
27 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 259. 
28 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 56n. 
29 Mouffe, C. (1979). “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,” in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Chantal Mouffe 
(eds.), 168-204. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, p.194. 
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Marx and Marxism. According to Bobbio, the distinction between civil society and political 
society goes back to Hegel, as the definition of civil society was borrowed from Hegel.30 
 
Like the other concepts of Gramsci, it is impossible to understand the distinction between 
civil and political society without referring to hegemony. For now, we can roughly define 
civil society as “the ensemble of organisms commonly called private.”31 This is a definition 
which will be modified later just as Gramsci modified it, but for now we will use it to 
understand the relationship of hegemony with civil society. By using this concept, Gramsci 
opened space for culture and ideology, which were cramped for space in the classical 
Marxism’s category of superstructure. Therefore, popular culture and the mass media, which 
is its main medium in modern societies, can be read and appreciated in the hegemonic sphere 
of civil society.32  
 
However, Gramsci did not totally deny the function of civil society as a superstructural 
element. Furthermore, he talks about the superstructures of civil society; that is, the elements 
of civil society such as cultural institutions and intellectuals. As he stated; “the 
superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare.”33 Cultural 
institutions and intellectuals play the role of the trench system in a crisis of capitalism as the 
outer defense perimeter of the military collapses first in an attack. In times of crisis, civil 
society will play the same role, as it will try to defend the whole hegemonic system. If it is 
not powerful enough to defend whole hegemonic system, the system would sacrifice civil 
society institutions, like the sacrifice of the outer perimeters of an army in an enemy attack. 
 
As Gramsci defined civil society as private, it is also a matter of personal behaviour, 
preferences and norms because it is a matter of organized cultural institutions.34 Then, as 
much as regulated institutions of civil society strike root inside the segments of a society, 
hegemonic power is personalized and internalized. Therefore, certain functions of state power 
are transferred to civil society and the people who are subject to it internalize these functions. 
This internalization prepares the way for the production of consent. The dual layers in civil 
society, i.e. private layer and institutions, have a direct relationship. On the one hand there are 
constraints and freedom as structure and superstructure respectively, and on the other hand 
there are force and consent produced by institutions and ideologies respectively.35 Individuals 
                                                            
30 Bobbio, N. (1979). “Gramsci and Conception of Civil Society,” in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Chantal 
Mouffe (eds.), 21-47. London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, p.30. 
31 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 12. 
32 Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.169.  
33 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 235. 
34 Jones, S. (2006). Antonio Gramsci. London& New York: Routledge, p.32. 
35 Bobbio, N. Gramsci and Conception of Civil Society, p.36. 
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in the sphere of civil society seem to make choices freely, but this freedom is a 
superstructural matter. In the base structure, either force of institutions or consent of subjects 
guarantees their “right” choices. This is the very operation of hegemony, which appears to be 
democratic, but actually is not. Consequently, the productive character of capitalism is also 
seen in the sphere of civil society. The “ethico-political dimension” of the mode of production 
is stressed by the term civil society whereas economical, political and ideological dimensions 
are stressed in classical Marxism.36 The fourth dimension of the mode of production is 
something found in western countries according to Gramsci. In these countries, civil society 
is much more developed than it is in the eastern ones and that is why a revolution became 
possible in Russia where civil society was not developed. Therefore, the revolutionary groups 
in western countries should bear in mind that there are developed civil society structures and 
also superstructures in their countries and that thus they should adopt specific strategies, 
which will also include the organization of civil society besides political society and the state.  
 
The organization of political society is something different from civil society. Political 
society is more tied to the state and there is an organic relationship between the two of them. 
From time to time Gramsci also uses political society as a synonym for the state apparatus. 
Furthermore, political society can be defined as a sphere in which the state uses the legal 
apparatus to discipline those who are undisciplined and are not developing consent. 
Regardless of the reason for the inexistence of consent, either as a result of a crisis of 
capitalism or a normative situation, the coercive capacity of the hegemonic group operates 
through political society to rebuild consent.  
 
Gramsci’s interpretation of the state has a key role in understanding the distinction between 
civil and political society. The definition of state for Gramsci is not static, even if it is 
possible to find different definitions of state. Therefore, this shift in the conception of state 
also changes the meaning of the distinction between political society and civil society. 
However, it is still possible to assemble different definitions and form a specific one for 
specific purposes as Gramsci did. For example, it is possible to derive extended and restricted 
notions of the state from Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks. The extended notion of state is fused 
with both civil and political society. In this notion of state, it is possible to observe the 
reciprocal and synchronous existence of the political and civil society. On the other hand, the 
restricted notion of state consists of the administrative and governmental apparatus of the 
state and it is more closely linked to political society. Gramsci did not directly define these 
                                                            




different notions, but he talked about the state differently in different cases. It is the extended 
notion of state when talking about the success of Jacobins in forming a national popular, 
whereas it is the restricted notion of state when talking about the formation of the Italian 
nation-state. 
 
Although distinction of civil and political society exists in the restricted notion of state, civil 
and political society are intertwined in most cases. Gramsci himself mentioned this as he 
made the distinction not organically but methodologically.37 Gramsci used civil society to 
point out the relation between the state, in the restricted notion, and civil society. Thus, he 
underlined the dependency of civil society on the state. That's why, in some cases, he defined 
the state as only a political society, whereas in others as a combination of civil and political 
society. Consequently, civil society in Gramsci is more than a simple matter of 
superstructure; it’s a superstructural reality. The distinction between political society and civil 
society is also superstructural. Political society and civil society are different superstructural 
reflections of the base structural hegemonic state. Intellectuals play a major role in hiding the 
base structural hegemonic reality and presenting it as political society and civil society. 
 
 
2.1.3. Organic and Traditional Intellectuals 
 
The question of intellectual and moral leadership always goes hand in hand with the question 
of ideology. In classical Marxism, the question of ideology is considered within the limits of 
superstructure. However, Gramsci gave more attention to ideology as he moved the question 
to a different sphere, and focused on the role of ideology in the securing of hegemony. Thus, 
intellectuals emerged as a chief category in the analysis of ideology.   
 
Before elaborating on intellectual and moral leadership, it is essential to define the concept of 
intellectuals in accordance with the wider usage of the concept in Gramscian terminology. 
Gramsci did not define intellectuals according to some intellectual and mental characteristics, 
rather he claimed that these mental characteristics, which are supposed to be the ones that 
intellectuals possess, are the general characteristics of all human beings and the question of 
being an intellectual or not is something which has more to do with functions. As he wrote, 
“All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the 
functions of intellectuals” and he explains this sentence with a footnote; “Thus, because it can 
happen that everyone at some time fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in jacket, we do 
                                                            
37 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 160. 
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not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or tailor.”38 The act of thinking or reaching some 
analytic conclusions are some general characteristics of humankind but only the systematic 
usage of these characteristics in a professional way with specific purposes is the function of 
intellectuals. The question of which kind of functions should be considered as intellectual 
functions depends on the conjuncture in a specific society.39 For example, a trade unionist can 
be considered as an intellectual for industrialism, a university scholar would be the ideal 
model of an intellectual for positivism and an adman for consumerism. Therefore, the 
definition of being an intellectual changes according to the needs of the society at that time 
and what is needed for the ensuring of hegemony. The category of professionals who meet the 
needs of a hegemonic system in a specific period is called intellectuals.  
 
The definition of intellectuals according to their functions is bidirectional. As Gramsci 
mentioned both the hegemony of the leading groups and the hegemony of the proletariat, he 
mentioned the intellectuals of the leading class and the intellectuals of the subaltern classes as 
well. This distinction is named as traditional and organic intellectuals. Traditional 
intellectuals are those who work for the continuation of the leading class hegemony whereas 
organic intellectuals work for the working class hegemony. However, these categories are not 
essential and sui generis. Just as the matter of being an intellectual is determined according to 
intellectual functions, the matter of being an organic or traditional intellectual depends on 
functions. That is, originating from the working class does not necessarily mean being an 
organic intellectual. A group of working class based intellectuals can be traditional if they 
support the hegemony of the leading class explicitly or implicitly. The best example of this 
category is trade unionists. They come from a working class origin, however in time they 
evolve into a category of working class elites and they work for the continuation of industrial 
production, not for the working class hegemony.  
 
Gramsci explains the shift from organic intellectuals to traditional ones by the general 
formation of a category of intellectuals. He pointed out that different social classes have 
different intellectuals, but historically the leading class intellectuals absorb the intellectuals of 
other groups and form the category of intellectuals.40 Therefore, we can talk about a specific 
solidarity of intellectuals which crosscuts the class solidarity of the subaltern classes.  
 
Traditional intellectuals, as functionaries of the leading classes, present themselves as if they 
are not attached to the leading classes. By doing so, they present the interests and truths of the 
                                                            
38 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 9n. 
39 Jones, S. Antonio Gramsci, p.82. 
40 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 60. 
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leading classes as if they are objective truths and common interests. This is the continuation 
and legitimization of the status quo.41 The manipulation of truths and interests has a key role 
in the assuring of hegemony, as Gramsci pays immense attention to the spontaneous character 
of hegemony. This misrepresentation is also the case for journalists. They also claim that they 
are true intellectuals and work for the objective truth and common interests of the society.42 
The production of truth and discourse is very central in the functioning of hegemony as it 
makes it more and more difficult for the subaltern groups to produce their language. Ives 
mentions that there is a huge gap between the thoughts and actions of subaltern groups which 
is the result of their inability to produce their own language and he writes; 
 
 “[…]there are discrepancies between the thoughts and actions of people in 
subaltern social groups- people who accept the hegemony of a ruling class that 
have very different interests from their own. Other Marxists understand 
ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ or deception based on ignorance, lack of 
fortitude and intellect. Gramsci suggests that this may explain why individuals 
hold views that are at odds with their own experiences and lives, but it cannot 
explain why whole groups of people adopt such positions.”43 
 
Gramsci fills this gap in the explanation of the role of ideology through its link to popular 
culture and media. Furthermore, the concept of civil society has a central importance in the 
connection between ideology and popular culture. In the Gramscian explanation, ideology is 
not simply false consciousness; rather it is an effect of culture that prevails in civil society by 
the help of intellectuals. Considering the contemporary conditions in the world, the popular 
culture is identical with the popular media culture. It is produced, distributed and rendered 
prevalent in the sphere of media. Therefore, producers, distributors and interpreters of the 
popular media culture are the intellectuals of modern capitalism.44 
 
The role of media in ideological and moral leadership is not only limited to the securing of 
the leading class hegemony over the subaltern classes, but also it makes compromises to 
consolidate the alliance of the leading classes. It is possible to talk about an organic 
relationship between the media elite and corporate and political elites.45 Hegemony of the 
leading classes is only possible by the creation of a higher synthesis and collective will firstly 
in the leading alliance and secondly among the subaltern classes. The creation of a higher 
                                                            
41 Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77. 
42 Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77. 
43 Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.78. 
44 Strinati, D. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, p.171. 
45 Gitlin, T. (1980). The Whole World is Watching. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.254. 
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synthesis and collective will serve as the cement that will hold the society together. “This is 
key to the indissoluble unity of the two aspects of Gramscian hegemony, since the formation 
of the collective will and the exercise of political leadership depends on the very existence of 
intellectual and moral leadership.”46 As mentioned earlier, the subaltern classes are unable to 
generate their own language and terminology. As a consequence of the absence of their own 
terminology and language, the subaltern classes interpret the world in harmony with the 
language and terminology of the leading classes. Obviously, this harmony between language 
and an interpretation of the world does not occur in a single day, but it changes conceptions of 
the world through the consistent efforts of the intellectual and moral leadership and this 




In a broader sense the Gramscian theory can be defined as a social theory of power and 
control, and these two concepts are good starting points for an elaboration on hegemony. 
Hegemony corresponds to a particular form of social control which depends on the creation of 
consent. Generally speaking, it is possible to talk about two basic forms of social control and 
conformity; (1) external control, which is based on rewards and punishment and (2) internal 
social control, which is based on “moulding personal convictions into a replica of prevailing 
norms.”47 Hegemonic social control is beyond external control. However, this does not mean 
that it is a typical example of internal control. On the contrary, the interrelatedness of consent 
(internal) and coercion (external), and the cumulative character of hegemony is the trademark 
of the Gramscian theory. To summarize, by hegemony, Gramsci refers to a type of control, 
which does not exclude coercion and\or possibility of using coercion at some points during 
the realization process of hegemony. Moreover, at the same time, hegemony is beyond the 
level of coercion because it now depends on consent which automatically makes coercion 
unnecessary – what it makes unnecessary is the use of coercive power, not the potential for 
using coercive power. A Turkish saying used for defining the state affairs is very explanatory 
for the relationship of hegemony and coercion; “it is to have the power to fulfill the threat of 
being in power.” 
 
Secondly, internal control has also some differentiations due to the source of it. Femia groups 
these sources into three as (1) “fear of consequences of non-conformity”, (2) unavailability of 
non-conformity or non-confirmative behavior, and (3) “conscious attachment to, or agreement 
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with, certain core elements of society.”48 According to Femia, the third type of conformity 
can be classified as hegemony. However, at this point, besides the underlying concept that 
hegemony is again beyond the first two types of conformity, it is not exclusive to them. In 
addition to containing the capacity of coercion and active usage of it in earlier stages, 
hegemony also includes the first two types of conformity. Differentiation from external 
control and the first two categories of internal control while covering them might be seen as a 
bit ambiguous. However, checking this relationship from the opposite direction will make it 
clearer. For example, in a society a social group (A) has hegemonic power and control over a 
group (B). If A’s hegemonic power over B is internal and conscious, is it possible to think 
any other power group, (C), has any kind of eternal or fear based control over B? If yes, will 
it not confront A’s hegemonic position? This is the very reason why Femia’s categorization of 
hegemonic power as internal and conscious is true but simply not enough. Hegemonic power 
is internal and conscious in the working sphere. However, it is also external and coercive in 
the potential sphere.        
 
For a power relationship to be hegemonic, the subaltern groups should regard the interests of 
the hegemonic group as their own and should work for the realization of such interests 
consciously and naturally. Such a commitment and conformity –a commitment unconscious 
of being committed, a conformity unconscious of being conformed- requires a higher level of 
common sense and collective will. Common sense is very important for the internalization 
and adoption of hegemony, as Gramsci wrote;  
 
“Every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’ and its own ‘good sense’, 
which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every 
philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: this 
is the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not 
something rigid and immobile, but it is continually transforming itself, 
enriching itself with specific ideas and with philosophical opinions which 
have entered ordinary life. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore of philosophy, and 
is always half way between folklore properly speaking and philosophy, 
science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the folklore 
of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a 
given place and time.”49   
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In this definition, there are some crucial points which can give a more complete idea of 
hegemony. First of all, there is the “conception of life and of man”. The layer at which 
hegemony works is so central and deep that it starts with the shaping of our conception of life 
and man. It is not simply politics, economics, culture and taste; on the contrary, it is the 
conception of life. The second crucial point is its dynamic character. It is always in a state of 
movement and change in order to fulfill different needs and gaps.  
 
Intellectual input is one of the key elements in the process of change and movement. Different 
social groups can have different ideals about common sense in a society. Theoretically, all of 
these have the potential of being a hegemonic one. However, the one which is supported with 
intellectual input can be successful in change and mobilization, therefore that one will be the 
hegemonic common sense. Gramsci named this process as “renewed common sense” and 
defined it as a “[…] matter […] of starting with a philosophy which already enjoys, or could 
enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to and implicit in practical life, and 
elaborating it so that it becomes a renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the 
sinew of individual philosophies.”50 Therefore intellectuals directly affect conceptions of the 
world and man. Masses have some ideas -common sense- about the world and man. Then 
these ideas are shaped by intellectuals and become renewed common sense as Gramsci claims 
that common sense is somewhere between folklore and science, that is, it is formed by both 
the masses and intellectuals. The common worldview will evolve into a collective will and 
the collective will will work as a merging code of the society and create a collective man 
from ordinary people.51  
 
The transformation process from national popular to hegemony is very useful in 
understanding hegemony itself. The point of existence of the two distinct categories as 
national popular and hegemony is illustrative in understanding the scope of hegemony. In the 
Gramscian sense, the national popular is related to culture and it corresponds to the existing 
cultural norms and practices of society. Accordingly, transformation from national popular to 
hegemony stands for a linkage between the existing cultural values of society and the 
hegemonic project of the leading group. This link is vital because denying the existing culture 
or trying to substitute it with an entirely new one would bring on a gap between the cultural 
norms of the society and the leading group.52 Likewise, this gap can cause a crisis which 
means an opportunity structure for the formation of another hegemonic group. From this 
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aspect, the national popular is strategically similar to the external means of control and lower 
levels of internal control, because it is a potential and exclusive domain of hegemony. 
 
The leading group manipulates this exclusive domain and tries to create a higher synthesis for 
the realization of hegemony. The tool for manipulation in the exclusive domain is intellectual 
and moral leadership, and intellectual and moral leadership of the national popular will 
advance to ideological unity and serve as the cement of the society.53 Therefore, hegemony in 
the Gramscian sense is not only the state power, but also the manipulation of how people 
understand the world and everyday life. For example, a specific kind of language usage or a 
relationship of meaning can be a precursor of the internalization of hegemony. Therefore, this 
thesis regards newspapers’ discourse on Muslims as a specific kind of language and will 
elaborate on how that specific kind of language become effective in internalization of 
hegemony during the February 28 and April 27 Processes. 
 
The exclusive character of hegemonic domain gains more centrality as the society becomes 
more capitalist and modern. To understand this relationship, one should consider different 
types of hegemony. According to Femia’s classification,54 it is possible to talk about three 
types of hegemony; (1) integral, (2) decadent, and (3) minimal. In an integral hegemony, the 
mass commitment to the hegemonic system would be absolute and unconditional. This kind 
of hegemony is only possible during extraordinary periods of societies, especially post-
revolutionary periods such as Gramsci’s typical example, post-revolutionary France. 
Secondly, decadent hegemony is a form that can be seen when the ideological consensus of a 
post-revolutionary period begins to break. There opens up a gap between the masses and the 
leading classes and therefore expansive ideological and political consensus becomes delicate. 
Finally, minimal hegemony is based on broader ruling classes. Ideological consensus between 
the leading and subaltern groups declines further, and as a result, the leading classes 
incorporate the elites of the subaltern classes. As a consequence, the ruling class expands. The 
minimal hegemony is still hegemonic in the Gramscian sense because it still preserves the 
exclusive domain of hegemony as it does not let any other group become hegemonic in any 
sense. 
 
After elaborating on the key role of the exclusive character of the hegemonic domain, 
studying how hegemony derived from the exclusive domain is another question, whose 
answer opens ground for a better understanding of hegemony. At this point, the relationship 
between civil society and hegemony is explanatory, especially in talking about a modern 
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capitalist society, where media and popular culture come into prominence among the other 
institutions of civil society. As people confirm the ideas of the leading classes neither because 
of physical or mental coercion, nor ideological indoctrination, but because of adopting them 
as ideas of their own,55 the leading group needs some tools to secure the adoption. As 
mentioned before, in modern capitalist societies, these tools are the media and the popular 
culture. As a result, the media and the popular culture are used for deriving hegemony from 
collective will and the national popular. This process can also be named as the securing of 
hegemony. As Jones wrote, “Gramsci argues that culture, politics and the economy are 
organized in a relationship of mutual exchange with one another, constantly circulating and 
shifting networks of influence. To this process he gives the name hegemony [...]”56 the 
“mutual exchange” and “constantly circulating and shifting networks of influence” secure 
hegemony and derive it from collective will and the national popular. By the help of these 
two, the masses adopt ideas of the leading group as the ideas of their own. 
 
Until now I have commented on the formation of hegemony and how the subaltern groups 
adopt the ideas of the leading group. However, formation of a leading group is also a crucial 
process. First of all, a leading group is not a homogeneous group. As Gramsci described it, 
the “historic bloc” is formed of several allied groups under the leadership of a fundamental 
one. The term “historic” designates the formation of the group and of the shared ideological 
positions and interests over time. 
  
Then, how can different interest groups make coalitions for a hegemonic position? The 
answer is simple and easy, but the practice is difficult and that is why it needs some historical 
articulation to form such a group. According to Gramsci, every class has its own political 
party and the different political parties will follow the interests of the specific class they 
belong to.57 There is a political division of labor between different political parties and they 
separate at the point of interests, but if they require each other – as Gramsci claims they do- 
they will unite when vital and major issues are in question.58 According to the explanation, 
the moments when vital and major issues are in question are not only the test moments of a 
historic bloc; rather they are the moments of its formation. This is the reason why Gramsci 
uses the adjective “historic.” In theory many classes vie for becoming a part of the bloc. 
However, by different test moments through history only the ones that were capable of being 
involved in hegemonic articulation become the members of the historic bloc. Hegemonic 
articulation is more than “united economic and political objectives” but it is also “intellectual 
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and moral unity.”59 The traditional intellectuals who are also a part of the historic bloc will 
propagate the intellectual and moral unity.  
 
However, the historic bloc is also subject to disentanglement, as there will always be a 
tendency of conflict between the specific interests of each of the allied classes and the major 
dominating class. When it comes to the last analysis, the bourgeoisie will follow its own 
interests and “come up against the limitations of its own hegemony.”60 In such a conflict of 
interests, the allied group will not totally follow the interests and directives of the bourgeoisie, 
that is, they will not endanger their basic interests. Moments of this kind are the crisis of 
hegemony and “then ‘spontaneity’ may be replaced by ‘constraint’ in ever less disguised and 
indirect forms, culminating in outright police measures and coups d’état.”61       
 
Gramscian concepts and analyses fit the political history of Turkey, especially concerning 
political discussions around secularism and Islam. Furthermore, the historic bloc can 
additionally be used as a framework for locating the Kemalists. On the other hand, 
conservatives that continue their opposition to the historic bloc and its modernization project 
can be considered as subaltern classes, and in turn this entire struggle between them becomes 
one of hegemony. However, an additional theoretical-historical tool is required to fit the 
February 28 and April 27 processes into Gramsci’s hegemonic analysis; Mardin’s center-
periphery analysis offers just such a tool.  
 
 
2.2. Mardin’s Center-Periphery Analysis 
 
Next to hegemony center-periphery analysis is a very helpful tool for the historical analysis of 
February 28 and April 27 Processes. Center-periphery relations have been frequently used for 
understanding the political and economical relations of societies. There is a vast amount of 
literature on center-periphery relations that consists of both theoretical and empirical 
approaches. For the theoretical literature, scholars like Frank and Gills,62 and Wallerstein63 
can be named as the three most leading figures. Their approaches, which consist primarily of 
a focus on explaining capitalist relations, are rather abstract and theoretical. In addition to 
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these theoretical accounts, it is also possible to come across some very outstanding case and 
empirical studies.  
 
Mardin’s analysis of the center- periphery relations in Turkish modernization64 is one of these 
outstanding empirical studies. In his key article, Mardin starts his analysis with the classical 
period of the Ottoman Empire and stretches it until the 1960’s. Furthermore, at the conclusion 
of the article he suggests that the newly emerging social strata, such as the urban proletariat, 
can change the momentum in the center-periphery relations. Due to the attractive and 
outstanding character of Mardin’s analysis, major scholars who concentrate on the Ottoman 
History and Turkish Modernization have focused on the issue and have published articles 
about the subject. Furthermore, it has been one of the frequently cited scholarly works of the 
discipline.  
 
Beyond its popularity, the empirical and theoretical perspectives drawn by Mardin are still 
valid today as Turkish politics still follow the same patterns of center- periphery cleavage. It 
offers some insights into the major issues of Turkish politics such as secularism, the Kurdish 
question and the process of accession to the European Union. As will be elaborated in the 
coming chapters, the center-periphery cleavage also played a crucial role in the February 28 
and April 27 Processes.  
 
In my analysis about the center-periphery relations, I firstly focus on the major claims of 
Mardin and his way of theorizing the question. Then, in the second part, I try to take the 
picture of parallelism and continuity between the Young Turks and Kemalists from the aspect 
of their approach to the periphery. Finally, I offer an argument about the major patterns of the 
center-periphery relations today. The distinction and categorization which I follow in this 
chapter also embraces a historical periodization. Mardin’s article starts with the classical 
system of the Ottoman Empire, and then goes on with the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
reform movements in the Ottoman Empire, and in the republican period. In the parts about the 
republican period he also writes on the position of the DP in center- periphery cleavage. 
Therefore, in order to avoid losing sight of historical periodization, Mardin’s main arguments 
should be the starting point of the analysis.  
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2.2.1. Main Arguments of Mardin 
 
Mardin focuses on the cumulative effect of different facts when he argues about the existence 
of a center-periphery cleavage. Moreover, instead of defining the cleavage in a specific 
historical setting, he rather mentions processes and phenomena. As a result, he does not focus 
on the Ottoman period or the Republican era specifically; rather, he prefers to elaborate on the 
concept of “centralization that created the modern state.”65 According to his formulation, the 
reform period in the Ottoman Empire resulted in various confrontations with the forces of the 
periphery which consisted of the feudal nobility, the population of the peripheral cities, 
burghers and later industrial labor.66 However, at this very starting point, there are some 
counter-arguments to those of Mardin. According to Heper, these distinct classes did not exist 
in the Ottoman society.67 Heper’s argument makes sense to some extent, yet as mentioned 
before, Mardin does not mean the existence of these classes in a specific time in Ottoman 
society. Rather, he claims that some confrontation points occurred between these segments of 
the society as a result of the overall centralization process of Turkey. Considering the title of 
the article “Center-periphery Relations: A Key to the Turkish Politics?”, he does not want to 
argue for the existence of such class distinctions in the Ottoman society, rather he wants to 
use these patterns as a key in interpreting Turkish politics.  
 
The nomadic character of the people of Anatolia has been another sphere of the center-
periphery confrontation. Rather than active resistance of the nomads- if there still existed in 
the republican period- the nomadic character of the Anatolian population and the symbolic 
inheritance of nomadism served as a means of confrontation.  Considering the center-
periphery relations “[...] the clash between nomads and urban dwellers generated the Ottoman 
cultivated man’s stereotype that civilization was a contest between urbanization and 
nomadism, and that all things nomadic were only deserving of contempt.”68 
 
The same symbolic inheritance exists in the case of the pre-Ottoman nobility and the 
powerful families in the Ottoman periphery. The peripheral rebellions from those that 
contested the throne to the ones based on religious heterodoxy69 created the same impact of 
contempt for the periphery and were regarded with a suspicious look.70 Indeed, from the 
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nineteenth century onwards the nobility in the Ottoman periphery caused many problems to 
Ottoman modernization besides the symbolic heritage of the settlement of the nomadic 
population in the earlier times of the empire. The long lasting warfare and some 
administrative reforms of the seventeenth century created a more powerful nobility in the 
Ottoman periphery, for the long lasting warfare in the seventeenth century required more 
military power and the need of military power was fulfilled by the forces provided by 
nobility.71 Furthermore, these military forces derived from local notables did not disband like 
the centralized army and served as a means of power for the local nobility.72 Apart from the 
military power, the administrative reforms of the seventeenth century also helped the nobility 
to gain power. Expanding tax farming and the mütesellim73 system provided the nobility with 
extraordinary privileges such as selecting some officials in the far cities of the empire.74  
 
In addition to these points, which stimulated the center’s mistrust of the periphery, Mardin 
also talks about the characteristic differences of the periphery and officials as representatives 
of the center. From these differences, one of the most distinguishing ones was the non-
Muslim background of state officials. As many state officials were raised by the devşirme 
system,75 they were very loosely tied to the rest of the society and raised to be the subjects, 
kuls, of the Sultan and the ultimate protectors of state interests.76 This system of raising state 
officials resulted in a detachment both socially and religiously. On the one hand as they were 
raised to be state officials and their primary concern was the interests of the state, they were 
never sensitive to the problems of the periphery. On the other hand, their non-Muslim 
background also detached them from the Muslim population. Furthermore, as state officials 
they were exempt from taxation. Therefore, they did not face the repressive apparatus of the 
state in the economic sphere which was more powerful than ever in the eighteenth century.77 
Also, the increasing amount of contraband trade in the second half of the eighteenth century 
and first half of the nineteenth century due to the increasing prices in Europe opposed 
officials to local merchants.78 Besides its economic advantages, exemption from the taxes 
underlined the fact that operators and representatives of the state power were the most 
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privileged citizens of the state.79 Finally, the cultural and status differences had a great impact 
on the loose ties of the state officials and the populace. Mardin claims that in earlier times, 
successful cultures such as the Iranian culture influenced state officials both by its urban 
character and its “myth of the majesty of Sultan” which was only accessible to the state 
officials.80 Later on, the educational differences served as another cultural point of separation 
between the officials and the periphery. As the reform movement in the Ottoman state system 
proceeded, modern schools were established for the sake of educating the state officials 
whom the Ottoman state needed for its own safety and preservation. On the one hand this new 
type of education underlined the superiority of officials among other citizens as the operators 
of state authority and, on the other hand, it emphasized the religious and ideological 
differences between the officials and the populace. The aim of new educational institutions 
was to raise new bureaucratic elites of the French type who were well trained, knowledgeable 
and privileged the interests of the state as opposed to those of the periphery.81 While the 
opinions of officials were shaped by the interests of the state and “positive science”, and they 
had the adequate means – state power – for expressing their opinions, the public opinion 
mostly shaped and reflected by traditional imams and preachers for whom the positivist 
ideology of the newly emerging type of state officials was totally unacceptable.82 
 
Mardin pays great attention to the Ottoman reform movements of the nineteenth century and 
the early twentieth century. As he asserts, reform movements of the period aimed to form a 
nation-state and for this purpose, they concentrated on (1) the integration of the non-Muslim 
groups, (2) the integration of the heterogeneous Muslim groups into the nation, and finally (3) 
the unification of the disconnected elements in the present political system.83 However, for 
the Young Turks, the efforts to form a unified nation did not have the expected results. As 
Mardin wrote “their ineptitude and incipient nationalism combined to undermine what 
support they might have gathered for their regime. Lack of integration, demands for 
decentralized administration, as well as provincial opposition to what were considered the 
secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main theme of their years in power and appear within, 
as well as outside, Anatolia.”84 
 
Mardin claims that as a result of political representation gained after 1908 and the economic 
conditions mentioned before, the peripheral nobility gained ground. However, there are some 
different interpretations about the gaining ground of nobility. While Mardin talks about the 
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demands of the decentralization of administration, Heper claims that the demands of the 
nobility never became effective enough to make a change in the policies of the center, and the 
argument about the political power of the nobility through commissions and agreements such 
as Document of Agreement, Sened-i İttifak,85  is not valid as they never resulted in a 
distribution of power between the state and the nobility.86 Heper’s claims make sense to some 
extent but the main argument of Mardin is not the nobility gaining power, but their demand 
for power and the existence of a cleavage in the political sphere. Although it is not a 
constitutional document, The Document of Agreement should not be disregarded “because 
the document is really a pact between the ruler and his barons […] As such it constitutes a 
high-water mark of the influence of the ayan87 in the empire, who were recognized officially 
as partners in government. The sultan himself did not sign the document, but he did allow his 
imperial monogram (tuğra) to be put on it”.88         
 
As the centralization problem was transferred to the republican era, the center-periphery 
conflict was also carried over. The intensity of the cleavage increased as a result of the 
Republic’s uncompromising demands of centralization and nationalization. The leading sign 
of the center-periphery cleavage in the first years of the Kemalist regime was the formation of 
the second group in the First Grand National Assembly. The main unifying point of the 
second group was its opposition to the first group, namely the Kemalists. The second group 
mainly consisted of any kind of local notables, from merchants to the men of religion, and the 
group was led by the alienated officials.89 The opposition of the second group was also 
diverse from decentralist ideas to the Islamist one like the diversity of group membership. 
The second group’s proposed policies in the Grand National Assembly are very useful in 
understanding the reflection of the center-periphery cleavage in the assembly. They proposed 
some policies such as the decentralization of the administration, military affairs, religious 
affairs and political policies regarding representation.90  However, they could not be effective, 
as Mustafa Kemal dissolved the assembly when he felt that it was getting out of control. In 
the constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire, bureaucrats supported the assembly because 
it meant a medium of opposition to the Sultan’s monopoly on legitimacy, however later the 
Kemalists -former bureaucrats and officers of the empire- dissolved it and formed it in a new 
composition to exclude the second group. 
 
                                                            
85 A treaty between grand vezir of Ottoman Empire and distinguished local notables of Anatolia amd Thrace. The 
treaty signed in 1808 regulated the relations of central and local authority.  
86 Heper, M. Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi, p.18-25. 
87 Ayans were local notables of the empire. 
88 Zürcher, E.J. Turkey: A Modern History, p.28.   
89 Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 181. 
90 Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 181. 
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Besides the second group in the first assembly, the rebellions in the Anatolia were the other 
case offering insights about the scope of the center-periphery cleavage and the center’s 
interpretation of the periphery. The Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 and the Menemen incident 
in 1930 aroused what Mardin calls Patrona Syndrome, that is, the fear of a blocking of the 
westernizing reforms of the military and administration by the so-called backward and 
ignorant masses.91 This syndrome was carried to the republican era by the Sheikh Said 
rebellion and the Menemen incident. Consequently, peasants were always regarded as 
backward by the Republican elites. The political culture of the republic was elitist, exclusive 
to the different parts of the society and regarded them as enemies; it stressed of the monopoly 
of the state on physical power.92 
 
The case of the DP offers many insights into understanding the Kemalists’ interpretation of 
the peripheral opposition. According to Mardin, the DP very well represented the traditional 
Ottoman state image of justice and abundance and it, “promised it would bring services to the 
peasants, take his daily problems as a legitimate concern of politics, debureaucratize Turkey, 
and liberalize religious practices.”93 The new discourse of the DP changed the legitimacy of 
statehood and introduced welfare, equality, rights and freedom94 instead of self-fulfilling 
ideologies of westernization and modernization of the Kemalists. These new paradigms in 
Turkish politics shifted the source of legitimacy from the westernization ideology to the 
masses, and therefore implicitly and explicitly told the masses that they are not inferior 
compared to the Kemalist elites of the Republic. As Mardin wrote, “there were now good 
reasons to claim that the RPP [Republican People’s Party] represented the “bureaucratic” 
center, whereas the DP represented the “democratic” periphery.”95 However, this was too 
much and it went too far for the Kemalist bureaucracy and therefore the DP rule was ended 
by a military intervention. The claim that policies of the DP encouraged the reaction has been 
one of the leading legitimizing claims of the military intervention against the DP in 1960. 
Although there are some existential differences between them, and the historical conditions 
which made them possible are different, drawing a parallelism between the discourses of the 
DP, RP, and recently AKP is possible. The commonality of the counter discourse against all 
three of them as supporting reaction can support Mardin’s thesis about the center-periphery 
cleavage, as well as the utilization of religion in expressing the claims of the periphery and 
the utilization of the discourse of reaction in suppressing the demands of the periphery.        
                                                            
91 Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 175. 
92 Heper, M. Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi, p.4. 
93 Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 184. 
94 Karpat, K. (1975). “The Politics of Transition: Political Attitudes and Party Affiliation in the Turkish 
Shantytowns,” in Political Participation in Turkey, Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), 33-61. İstanbul: 
Boğaziçi University Press, p.75. 
95 Mardin, Ş. Center Periphery Relations, p. 186. 
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Before concluding Mardin’s analysis of the center-periphery relations, it is necessary to 
mention an ambiguous point in the role of religion in the analysis. As mentioned before, 
Mardin treats religion as one of the major spheres in which the cleavage between the center 
and the periphery emerged. However, Mardin does not elaborate on what he means by 
religion in a detailed way. He mentions the religious heterodoxy in a few places in the article 
but does not explain the fact of how the orthodox religious character of the DP and heterodox 
character of Alevi belief can be explained within the limits of the same concept. However, the 
lack of differentiation between the two, if not more, types of religiosity should not be 
interpreted as a shortcoming in Mardin’s conceptualization of religion in the center-periphery 
cleavage. Mardin is very accurate in identifying religion as the most problematic issue 
between the periphery and the center. The shortcoming in the theory was not in the 
conceptualization of religion but in the conceptualization of the center. Mardin treats the 
center and the state as constant and concrete categories. However, the state is not so constant 
and concrete while following its interests. On the one hand, it can be secular against the Sunni 
religious periphery like in the cases Mardin mentions, but on the other hand, it can be Sunni 
against the peripheral Alevi community. The same flexibility is also valid for the periphery as 
it can be secular and Kemalist as in the case of Alevis against the Sunni majority. At that 
point Gramsci’s ideas about the formation of the historic bloc in moments of crisis, as well as 
the comprehensive capacity of the historic bloc, become helpful cures to the shortcomings of 
Mardin’s constant and concrete definitions of center.  
 
In conclusion, Mardin offers the center-periphery cleavage as an efficacious tool in the 
analysis of Turkish politics. While offering the center-periphery cleavage, he historically 
analyses the classical Ottoman Period, reform movements of the late Ottoman period and the 
Republican period under the rule of the CHP and DP. Excluding the different character of the 
center-periphery relations in the classical Ottoman period, he mentions a continuation 
between the reformers of the late Ottoman and Republican elites. As centralization, 
nationalization and secularization are the key common aspects of the elite character in Turkey 
from late Ottoman Period until today, he introduces religion as the major medium of 
confrontation between the center and the periphery. Although the one-sided approach to 
religion contains some shortcomings in the broader analysis of the politics in Turkey, the 
general model drawn by Mardin can still be used within the scope of this study. In other 
words Mardin only refers to the religious orthodoxy when he indicates religion as a ground 
for the center-periphery cleavage. Although there is also a cleavage between the peripheral 
heterodoxy and the relatively orthodox center like in the case of Alevis, my study by 
definition does not cover this kind of cleavage. Therefore, the mentioned shortcomings do not 
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constitute an obstacle for applying Mardin’s model to my research. In the next parts of this 
chapter, I will continue to focus on the center- periphery cleavage in Turkish politics. I will 
focus on the continuity in the Young Turks’ and Kemalists’ interpretation of culture and 
religiosity of the periphery.   
 
2.2.2 Populace: The Chief Culprit of non-modernization of Turkey from the Young 
Turks to the Kemalists 
 
The continuity between the Young Turk thought and the Kemalist ideology has been one of 
the widely discussed themes of Turkish modernization. However, considering the scope of 
this study, this particular issue is not pertinent and I will not go into details.96 Instead, the 
continuity of the center-periphery cleavage and the continuity of the ideological origins of the 
center-periphery conflict will be mentioned.  
 
Mardin pays great attention to the role of modern educational institutions of the late Ottoman 
period in center-periphery relations. He also mentions the continuity of the spirit of the Late 
Ottoman and early Republican educational institutions. The main focus of the Ottoman 
education system after nineteenth century reforms, and then the Turkish education system, 
has been the bringing up of state elites who are supposed to be the representatives and 
instructors of the official ideology.97 The education of the populace still has been one of the 
top issues of agenda of the Turkish elites, and that is why they always complain about the 
ignorance of the society. Although the republicans argue that the Kemalist ideology is unique 
and new, the understanding of the difference between the status and culture of the masses and 
intellectuals, are some of the legitimizing points of the societal image of both the Kemalists 
and the Ottomans.  
 
In the Republican Period, the aim of educating the state elites has been to train the staff who 
will give priority to state affairs rather than to those of the populace, while the aim of 
educating the masses has been to eradicate the cultural and social structures and also the 
traditions of the old regime. The Republican elite considered populace’s adherence to values 
of tradition as the primary delinquency of the masses. However, the measures taken against 
the “ignorance of the masses” and efforts to “enlighten” them do not work in the way the 
Kemalists wanted.  
                                                            
96 For a more detailed account; Zürcher, E.J. (1992). “The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic,” Die Welt 
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97 Akarlı, E.D. (1975). “The State as A Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey,” in 
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Religion preserved its central role in the center-periphery conflict during the Republican era. 
Although in different amounts, there was a religious motivation in the two main opposition 
movements of the republican era- the Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Menemen Incident. The 
case of the Sheikh Said rebellion itself is very useful in understanding the role of religion in 
the center-periphery relations. Zürcher mentions that during this rebellion the Alevi Kurds 
attacked the Sunni rebels because of the dual character of the rebellion, and he writes; “while 
the leadership was undoubtedly motivated by the desire for an autonomous or even 
independent Kurdistan, the rank and file acted from religious motives, demanding the 
restoration of holy law and the caliphate.”98 The different attitude of the Alevi Kurds and the 
Sunni ones is a good example of Mardin’s ambiguity about the religious heterodoxy in the 
center-periphery relations. Moreover, the dual character of the rebellion, i.e. its being Kurdish 
nationalist as well as Islamist, also offers insight into the usage of religious and secularist 
discourse in center-periphery relations as the Kurdish nationalist motivations of rebellion are 
not usually stressed by the Kemalist official history. It is also possible to observe the 
utilization of the secularist discourse in the Menemen Incident. The incident still serves as a 
means of legitimacy in suppressing the religious demands of the periphery. Furthermore, 
scholars like Bozarslan question the place of the Menemen Incident in the secularist discourse 
and claim that contrary to the public sense and the Kemalist historiography, it is not even 
possible to find any proof to argue that the dervishes engaged in the incident were 
Nakshibendis.99 
 
The Kemalist discourse on religion can be traced back to the Young Turks. The Young Turks 
also regarded religion as one of the chief obstacles to modernization. Furthermore, their 
solution was also similar to the Kemalists: to cleanse the religion from superstitions.100 As 
Hanioğlu mentioned; “[…] the thesis of Garbcılar101 was that a new ‘ethic’ should be created 
for Muslims. This thesis undoubtedly stemmed from their conviction that Islam could not 
keep up with modern progress. The ideal espoused by the Garbcılar in this field was the 
creation of a Protestant ethic.”102 Hanioğlu also underlines the continuity of the ideas of the 
Garbcılar and Kemalists as he claims that although Garbılar’s dream of founding “Societies 
for Enlightening People’s Minds” was not materialized, the new regime’s “Directorate of 
Religious Affairs” fulfilled the same task of “enlightening” people through the Friday 
                                                            
98 Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 171. 
99 Cited in Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 349n6. 
100 Mardin, Ş. (2007). Din ve İdeoloji. İstanbul: İletişim, p.144.  
101 Garbcılar means the ones who championed westernization as the only way of modernization and reforms.   
102 Hanioğlu, S. (1997). “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of 
the Turkish Republic,” Studia Islamica, 86, p.143. 
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sermons.103  Furthermore, Abdullah Cevdet’s104, one of the outstanding figures of Garbcılar 
who spread his ideas on the modernization of religion by his publishing house, preface to one 
of the books of Dozy,105 which he translated and published, is very important in terms of 
revealing the parallelisms of the interpretation of religion;  
 
“One cannot become a Muslim by [adopting a Muslim] name, by fasting, and by 
performing namaz […]Learned, erudite Doctor Dozy, who had spent his entire 
life with research and study, and who strived to enlighten the minds of ibadullah 
[Servants of God] and tried to be beneficial to people, is one hundred times more 
Muslim than vagabond Hamid’s whose creation and desires are 
nefarious…Every learned and virtuous person is a Muslim. Any ignorant or 
immoral person is not a Muslim even if he comes from the lineage of the 
prophet.”106 
 
The discourse of defining a new understanding of religion depending on ethics and good 
manners and without the practical and social parts of it, like in the words of Cevdet, was also 
widely used in the February 28 and April 27 Processes.  Plenty of examples of this will be 
presented in the next parts of the study.      
 
Young Turk attitude towards politics was also similar to their attitudes towards religion. 
Many Young Turk thinkers and officials regarded political and administrative issues as so 
important that they could not be left to the masses. Therefore, they thought that the political 
and administrative affairs had to be handled not by the masses but by specialists.107 These 
elitist tendencies of the Young Turks were not only bequeathed from the Ottoman Empire to 
the Turkish Republic, but also they deeply penetrated all ranks of the bureaucracy and the 
urban middle and upper classes with the help of the long rule of the Kemlalists as a one-party 
state. So how is this deeply entrenched elitist tendency reflected in contemporary Turkey? 
 
2.2.3. The Contemporary Character of the Center-periphery Cleavage 
 
                                                            
103 Hanioğlu, S. Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 148. 
104 Abdullah Cevdet was one of the outstanding figures of Garbcılar that attempted to disseminate his ideas about 
modernized religion through his publishing house called İctihad. İctihad, that also the mane of the journal 
published by Cevdet, literally meaned the new interpretations of religion. 
105 Dozy, R. (1908). Tarih-i İslamiyet. Kahire: İctihad. 
106 Cited in Hanioğlu, S. Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 138. 
107 Hanioğlu, S. Garbcılar: Their Attitudes Towards Religion, p. 145. 
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The question at the title of Mardin’s 1974 article – “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to 
Turkish Politics?” - should be answered for today. To what extent should Mardin’s 
economical and political analysis be used today to explain the center-periphery relations? 
With which character does the center-periphery cleavage continue to exist today? These are 
the questions which should be answered before starting to analyze the February 28 and April 
27 Processes with the theoretical perspective drawn by Mardin.  
 
First of all, the economical aspect of the center- periphery cleavage still exists today. To some 
extent it can be claimed that the periphery of the country is articulated to the capitalist 
economy and therefore economics is not a major medium of center-periphery cleavage. 
However, the state mechanism still exists as one of the largest institutions one can earn a 
living.108 The amount of total economic activity directly controlled by state has decreased, but 
state related income still serves as a differentiating point for the state elites and the masses. 
Moreover, the income of the bureaucrats is still not affected by market relations, similarly to 
the condition of the Ottoman officials who were not taxpayers. Economy is still not a variable 
for bureaucrats when they use the state authority. The best example of this issue is the 
economical crises Turkey faced until recent years. The reason for such crises was basically 
political. The state elites always constituted one of the sides of the crises- e.g. the crisis that 
originated from a discussion between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer in November 
2000- but they have never been affected by the crises as the masses have been. They 
continued living in their houses provided by the state, taking their salaries from the state, and 
going on holidays to the holiday spots provided for bureaucrats by state. 
 
The modernization process of Turkey has some positive material results in terms of the 
center-periphery relations. Except for the extremely remote corners of the country, the 
centralization plan of state is fulfilled by developed communication and transport facilities. 
Therefore, geographic position is not as important as it was in the early times of Republic. In 
addition, migration to the cities has also removed the centrality of geography from the center-
periphery cleavage, because through migration the peripheral elements were brought to the 
town. In other words, the peripheral objects of the rural areas were also carried to center. 
Center-periphery is no longer geographic but continues to be political, social and cultural. 
The periphery now means the sum of all others except those who share social, cultural and 
political perceptions of the center.  
                                                            
108 According to Manpower Group’s survey, with its %23 increase rate, state related sectors will be one of the 
major employers in Turkey in 2012. For details see: ManpowerGroup. (2011). The Manpower Employment 
Outlook Survey for Turkey, accessed January 6, 2012. 
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Under such conditions, the center of the society makes excessive usage of the fragmented 
image of society for peripherization of the other parts of society. Every layer of the social 
strata, every fragment of the society, and every single institution or individual needs the 
assistance of the state to survive. The Alevis need the assistance of the center in order to be 
saved from repression. The Sunnis need the assistance of the center to continue their religious 
activity, whose only legal medium is controlled by state. Even leftist intellectuals condone the 
tyrannical and undemocratic treatment of conservative actors for the sake of safety from the 
rising danger of reaction. Similarly, some twenty years ago nationalists needed the state to 
fight against the rising danger of communism because both nationalists and the state 
apparatus regarded the leftist activism of the 1970s and 1980s as the major threat against the 
unity of the state.  
 
Through the fragmentation of civil society, the state emerges as a chief partner of it: a partner 
which has ties to every element of the society but never becomes the exclusive domain of any 
of them. It stands above the rest of society, but not unrelated to them. Sometimes it plays 
mediator between two conflicting groups, sometimes it targets one, and sometimes even 
encourages and leads others to attack a target. 
 
The peripheral reality of Turkey, which was easily ignored by the Turkish elites before, has 
gained public visibility and has become impossible to disregard with the help of the 
modernization achieved by the Republic. Therefore, the center-periphery cleavage has been 
brought to the center of society. In other words, the cleavage in the periphery had been 
somewhat solved by the isolation of the Kemalist elites from the periphery. However, the 
problem reemerged in the center by the move of the peripheral elements to the center of 
society. Generally speaking, the economic and cultural dimensions of the center- periphery 
problem were brought to the center through everyday practices, which again constituted a big 
problem considering the formalist and imitator character of the Kemalist modernization 
project. Therefore, it can be concluded that the center-periphery conflict continued to exist in 
a transformed state. However, this is not sufficient for understanding the February 28 and 
April 27 processes. The new conceptualization inspired by Mardin and Gramsci will be more 
useful for explaining these events.   
 
2.3. The Historic Hegemonic Center 
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Before moving on to the factual history of the February 28 and April 27 processes, a 
discussion about the previously mentioned theoretical frameworks will be useful for merging 
theory with the actual case to which it is to be applied. Mardin’s “Center-Periphery” concept 
and Gramsci’s “Historic Bloc” can be merged in order to better analyze the activities of the 
Kemalists in the two intervention processes. In my study the historic bloc and the center 
correspond to the same societal reality. Indeed, the two concepts fill each other’s gaps with 
regard to understanding the Turkish case.  
 
To start with Gramsci, hegemony is a very useful conceptual instrument for this kind of 
analysis. Gramscian theory offers the opportunity to better understand the sides of the conflict 
in the February 28 and April 27 processes. In particular, a Gramscian explanation of the 
formation of a historic bloc is indispensible for explaining the broadness of the alliance 
against conservative politics and how these different figures with conflicting interests come 
together. Unlike other Marxist analyses, the strength of Gramsci for this study is the fact that 
his conceptualization makes room for non-economic factors. However, Gramsci is a post-
Marxist and Marxist in the last instance. His initial question pertains to economic relations 
and class conflict. Even though he proposes a new concept and a new way of understanding 
class, the Marxist notion of class is always on the table as the starting point of conflict. This is 
a shortcoming for the analysis of the February 28 and April 27 processes, in particular, and 
debates over Turkish modernization and secularization in general. In the Turkish case it is not 
class positions and relations, but non-economic factors, modernization, secularization, 
westernization, etc. that lie at the root of the conflict. 
 
The chief strength Mardin’s center-periphery conceptualization for the analysis of the 
February 28 and April 27 processes is his theory’s historical depth. The center-periphery 
conceptualization is helpful for historicizing the conflicts in the February 28 and April 27 
processes. Furthermore, center-periphery analysis underlines the importance of secularization 
in the conflict. Also, other non-economic sources of the conflict, such as prestige, status, and 
culture are stressed in Mardin. But along with these strengths, Mardin’s center-periphery 
analysis includes some weaknesses for the purposes of this case study. First of all, the theory 
is too constant and one-sided to explain the complexity of the February 28 and April 27 
processes. It offers less in explaining how non-economic factors merged with economic 
factors, and why they always overlap. Secondly, although Mardin tries to avoid geographic 
determinism by including broader concepts such as status, prestige, culture, and education 
into his model of the center and periphery, the theory by its nature tends toward geographical 
determinism. The fault lines Mardin proposed as the origin of the conflict still exist today 
with the same background, but the periphery has now become the center and vice versa. Also, 
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with regard to the conclusion of this study, center-periphery analysis does not offer an 
explanation of the formation of conservative lifestyles, prestige, or status, which also means 
that it cannot explain how the conflict regenerates and reproduces itself again and again.  
 
If center-periphery and hegemonic analyses were applied to the February 28 and April 27 
Processes separately, Mardin’s center and Gramsci’s historic bloc would define the same 
social actors. Similarly, whether discussing the center or the historic bloc, the social segments 
excluded by these concepts would be the same. However, when using Mardin’s center and 
Gramsci’s historic bloc separately, the strengths and weaknesses of each concepts also stand 
separately. On the other hand, combining these concepts into that of the “historic hegemonic 
center” serves to eliminate their weaknesses and reinforce their strengths. By merging these 
two concepts both Mardin’s historical depth and Gramsci’s analytic functionality are 
preserved. The same social segments that are covered by the separate usage of the two 
concepts are covered by this combination and the weaknesses of the original concepts are 
eliminated.  
 
The static character, theoretical limitations, and geographical dependency of Mardin’s center-
periphery analysis are overcome by Gramscian hegemony’s analytical and theoretical depth 
and functionality, as in the concept sets of consent and coercion, and civil society and 
political society. On the other hand, the class-dependent analysis and overemphasis of 
economic factors in Gramscian hegemonic analysis are overcome by the historicity and 
inclusion of non-economic factors in Mardin’s center-periphery analysis. Their weaknesses 
having thereby been eliminated, the theoretical explanations of Gramsci and Mardin become 
the most appropriate theories for discussing February 28 Process and April 27 processes.    
 
So what is the “historic hegemonic center” discussed in this study? The existence of a historic 
hegemonic center and a subaltern periphery becomes clear in the conjunction of ideology, 
politics, culture, society, and economy. In the long history of Turkish modernization, there 
have been always supporters and opponents of modernizing reforms and ideology, politics, 
culture, society, and economy always worked to determine different social groups’ support or 
opposition to modernization. However, only with the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
and the emergence of a Kemalist one-party state did the historic hegemonic center take on its 
combined ideological, cultural, political, and economic character.  
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Kemalism was the ideology of the one-party state and the only legitimate ideology in the 
country. Being a set of attitudes and ideas rather than a clearly defined ideology109, Kemalism 
was the only medium of (legitimate) existence in any of the country’s ideological, cultural, 
political, social, and economic spheres. The ideological and political spheres were determined 
and limited by the Kemalist principles of secularism, nationalism, republicanism, and 
populism. Reflections of populism could also be observed in the spheres of culture and 
society as the “cultural revolution” of Kemalism spread to the far corners of the country with 
the help of People’s Houses110 and Village Institutes. As a necessary part of statism, the one-
party state was also very active in the economic field, attempting to create a new national 
bourgeoisie that would be in full conformity with Kemalist principles. Finally, revolutionism/ 
reformism stood as the general method of applying these principles and as a continuous 
support for reforms.  
 
However, the historic hegemonic center was not as monolithic or static as initially intended. 
During the course of Republican history, there existed many different groups within the 
historic hegemonic center and the spheres in which the subaltern periphery expressed its 
opposition to the historic hegemonic center changed. However, despite these differences, 
changes, splits, alliances, and partial settlements, the existence of two different groups with 
conflicting interests, the historic hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery, can be clearly 
discerned. As in the case of the Democrat Party, in which the religious demands of 
conservatives overlapped with the political and economic demands of an alienated segment of 
the Kemalist elite, in almost every moment of republican history these conflicting interests 
were redefined and regenerated. More recently, The Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association’s (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD) position in 
the February 28 Process, and Sabah and Akşam’s position in the April 27 Process are the best 
examples of such position changes. However, despite the changes, redefinitions, and 
regeneration of conflicting interests, the conflict between the historic hegemonic center and 
the subaltern periphery has always remained. Although ideas, policies, supporting and 
opposing groups, alliances, and grievances have shifted, there has always been an existing 
power group with its interests as a whole and with the sometimes conflicting particular 
interests of its members and an opposing group. On the one hand there existed those who 
identified their interests with the continuation of the existing establishment and, on the other 
hand, there were those who saw their interests in the replacement of the establishment. At this 
                                                            
109 Zürcher, E. J. Turkey: A Modern History, p. 181. 
110 People’s Houses and Village Institutions were the indoctrination institutions established during single party 
rule. For more information on People’s Houses, see: A. Lamprou, Between Central State and Local Society: The 
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point, the concept of the historic hegemonic center is vital, as it refers to the historical 
character of the conflict, which includes transformation and continuity, and its hegemonic 
character, thanks to which the historic hegemonic center could unite its many members 
despite their conflicting self-interests. As a result, the concept is a valuable theoretical tool for 
the analysis of complex events such as the February 28 and April 27 processes. 
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3. The February 28 Process: A Postmodern Coup 
3.1. Rise of the Welfare Party 
 
When it was once again allowed to engage in political activities after the military intervention 
of 1980, conservative politics resumed as expected. Before 1980 there had also been a 
powerful stream of conservative politics in Turkey. The movement, named the National 
Outlook (Milli Görüş, MG), had an anti-Western alignment and advocated a combination of 
moral and economic development for Turkey.111 After its earlier incarnations were closed in 
the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, this time the conservative party of the MG was 
named the RP. Given its leader, high-rank figures and ideology, the RP was a typical National 
Outlook Party in the beginning. Although the continuity was not interrupted in terms of its 
leading cadres over the next decade, external factors were now more advantageous for the RP 
in the 1990’s. Turkey’s new social and economic conditions offered various opportunities for 
the RP. Capitalizing on such political advantages, the party received 21.4 percent of the 
national vote at its height in 1995. These new opportunities included the tolerant attitude of 
the state mechanism to Islam in the post-1980 period, the culturally conservative and 
economically liberal character of the Özal period, and the collapse of Turkey’s center parties. 
  
The ruling elite after the 1980 military coup instrumentalized religion against the leftist 
mobilization of the time. This attitude toward Islam – embodied by the junta leader and later 
president Kenan Evren – used the religion as a barrier against radical leftist politics. Evren 
himself often referred to “Quranic Islam” while he was expressing his ideas about the 
importance of order and rule for a society. In issues ranging from birth control to the 
increasing “communist threat,” Islam was used as a way of expressing the official ideology.112 
However, the societal results of Evren’s policy became different from his expectations - a 
clear case of the law of unintended consequences. Instead of an enlightened and instrumental 
Islam that would be compatible with Kemalism, conservative mobilization became the 
beneficiary of the situation. Conservative actors increased their influence and expanded their 
domain. For example, apart from the addition of mandatory religion courses to primary and 
secondary school curriculum, the number of students enrolled in İmam-Hatip Schools 
increased by 61 percent and 51 percent at the senior and junior levels, respectively.113 The 
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increase in the number of enrolled students, but not in the number of schools, is a good 
example of the difference between the result of Evren’s instrumentalization of Islam and his 
intentions. The number of İmam-Hatip Schools did not increase due to the difficulty of 
getting permission to set up new ones, but it was still possible to open new schools as 
branches of existing ones.114  
 
Furthermore, Turgut Özal’s governance, first as prime minister and later as president, also 
stimulated a tolerant attitude toward conservative activism. Among many other developments, 
the removal of the symbolic barriers that had previously blocked conservative actors’ 
participation in social and political life is worth mentioning. Due to the fact that one of the 
major policies of the Kemalist modernization about Islam was the prohibition of any kind of 
Islamic representation in the public sphere, conservative actors had voluntarily remained 
outside of the public sphere, in addition to being excluded from it forcibly. Aktay refers to 
this self-imposed exclusion from the public sphere as a situation of symbolic diaspora.115 The 
tolerant attitude of the Evren period and later the Özal period stimulated the process of 
conservative actors’ entrance into the public sphere. The establishment of Islamic financial 
institutions, the increasing circulation of conservative books, newspapers, and magazines, and 
the increasing public visibility of women wearing the headscarf were prominent examples of 
increasing conservative public visibility from the 1980’s onwards.  
 
The formation of a new middle class was another political opportunity for the RP as a result 
of the policies of the post-1980 period and the Özal administration. As a consequence of 
Özal’s liberal policies in the economic field, the small and the middle-scale businessmen of 
the major Anatolian cities were given access to the domestic and international market. The 
new emerging middle class was more conservative compared to the existing one. As they 
were the representatives of the periphery, values such as religion and tradition were dominant. 
In the beginning of the 1990’s, this new middle class materialized under the umbrella of the 
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları 
Derneği, MÜSİAD). The letter “M” in the name of the organization, which represents the 
word müstakil - independent, is often claimed to represent “Muslim” instead of “müstakil” 
due to the religious affiliations of the members of the organization. The incorporation dates of 
MÜSİAD’s member companies and their geographical distribution provide insight into the 
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relationship between the post-1980 period and the rise of the RP. Whereas only 280 of these 
companies had been incorporated in the period from 1970 to 1979, this number rose to 744 in 
the 1980-1989 period.116 The geographical distribution of the member companies is also 
useful for understanding the peripheral character of the association, as Konya, a peripheral 
city, with 153 companies, comes third after metropolitan Istanbul, with 488 members, and 
metropolitan Ankara, with 175 members, while Kayseri, also a peripheral city, with 112 
members, comes fifth after metropolitan Izmir, with 114 members.117  
 
The economic visibility of the traditional Anatolian middle class was not independent from 
the increasing social participation of conservative actors. Rather than arising as independent 
social, economic and political processes, these processes emerged synchronously out of a 
shared set of causes. When conservative actors began participating in social life, their 
economic activity increased, and vice versa.  
 
In addition to these factors, the RP’s ability to capitalize on these opportunities and its 
mobilization of resources were crucial. When the 1990s arrived, the political arena in Turkey 
was in the midst of a serious deadlock. Ongoing political corruption and a series of 
unsuccessful coalition governments made the RP a popular, fresh and untested alternative to 
the prevailing political system. As a result, the party took 19.7 percent of the national vote in 
the local elections of 1994. On the one hand, the political opportunities described above 
encouraged the rise of the RP in the 1994 local elections. On the other hand, the successful 
administration of the RP mayors further increased support for the RP in the 1995 elections. 
As Yavuz wrote: “The RP’s victory in the 1995 elections is less the result of Islam than of a 
complex set of factors. Since the local elections of March 1994, RP mayors have offered 
better services than their predecessors and worked hard to improve public services. Moreover, 
they reduced corruption and nepotism in their municipalities. The RP also acted more 
professionally than the other parties on the left and right.”118  
 
However, the picture of the political arena after the elections on December 25, 1995 was not 
clear. The RP was the leading party with 21.38 percent of the total vote and the Motherland 
Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) became the main opposition party with 19.65 percent, while 
the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) came third with 19.18 percent of the total vote. 
Secularist public opinion favored a center-right coalition of the ANAP and DYP. 
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Newspapers, in particular, openly encouraged and supported a coalition between the center-
right parties that would exclude the RP. Newspapers were implicitly, if not explicitly, 
claiming that the military was also supporting a center-right coalition and that it was upset 
with the possibility of the RP becoming a part of the government.119 Although a center-right 
coalition government was set up by the ANAP and the DYP, these parties were not inclined 
toward cooperation, because each of them was trying to eliminate the other in order to 
become the only representative of center-right politics. As a result, the coalition was 
dissolved after three months. The RP played a significant role in the collapse of the coalition 
government by both applying for and receiving a Constitutional Court decision that 
invalidated a vote of confidence for the government and, later, by setting up a parliamentary 
means test commission for Tansu Çiller, leader of the DYP. Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the 
ANAP, tried to take advantage of the means test commission to eliminate Tansu Çiller from 
center-right politics. As expected, the coalition dissolved on June 6, 1996.  
 
 
3.2. The Conservative Party in Power: The Welfare Party & True Path Party Coalition  
 
After the resignation of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, the formation of a coalition 
government between the RP and DYP was one of two alternatives, the other of which was 
early elections. The second option was not received well as the parties in parliament were not 
optimistic about the possible results of an early election. Moreover: “Refah [RP] made a 
special effort to appease the ‘powers-that-be’ and demonstrate that it was a tenable and 
credibly mainstream political party. It was important for Refah to establish its legitimacy in 
order to fully mobilize its potential base of support, which was divided among several center 
right parties and a large group who did not even go to the polls.”120 Thus, the coalition 
government of the RP and DYP was a real win-win scenario for both parties: It served as a 
medium of legitimacy for the RP and as an escape route for Tansu Çiller from the 
parliamentary investigation. As expected, the coalition government, which was named 
Refahyol -- a combination of the names of the participating parties, the RP (Refah Partisi) 
and the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi) -- was established on June 28, 1996.  
 
Intra-governmental relations and relations with the military were relatively free of problems 
in the first months of this government. This virtual harmony was sustained by the 
compromises made by the RP. As the RP’s main motivation was gaining legitimacy and 
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securing itself a place among the center parties, the party’s ideological position was not 
reflected in the program of the government. It was very difficult even to differentiate between 
the coalition protocol of Refahyol and the previous ANAP-DYP government.121 The sharp 
ideological tones of the RP and the MG of Necmettin Erbakan did not rank among the 
projects of the RP in government.  
 
In addition to economic policies, important parts of the RP’s conservative discourse were also 
abandoned. During the first months of the government, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan 
signed very controversial documents that were entirely contrary to his party’s principles. The 
discharge from the military of some personnel who were practicing Muslims, the extension of 
the mandate of the Poised Hammer Force122 and, finally, the renewal of security agreements 
with Israel were some examples of the compromises the RP made in order to secure its 
position as a center-right party. However, Erbakan’s strategy did not work. The reason for the 
RP’s failure to secure a position among the ranks of the center right was the reluctance of the 
historic hegemonic center to accept a new element into the politics of the center. For the 
historic hegemonic center, the problem was not only rising fears of reaction or worries about 
secularism, but also the RP’s threat of filling the political gap in the center of Turkish 
politics.123 For the RP to fill the political gap in the center of Turkish politics meant a new 
actor in hegemonic politics, a new claimant for political power. To avoid such an outcome, 
the fear of reactionary danger was manipulated again.   
 
3.3 Rising Reactionary Danger 
 
After a relatively calm period of three months, tensions in the Turkish political arena 
increased toward October 1996. In Turkey the September-October period marks the 
beginning of the new administrative year. In this period, the Turkish bureaucracy and other 
state-related sectors – sectors that are occupied by the Kemalist cadres - organize the first 
gathering of the year for occasions such as the beginning of judicial, financial, and academic 
years and the parliamentary session. In the Turkish political tradition, the heads of these state 
organs give speeches at the first gatherings of their respective institutions. In these speeches, 
the wishes and intentions of these institutions are declared in the presence of all ranks of the 
state mechanism. This was also the case in 1996, but the content of the speeches was 
somehow different from previous years. The heads of these institutions mentioned the rising 
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danger of reaction and the necessity of protecting the secular state. These warnings were a 
sign of the coming campaign against the coalition government. After the warnings of the 
bureaucrats, Mesut Yılmaz, leader of main opposition party, and Chief of General Staff İsmail 
Hakkı Karadayı took the floor again to talk about the rising reactionary danger. As expected, 
the media also joined the Kemalist chorus, and news articles about the rising reactionary 
danger started to appear on the front pages of the country’s newspapers simultaneously.  
 
It is possible to categorize the so-called major reactionary incidents that were presented by the 
media in this period. Some were long-standing discussions of secularism in Turkey, such as 
the headscarf ban in universities, the construction of a mosque in Taksim Square, and the 
opening of a land route to the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. The university headscarf ban was 
introduced by Kenan Evren, whose administration was considered to have been tolerant of 
conservative demands. Although under the rule of the conservative mayor of Istanbul, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, some plans were made and expectations were raised for the construction of a 
mosque in Taksim Square, the project did not amount to more than a fantasy. In addition, the 
Hajj land route was an old practice that had been abandoned years ago. Demands for its 
reopening had always been popular in Turkish public opinion, but the prospect started to be 
considered a reactionary danger under the rule of the RP-DYP coalition government. The 
main discourse about such demands argued that the reactionaries had been emboldened by the 
conservative RP and that they had therefore become more demanding.  
 
However, the RP itself also provided much additional ammunition for the Kemalists to use to 
bolster its claims about the rising reactionary danger. First among these was Erbakan’s visits 
to Islamic countries such as Libya, Egypt, Malaysia and Indonesia. Although earlier Turkish 
prime ministers had visited these countries as well,124 the timing and character of Erbakan’s 
visits was severely criticized by the media, especially the Libyan dictator Colonel Qaddafi’s 
treatment of the prime minister, which was a real diplomatic scandal and was also criticized 
by Erbakan’s supporters as well as going too far in the eyes of secularists. 
 
Erbakan’s proposal of an Islamic solution to the Kurdish question and the Sincan incident can 
be considered as having been the last straw for the Kemalists. Toward the end of the 1990s, 
Turkey was proceeding in its struggle against the PKK, Kurdish armed insurgence 
organization, through military means. However, the core of the Kurdish problem still existed, 
as the demands of the Kurdish population had not been met. At that point, Erbakan offered 
the classical formula of the instrumentalization of religion as the cement of a society. 
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Although the Kemalists had been applying the same formula to Turkish society, Erbakan’s 
attitude was more Islamic compared to the cultural Islam of the Kemalists. For example, 
Erbakan and his party were loudly pronouncing the brotherhood of all Muslims, the idea of 
Ummah, whereas Kemalist discourse was more silent on the Islamic part of the discourse and 
contented itself with mentioning the brotherhood of Turks and Kurds. Secondly, the Sincan 
incident was another cornerstone illustrating the rising reactionary danger. The RP mayor of 
Sincan, a provincial town close to Ankara, organized a Jerusalem Night at the end of January 
1997. The Iranian ambassador was invited to speak at this program. Although the Association 
for Solidarity with Jerusalem had organized similar solidarity nights several times in the 
past125, this one was different, as the speech by the Iranian ambassador fit very well into the 
narrative of the Iranization of Turkey. Another reason for the TSK’s harsh reaction to the 
Jerusalem Solidarity Night was the origin of this type of event: Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
religious-clerical leader of the revolution in Iran, first established such celebrations in 
revolutionary Iran. Jerusalem Nights, which were events aimed at increasing solidarity with 
Palestinian Muslims and protesting Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem, was also utilized for the 
spread of a new regime to all segments of society.126 Furthermore, the mayor of Sincan, Bekir 
Yıldız, was a member of the RP. A few days later, the military responded to the Jerusalem 
Night with a parade of tanks on the main street of Sincan.127 Although the military cadres 
claimed that the tanks’ appearance on the streets of Sincan was a previously planned regular 
training move, it was widely considered a warning to the RP.128  
 
Among all of these incidents, the Fadime Şahin episode was the most effective and 
serviceable case in favor of claims about a rising reactionary threat. In the last days of 1996, 
the self-proclaimed Sufi sheikh Müslüm Gündüz, who was wanted by the police for violating 
the secular regime of Turkey by gathering with his followers in the great mosques of big 
cities for the remembrance and recitation of God and violating laws on religious dress, was 
raided while he was together with a woman named Fadime Şahin. The incident was covered 
as the drama of Şahin by the media, because Gündüz was half naked when the policed broke 
into his house with television cameras in tow. Şahin appeared in the news releases of the 
major television channels and claimed that she had been deceived by Gündüz and that her 
religious feelings had been exploited by him. In a few days, Fadime turned into a celebrity 
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and her former relationships with other self-proclaimed sheikhs, such as Ali Kalkancı, were 
uncovered. Furthermore, Şahin claimed that the children of certain famous RP members were 
also followers of her ex-lover-sheikh Kalkancı. Furthermore, Kalkancı’s ex-wife Emire 
Kalkancı also proceeded to make sensational confessions about the so-called deviant 
relationship between politics, Sufi orders and sex. Although the incident was brought to court 
and several lawsuits were filed against Kalkancı and Gündüz, the claims of Şahin and Emire 
Kalkancı were never proven. The manipulation in the Şahin incident will be covered in detail 
later in this study. For now, it can be said that the incident and its manipulation by the media 
were the trademarks of the process just as the Susurluk incident, which will be also covered in 
subsequent sections. Such incidents of rising reactionary danger were regarded as threats to 
the secular character of the state and, as a result, the state apparatus started to take measures 
in order to defend itself. 
 
3.4. ‘The System Defends Itself’: The National Security Council and Briefings 
 
Once the necessary conditions for a military intervention were set by the discourse about a 
rising reactionary danger, it was the military’s turn to begin taking more drastic measures. Its 
first move was an ordinary MGK meeting on February 28.  
 
The MGK is a constitutional body that was formed by the 1982 Constitution. However, the 
official website of the council traces its establishment back to 1933.129 According to the 
official site of MGK, the period between 1933 and 1949 is known as the Secretariat General 
of Supreme Defense Assembly Era, the period between 1949 and 1962 is the National 
Defense Supreme Council and Secretariat General Era, the period between 1962 and 1983 is 
the National Security Council and Secretariat General of National Security Council Era under 
the provisions of the 1961 Constitution, and, finally, the period from 1983 until the present is 
the National Security Council and Secretariat General of National Security Council Era under 
the provisions of the 1982 Constitution. The official interpretation of the continuity of the 
council offers insight into the role of the Turkish Army in politics and establishes legitimacy 
through a link to the Atatürk era. The main aim of the establishment of the National Security 
Council in 1962, which at that time consisted of five high-ranking military officers - namely, 
the chief of general staff, the commanders of the army, navy, air forces, and gendarmerie - 
and five civilians - the president, prime minister, and the ministers of interior affairs, foreign 
                                                            
129 “Historical Background,” accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/Tarihce/tarihce_en.htm 
 58 
affairs and national defense - was to supply a legitimate basis for the military’s intervention 
into politics.130  
 
After the council’s regular February 28 meeting, a press release was issued. Such meetings 
and press releases were normal for the Council, but the content of the press release of this 
meeting was extraordinary, as the council – or rather the military side of the council - wanted 
the government to take harsh measures against the so-called rising danger of reaction. The 
content of the statement and its discourse, which threatened the government with “sanctions,” 
“yaptırımlar” if it neglected to take action against the rising danger of reaction, was regarded 
as a memorandum. After the MGK meeting, Prime Minister Erbakan tried to face the 
memorandum by directing the issue to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük 
Millet Meclisi, TBMM). However, he reached an impasse as neither the president of the 
assembly, the leaders of the opposition parties, nor his partner Tansu Çiller supported him. 
After the unsuccessful attempt at directing the issue to the assembly, Erbakan made another 
attempt to respond to the memorandum by not signing decisions passed by the National 
Security Council. As the prime minister, he was “officially” a member of a council that had 
threatened him with “sanctions,” and therefore these decisions needed his signature in order 
to be legal. This attempt also lacked both public and political support and, after a month of 
resistance, Erbakan signed the decisions.131  
 
Two documents were created after the February 28 MGK meeting. The first was a press 
statement132  that consisted of four articles. The first article of the statement contained 
information about the participants, venue, and date of the meeting. The second article was 
reserved for the Kurdish issue, and the third for the Cyprus problem. Aside from the fourth 
article, the context was typical of press statements made by the MGK. However, the fourth 
article, which constituted nearly the half of the whole statement, was very different from 
usual MGK press statements. The article was an examination of “movements opposed to the 
regime that were looking to establish a base against the Republic of Turkey, which is known 
as a democratic, laic, social state and a state governed by the rule of law bounded with 
Atatürk nationalism.” The article called for the enforcement of laws against the rising 
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reactionary danger, and stated that “laicism in Turkey is not only the guarantee of the political 
regime but also the guarantee of democracy and social peace, and it is a way of life.” The 
striking point in the statement is that it regards democracy as external to the political regime it 
mentions. The statement was not detailed about the proposed measures against the rising 
reactionary danger. Rather, it underlined the principle of laicism and the importance of this 
principle from the aspect of characteristics of the state and societal peace. The possible results 
of acts contrary to this principle were mentioned as “new tensions and sanctions,” “yeni 
gerilimler ve yaptırımlar”. 
 
The press release identified the problem, whereas the second document133 detailed the MGK’s 
proposals to the government, demanding measures against the rising reactionary danger. The 
general themes of the text start with a conventional declaration about the need for the 
enforcement of existing laws and making new ones if needed for the fight against the rising 
reactionary danger. Furthermore, in many points - articles 1, 12-16, and 18 - the text refers to 
laws and legal arrangements. Moreover, later it also specifically calls for the enforcement of 
existing laws and regulations against outdated/backward, çağdışı, clothing, the hides of 
sacrificial animals, private security staff and the protection of Atatürk. This stress on the 
enforcement of existing laws and regulations was in order to stop the prevailing tolerant 
attitude of the state mechanism toward Islam. After the laws and regulations, education was 
the second most-stressed issue in the text, with demands that the legislative organ introduce 
eight-year mandatory education, decrease the number of İmam-Hatip Schools, and finally 
subordinate education institutions that claimed to be under the control of sufi orders to the 
Ministry of Education.134 The ideological make-up of the state’s civil servant ranks was also 
stressed in the text as a hot item, and other state institutions were advised to adopt the TSK’s 
policy of discharging those members of the staff who are practicing Muslims as a means 
against ideological staffing. 
 
The MGK wanted the government to fight against the rising danger of reaction with the 
assistance of other elements of the historic hegemonic center. Although Erbakan avoided 
direct confrontation with the military and did not deny its claims, he was not eager to follow 
its instructions. Erbakan’s main strategy was to buy time. When he was asked about the MGK 
decisions, he accused the media of formulating an artificial agenda. Erbakan was justified in 
his accusations of an artificial agenda, but he targeted the intermediary, not the instigator, 
which was the military. The meetings of the MGK in March and April were calm, as the 
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military set time aside for the government to execute the February 28 MGK decisions. In the 
meantime, the military was increasing the tension day by day and asking for the cooperation 
of civil society. They insisted that their real aim was not to use power, but that they expected 
politicians and the parliament to follow the instructions of the MGK.135 Their expectations 
from the parliament meant a change in parliamentary arithmetic, which started slowly with 
DYP representatives going over to the opposition. Yet the tension between the government 
and the military did not develop as slowly as the change in parliamentary balance, because the 
armed forces increased tension as “one senior officer went so far as to call the prime minister 
“a pimp” for going with his family on the pilgrimage to Mecca as guests of Saudi Arabia. 
When Erbakan urged the military to sanction the officer, they refused.”136  
 
The MGK meeting in May was crucial as time was now up for the government. In the 
meeting the generals called the government to account for the lack of measures taken against 
the rising reactionary danger. The result was nothing more than a delusion for the military. 
Therefore, the military employed the second phase of their action plan; organizing other 
elements of the historic hegemonic center - or civil society in their terminology. In this phase, 
the military organized briefings for judges, the media and civil society organizations.  
 
3.5. Civil Society at Work: Activities of NGOs and Non-State Actors 
 
Unlike former military interventions, the February 28 Process was a military intervention that 
was realized through civil society in the Gramscian sense. In the February 28 Process, the 
Armed Forces chose to organize so-called civilian forces137  to overthrow the coalition 
government instead of directly targeting the government with memorandums and/or physical 
interventions by using their armed advantage. The civilian forces, which consisted of the 
judicial organs, bureaucracy, universities, trade unions, trade associations and, finally, the 
media, played crucial roles in overthrowing the coalition government. The contribution of 
NGOs to the process was so ironic that some of the so-called NGOs, such as the Association 
for Kemalist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği, ADD) and the Association for the 
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Support of Modern Life (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, ÇYDD)138 demanded the 
military to take control of the government, using the slogan “Army Do Your Duty,” “Ordu 
Göreve.” Actually, the existence and activities of these two organizations can be traced back 
to the period before the process, as they considered Kenan Evren’s tolerant and 
instrumentalizing policies regarding Islam as a deviation from the principles of Kemalism. 
That is to say, before the process they had been critical about the opportunity structures which 
made the rise of the RP possible. Therefore, during the process, such organizations worked as 
an extension of the official body of the TSK and, not very surprisingly, high-ranked retired 
officers occupied the presidencies of these organizations. The stance of the Kemalist NGOs 
was full of contradictions concerning their relationships with the state. As already mentioned, 
before the end of the 1990s these groups had accused the army and other state institutions of 
compromising the principles of the Kemalist revolution and being tolerant of conservative 
politics. For example, Erdoğan mentions that the ADD established a foundation called the 
Foundation for Kemalist Thought, Atatürkçü Düşünce Vakfı, a kind of property that cannot be 
confiscated according to law, because they thought that there was a possibility of being closed 
after a military coup like the one in 1980.139 Despite the fact that they feared the potential 
negative consequences of a military coup, they supported the campaign and role of the 
military in the February 28 Process. Besides their contradictory relationship with the military 
and their role in the process, the Kemalist NGOs had a particular agenda, which was the 
hegemonic projection of Kemalism. In his detailed research of the discourse of such NGOs, 
Erdoğan states: “The discourse of associations like the ADD and the ÇYDD re-accentuates 
and re-articulates Kemalism into a new context so as to make it hegemonic over social. It 
attempts to construct a new and civil collective will that would serve as the subject of 
Kemalist restoration, or as a supplement of the official project.”140  
 
The Susurluk Scandal is of central importance for understanding the historic hegemonic 
center’s mobilization. On November 3, 1996, Turkish people learned from news sources that 
a car accident had occurred near a town called Susurluk. However, after a short time, it was 
revealed that it was not an ordinary car accident. There were four people in the car at the time 
of the accident: (1) a senior police officer, Hüseyin Kocadağ, (2) an outlaw heroin smuggler 
who was also accused of killing several people in the context of intrastate mafia relations and 
was wanted by Interpol, Abdullah Çatlı, (3) a former beauty queen and Çatlı’s girlfriend, 
                                                            
138 The English translation of “çağdaş” is always problematic. Normally, “çağdaş” means contemporary. However, 
because Kemalists associate the modern with the contemporary, they use the word “çağdaş” as a synonym of 
modern. For example, when I was a sociology student in the Middle East Technical University in 2004, the course 
name “Postmodern Sociology” was “corrected” by the office of the dean into “Contemporary Sociology” because 
the dean was unable to imagine a contemporary condition that was beyond modernity. 
139 Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.271. 
140 Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.280. 
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Gonca Us, and, finally, (4) a DYP deputy for Şanlıurfa who was the leader of an anti-PKK 
Kurdish tribe, Sedat Edip Bucak. After a few hours passed, people began to question the 
context that had brought these people together. The incident created suspicions in society 
about the interrelationships between the mafia, politics and the state. As a result of society’s 
increasing sensitivity about the incident, people started a protest to demand an investigation 
of the incident and intrastate relations by turning their lights on and off every night at 21.00. 
The protests were named the “One Minute Darkness for Everlasting Light,” “Sürekli Aydınlık 
İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık” campaign. 
 
In the beginning, society’s reaction to the incident had nothing to do with the RP, as the party 
had been out of the state mechanism for years. However, the RP spokespersons, especially 
Minister of Justice Şevket Kazan, belittled the people’s demands in order to protect their 
coalition partner.141 The explanations of the RP members suddenly created public sentiment 
against the RP and the coalition. Now the RP became the center of attention and people were 
demanding the resignation of the government every night during their protests. Of course, the 
media also played an important role in channeling discomfort against the RP.142 Public 
opinion’s sensitivity lasted only a few months as the agenda in Turkey was taken over by the 
rising reactionary danger of the February 28 Process. However, the RP’s ordeal related to 
Susurluk continued. The internalized method of the protests - turning lights on and off - was 
used against the rising reactionary danger. In the second rally of protests that started after the 
critical May meeting of the MGK, people started turning their lights on and off for the 
resignation of the government. Thus, public sensitivity and method of protest about the 
Susurluk incident accumulated and were manipulated against the conservative party. At the 
beginning of protests the word light was used concretely as the opposite of darkness. 
However, as soon as the protests became popular, the word also took on an abstract meaning 
and the campaign turned against conservative politics. NGOs were very active in the 
transformation of the campaign against conservative politics. For example, the Isparta branch 
of the ADD declared after a regional meeting that, “Our light will be shining over the gangs, 
the reactionaries and those who use the headscarf as a political symbol.”143 In addition to 
combining Susurluk and reaction, these lines are also critical with respect to discourse. 
Instead of directly referring to headscarf itself, the declaration targets “those who use the 
headscarf as a political symbol.” The following remarks by Ives reflect this discourse very 
well: “Traditional intellectuals, as functionaries of the leading classes, present themselves as 
                                                            
141 While criticizing the protests Şevket Kazan blundered by referring to the prejudiced urban legend about the 
Alevi community in Turkey. Kazan’s blunder made the situation more tragic as he confronted the number one 
example of “good Muslims” of the official discourse.  
142 Finkel, A. (2000). “Who Guards the Turkish Press? A Perspective on Press Corruption in Turkey,” Journal of 
International Affairs, 54(1), p.163. 
143 Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.253. 
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if they are not attached to leading classes. By doing so, they present the interests and truths of 
leading classes as if objective truths and common interests.”144 As will be mentioned in the 
discourse analysis chapter, newspapers also claimed that their criticisms were not against 
Islam itself, which is followed by good Muslims, but rather that they were against the 
deceivers of Islam, i.e. the bad Muslims.  
 
All in the same breath, a civil society alliance was being formed against the RP. Major 
employers’ associations and trade unions in Turkey – the Confederation of Public Employees 
Trade Unions (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikası, KESK), the Confederation of Turkish Tradesman 
and Craftsmen (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu, TESK), the Confederation of 
Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TÜRK-İŞ), the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, 
DİSK), and finally the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye 
Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) – allied against the coalition government. With a 
declaration signed on May 4, 1997, the leaders of these unions demanded the government’s 
resignation. The timing of the declaration was significant, as it was just after the unsuccessful 
posing of the question of confidence among opposition parties. During the process, the 
alliance organized several rallies against the government and fully adopted the historic 
hegemonic center’s discourse of the rising reactionary danger.  
 
Later, the largest association of capitalists, TÜSİAD, also became involved in the alliance. 
The alliance was very significant, considering the different backgrounds and ideologies of the 
associations, such as KESK, TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK, which were leftist trade unions; TOBB and 
TESK, which were middle class employees’ organizations; and TÜSİAD, which was an 
organization of upper-class capitalists that is publicly known as the Employer’s Club. For 
example, TÜSİAD used to be a politically liberal organization that supported the market 
economy. Until the February 28 Process, the organization supported the democratization of 
Turkey and in several policy papers prepared by the organization existing civil-military 
relations in Turkey were harshly criticized.145 However, during the February 28 Process, the 
organization changed its tone and backed the military’s intervention in Turkish politics.146 It 
seems that the pro-center and elitist attributes of TÜSİAD were dominant over its capitalist 
characteristics and, as a result, TÜSİAD preferred to act in this manner. The change in the 
position of TÜSİAD proves the explanations of Gramsci on crisis moments. According to 
                                                            
144 Ives, P. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, p.77. 
145 For a list of TÜSİAD reports and their contents see: http://www.tusiad.org/information-center/reports/ accessed 
March 09, 2012. 
146 Demirel, T. (2004). “Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy,” Middle Eastern Studies, 
40(1), p. 137. 
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Gramsci, the moments when vital and major issues are in question are not the testing 
moments of a historic bloc; rather they are the moments of its formation.147 The relationship 
of TÜSİAD and ÇYDD is another example of the formation of the historic bloc, because the 
ÇYDD began to receive financial support from TÜSİAD.148 Before the process, the ADD 
used to be critical of financial support, and generally the ADD considered the ÇYDD as not 
sufficiently Kemalist. When a crisis moment like the process occurred, the ÇYDD turned out 
to be a fully Kemalist organization and developed good relationships with the relatively statist 
ADD and liberal TÜSİAD. The formation of a strong relationship with both parties shows the 
hegemonic capacity of Kemalism in Turkey.  
 
Not surprisingly, the coalition government could no longer resist this rising pressure and 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned on June 17, 1997. Coalition parties tried to 
demonstrate that the resignation was a consequence of coalition protocol, by which a rotation 
in the office of the prime minister between Erbakan and Çiller was made after the government 
fulfilled half of its pre-appointed time. In fact, the coalition protocol really ordered such a 
rotation, but in this it occurred prematurely. However, the plan did not work because of the 
fact that President Demirel did not appoint Çiller as prime minister. Demirel’s decision was 
entirely lawful but not just. According to precedent and established practices, Demirel was 
expected to appoint Çiller as prime minister due to the fact that the two-party coalition still 
formed the majority of the parliament. Nevertheless, Mesut Yılmaz was appointed as the 
prime minister. In the meantime, the Democratic Turkey Party (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi, 
DTP) of Hüsamettin Cindoruk was formed by parliamentarians who had suddenly and 
successively decided to resign from the DYP during the governmental crisis. Despite the fact 
that the resignations from the DYP had started before the resignation of Prime Minister 
Erbakan, the government block lost its majority amidst the resignations during the 
government formation process of the ANAP and Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol 
Parti, DSP). In the end, Mesut Yılmaz formed a minority government consisting of his 
ANAP, Bülent Ecevit’s DSP, and Hüsamettin Cindoruk’s DTP. Receiving a vote of 
confidence for Yılmaz’s government only became possible with the support of the CHP. 
However, the process did not end with the overthrow of the coalition government. On the 
contrary, the overthrow of the coalition government and the establishment of a new one were 
the preparatory stages for “cleansing Islam from the public sphere.”149 The problems with the 
military faced by the succeeding government of Mesut Yılmaz despite its dedication to 
fighting the rising danger of reaction offers insight into the interventionist aims of the TSK 
                                                            
147 Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p.158. 
148 Erdoğan, N. Kemalist Non- Governmental Organizations, p.279. 
149 Yavuz, H. M. (2000). “Cleansing Islam From the Public Sphere,” Journal of International Affairs, 54(1), 21-42. 
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behind the discourse of the rising danger of reaction. These interventionist aims were declared 
in the statement: “The Process Lasts Ad Infinitum.” 
 
3.6. “The Process Lasts Ad Infinitum”: The Cleansing of Islam from the Public Sphere. 
 
It is said that the Turkish military has never been particularly eager to intervene in civil 
politics. Due to the fact that military regimes in Turkish history were not long lasting, many 
commentators make this claim.150 Even if this common-sense claim was true, the military 
intervention of February 28 is an exception. As Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu 
stated in a reception in the first days of 2001, the February 28 Process was meant to last for a 
thousand years.151 
 
The aim of the process was to silence all conservative claims and to banish the conservative 
actors back to their symbolic diaspora. Therefore, the process did not finish when Erbakan 
resigned from the office of prime minister, nor with the banning of the RP on January 16, 
1998. Furthermore, it is difficult to set an end date for the period. It can even be said that the 
process is still continuing, considering the adoption of the same discourse of the rising 
reactionary danger today. Naturally, however, the scope and potency of the process have 
decreased over time. 
 
As stated before, there was a political opportunity structure for conservative demands in 
Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. During the process, these political opportunities were 
reversed. The rapid rise of conservative actors in the public sphere decelerated, if not halted 
entirely, through the process. Education was one of the issues emphasized most by the 
military during the process. As mentioned before, the military in their briefings claimed that 
the educational institutions run by reactionaries should be closed down in order to fight 
against the rising reactionary danger. Therefore, during the process, the educational means of 
the conservative opposition were amputated. The closure of junior high school-level İmam-
Hatip Schools, discrimination against İmam-Hatip graduates in university entrance exams, the 
headscarf ban in universities, and the pressure on private conservative education institutions 
were aimed at blocking conservative upward mobilization through education. Secondly, the 
economy was considered another sphere in which an arduous fight against the reactionaries 
was necessary. The military claimed that the so-called Green Capital, Yeşil Sermaye, 
economically supported the reaction in Turkey. As a consequence, harsh measures were taken 
                                                            
150 There are also more scholarly examples of this claim. See: Lombardi, B. (1997) “Turkey-Return of the 
Reluctant Generals?” Political Science Quarterly, 112(2), 191-215.  
151 Koru, F. “Mantık ve Dilbilimin İzinde,” Yeni Şafak, January 18, 2001, accessed June 1, 2011, 
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against companies that were accused of being reactionary. Thirdly, staffing was another issue 
pointed out by the Kemalists as one of the indicators of rising reactionary danger, and harsh 
measures were also taken against conservative personnel in state institutions. Just as the 
military advised in their briefings, other state institutions also started dismissing practicing 
Muslim staff, claiming that they were reactionaries. Last but not least, the Kemalist 
establishment claimed that reactionaries made use of loopholes in laws in order to expand 
their sphere of influence. In order to stop the usage of these loopholes, new legal 
arrangements were made by the government that was established after the resignation of 
Erbakan. By taking these measures, the Kemalists hoped to destroy the social, political and 
economical bases of conservative politics in Turkey forever, and this is what is meant by the 
ad infinitum character of the intervention. 
 
However, while nobody thought that the February 28 Process would last ad infinitum, nor did 
anyone think that it would be mostly stopped by majority rule of the AKP that started in 2002. 
Yet the AKP majority was not free from problems in terms of civilian-military relations or the 
debate over secularism.  
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4. The Presidential Election and e-Memorandum 
 
In order to understand the April 27 Process, it is essential to analyze the AKP and the factors 
behind its rise. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to investigate the AKP and its rise. The 
investigation will first provide the basic factual history of the AKP. After this, different 
theoretical accounts that were offered by scholars to explain the case of AKP will be 
summarized. Finally, a partly new theoretical approach will be proposed for the analysis of 
the AKP. The new approach will be proposed through the criticism and rejection of some 
parts of the existing literature and, of course, by drawing inspiration from other parts. At the 
end, this new approach will also be placed into the general theoretical framework of the 




4.1. Rise of the AKP 
 
The AKP’s 34.29 percent landslide electoral victory in the November 2002 general elections 
constituted the first step in a series of election victories that the AKP would have during its 
political life. The election victory that the AKP achieved in the first election it participated in 
less than one year after its establishment is a key point that should not be overlooked. Yet, it 
is not the starting point, even though many accounts that will be given as examples in the 
following section treated it as such. In order to maintain a historical perspective in the 
discussions of secularism in Turkey and in this dissertation, an accurate analysis of the AKP 
should start with (1) the political and social atmosphere in Turkey on the eve of the 2002 
elections, (2) the condition of the electorate in the above-mentioned period and (3) the 
messages of the AKP that were transmitted to the electorate at this time. 
  
4.1.1. The Political and Social Atmosphere on the Eve of the 2002 General Elections 
 
Looking at the general social and political atmosphere in the country before the 2002 general 
elections, it can be said the February 28 Process did not last for a thousand years as hoped by 
Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu. However, in the last years of the 1990s and the 
first years of the 2000s, military tutelage was still prevailing in Turkish politics. Arguments 
between succeeding prime ministers and TSK were good indicators of the TSK’s continuing 
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involvement in Turkish politics. At the end of 2001, Army Commander Yaşar Büyükanıt 
defined the situation as follows: 
 
“It is important to learn the Atatürkist thought system. However, the main 
thing is to turn lifestyles into a behavior type that is in conformity with this 
thought system. Those countries that fail to form a common denominator are 
in an environment of conflict. Our common denominator is a secular and 
democratic Turkey within an Atatürkist thought system and unitary structure. 
Every action that does not converge with this common denominator is an 
enemy of our nation and homeland and must be fought. The Atatürkist 
thought system is your only soldier.”152   
 
It should be noted that Büyükanıt gave this speech in the opening ceremony of the Gülhane 
Military Medical School and at that time the coalition government of the DSP, MHP and 
ANAP was in power, which meant that the reactionaries of the February 28 Process had been 
away from power for three years and all the recommendations of the February 28 MGK 
meeting were being realized. What Büyükanıt defined as the “Atatürkist Thought System” 
was the official ideology of the Turkish state, which the TSK utilized as a source of 
legitimacy for its interventions in civil politics. As very clearly revealed in the statement, the 
TSK regarded any attempt at deviance from the official ideology as hostility toward the 
Republic and itself as well. Furthermore, the TSK’s tutelage was not limited to the political 
realm but also expanded to the social realm with the aim of bringing lifestyles into conformity 
with the official ideology. As a result of this understanding, the political realm of the country 
was extremely narrowed down and took on an artificial character. 
  
The characteristics and structures of the governments that succeeded Refahyol reflected this 
constrained and artificial political atmosphere. The 1999 general elections were the first since 
the February 28 Process. The coalition government established after the 1999 elections 
between the statist and central leftist DSP, the nationalist and rightist MHP, the and central 
right and liberal ANAP had been the most long-lived coalition government in Turkey’s 
history. In other words, the long life of the coalition government despite the considerably 
different party programs, policies and historical backgrounds of the coalition partners showed 
the constrained and artificial character of the Turkish political realm during and after the 
February 28 Process. The formula for this harmony within the coalition government consisted 
in the fact that the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), which succeeded the RP, and the DYP 
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were the only opposition parties in the parliament. Any change in the coalition government 
would have meant the inclusion of either the FP or the DYP in the government. However, it 
was well-known that the TSK was against the FP and the DYP, which were regarded as 
responsible for the rising danger of reaction. This was the reality that Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit referred to when he frequently said that the country did not have an alternative 
government.153  
 
Being unsure about the possible results of an early general election and in the company of a 
powerful force majeure, i.e. the TSK, the coalition partners could only continue their 
“consistent cooperation.” However, the constrained and artificial character of the political 
realm erupted with a discussion between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister 
Bülent Ecevit in the MGK meeting on 19 February, 2001. It was again a MGK meeting that 
set the scene for another turning point in Republican history. It was claimed that President 
Sezer threw a copy of the Turkish constitution in Prime Minister Ecevit’s face. According to 
political rumors, President Sezer accused the government of corruption. As a response to the 
president’s accusations, it was rumored that Deputy Prime Minister Hüsamettin Özkan called 
President Sezer unthankful because it had been Ecevit’s government that nominated and 
elected Sezer as president.154 Ecevit stated in the press conference held after the aborted MGK 
meeting that this was a huge crisis. Contrary to what was expected, the government was not 
dissolved after the crisis and the coalition partners did not call for an early election. The 
“consistent cooperation” of the government was still continuing despite the huge crisis.  
 
On the other hand, the government could not prevent the economic crisis that was triggered 
by the political crisis. On February 21, only three days after the MGK crisis, the economic 
situation was regarded as the deepest economic crisis in the history of the country,155 which 
had already been in a crisis since 1998. The paradox that the deepest economic crises in the 
history of the country broke out in the term of its most consistent coalition government is the 
key element for understanding the artificial and constrained political realm of the period.  
 
Meanwhile, Turkey continued to experience other firsts. The tension in the streets was also 
rising to an unprecedented level. This time it was not student groups or activists that went out 
but artisans and craftsmen; the most conservative and traditional classes. The rallies that 
started with the throwing of a cash register at Prime Minister Ecevit by a bankrupted artisan 
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gained a communal character and spread to every corner of the country. Turkey witnessed 
craftsmen’s and artisans’ protest rallies in Konya, Ankara, Kayseri, İzmir, Gaziantep, Sivas, 
Çankırı and Kocaeli. The protests of artisans and craftsmen reflected the dimensions of the 
huge crisis that the country was passing through. The protest of any social group and their 
dissatisfaction with the condition of the country was quite normal in Turkey. However, when 
the people in the street constituted the most traditional segment of the society that had never 
gone out in protests before, it meant that the issue was deeper than simple dissatisfaction or 
discomfort. That is, it corresponded to a certain hegemonic crisis that had been held at bay 
with the help of the February 28 Process in the short run but deepened by that same process in 
the long term. While economic and social crises were deepening, Ecevit’s health was also 
deteriorating. Ecevit, who was 77 at the time, was moved to a hospital on May 5, 2002. After 
his treatment, which lasted longer than one week, Ecevit was discharged from the hospital. 
However, after a short time he returned to the hospital and his condition was serious toward 
the end of June 2002. It was not surprising that Turkey, experiencing the deepest economic 
and social crisis of its history, its prime minister having been hospitalized for severe health 
problems, faced the dissatisfaction of the urban middle class and the conservative electorate.  
 
4.1.2. The Urban Middle Class and the Conservative Electorate  
 
The condition of the urban middle classes, who supported the February 28 Process but later 
faced the deepest social and economical crisis in Republican history, and of the conservative 
electorate under such a crisis environment is also important for understanding the rise of the 
AKP.  
 
The winners of the 1999 general elections were the central leftist DSP and the nationalist and 
right wing MHP. The reason these two parties came first and second in the election goes back 
to the February 28 Process and it is indicative of the condition of the urban middle class and 
the conservative electorate on the eve of the 2002 elections. The historic hegemonic center of 
Turkish capitalism defined reaction and PKK as the country’s two problem axes. The 
mobilization of the urban middle classes in the February 28 Process and later the results of the 
1999 elections show that the urban middle classes seemed satisfied with this understanding on 
the part of the historic hegemonic center.  
 
Having the advantage of being the prime minister when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the 
PKK, was captured, Bülent Ecevit and his DSP came first in the 1999 general elections with 
22.19 percent of the vote. Furthermore, Ecevit’s DSP’s “faith-respectful secularism,” 
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“inançlara saygılı laiklik” was also a factor in its party’s election result. The party was 
secular enough to submit to the TSK’s demands for increasing its influence in politics, and 
respectful and tolerant enough to assuage the concerns of conservatives and urban middle 
classes that were also uneasy about a crisis like the February 28 Process despite the fact that 
they supported the secularist measures in the process. The same binary of reaction and PKK 
was also evident in the 17.98 percent of the vote the MHP received in the 1999 elections. As 
nationalists, the MHP fit very well the role of the hawk in a period when people expected the 
execution of Abdullah Öcalan. Being the hawk in the struggle against the PKK was not the 
only expectation from MHP. With its conservative character, the party was also expected to 
represent the conservative masses, whose means were crippled by the February 28 Process. 
Although it never had an Islamist tone, the MHP, which even made an electoral alliance with 
the RP in the 1991 general elections, was the second-best choice for the conservatives. 
Furthermore, popular conservative figures like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek 156  also formed a 
transparent zone between the conservative masses and the MHP.157 As a result of these 
historical ties, the MHP became the address of the conservative electorate who did not 
support the FP, the successor of the banned RP. Furthermore, the iron fist of the MHP also 
played a role in the conservative electorate’s choice of the MHP rather than the FP. Mehmet 
Bekaroğlu158 claims that the FP did not manage to put forward an astute and powerful 
opposition and that the electorate therefore abandoned the party not because of its victimhood, 
but because of its being helpless and incompetent.159 However, the MHP disappointed the 
conservative electorate in the very first step during the opening ceremony of the TBMM. Far 
from supporting Merve Kavakçı, the headscarf-wearing deputy of FP, against those who 
claimed Kavakçı could not take the deputy oath with her headscarf on, the party asked its 
member, Nesrin Ünal, a headscarf-wearing deputy, to take her headscarf off during the 
meetings of the TBMM. Thus, this party failed to satisfy the conservative sectors of Turkish 
society.  
 
Although they supported the “appropriate” parties against reaction and the PKK, which were 
Turkey’s major problems according to the understanding put forward during the February 28 
Process, it is difficult to say the urban middle classes and conservatives were satisfied, as 
none of the problems that caused the February 28 crisis were solved. On the contrary, 
Turkey’s long-standing problems of corruption, underdevelopment, unemployment, and 
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political and economic instability were deepened as a result of these extraordinary conditions; 
that is, the artificial and constrained character of the social and political realms. Therefore, it 
can be said that the urban middle classes and conservative electorate were ready to be flexible 
voters in the coming elections if they received the appropriate political messages and program. 
Under such circumstances it is important to understand the ideology and message of the AKP.  
4.1.3. The Ideology and Message of the AKP 
 
While the country’s atmosphere of crisis and ambiguity continued, along with the resulting 
dissatisfaction of the electorate, the popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party, which 
included many figures from center-right besides the reformist wing of MG, increased. 
Erdoğan and his party’s public relations policies offered an alternative to the Turkish 
electorate in the crisis conditions. In his visits to several Anatolian cities both before the 
establishment of the party and during the election campaign, Erdoğan talked to thousands of 
people. During his speeches he recited the first verse of a popular song, which was also 
frequently sung in stadiums in football matches: “We Walked Together On These Roads,” 
“Beraber Yürüdük Biz Bu Yollarda.” The crowds replied to Erdoğan with the second verse: 
“We Got Soaked Together Under the Rain,” “Beraber Islandık Yağan Yağmurda.” This kind 
of populist and comprehensive political language brought the support of a right wing and 
liberal electorate that had never supported a MG party before. Pointing to the military tutelage 
over civilian politics, he was stating: “We will stand tall, but we will not become obstinate,” 
“Dik Duracağız ama Dikleşmeyeceğiz.” With the first part of the motto he was targeting the 
MHP, which had been the earlier preference of conservative votes but later became a 
disappointment because of its compromising politics with the TSK. The second part of the 
motto targeted the previous MG parties, which were criticized for being “too radical” and 
irreconcilable with the TSK and other state institutions. Thus, he constantly emphasized that 
the AKP would not be an ideological party, but a practical one. 
 
The ideologists of the AKP conceptualized the party’s ideology of “ideology-lessness” as 
conservative democracy. However, neither scholars in the field nor the ideologists who first 
coined the term, Ömer Çelik and Yasin Akdoğan, have defined it yet. In spite of party’s many 
years in power now and the many documents its ideologists produced, it is still impossible to 
infer the boundaries of the term, what it excludes or includes. Yet, the non-definition of the 
term does not depend on a technical impossibility but rather on a choice: ideology-lessness. 
For example, in various academic and political documents written by Çelik and Akdoğan, 
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after declaring the death of ideology, they mention the “opportunities” of conservative 
democracy instead of its definition.160  
 
The first part of the concept – conservatism, muhafazakarlık – has nothing to do with the 
conceptual discussions of political science. When referring to conservatism, the AKP and its 
actors were not talking about conserving the political system and its norms; rather, they meant 
the conservation of social and cultural norms, which were highly intertwined with religiosity. 
The cultural, social and religious connotations of the concept offered the AKP a discursive 
opportunity to define the priorities of the party, as when Mehmet Ali Şahin, an influential 
AKP member, declared that the headscarf was not a priority of the party.161 Şahin’s message 
was clear: “Although we are all conservatives like you, for now we are unable to solve the 
headscarf problem,” and he was sure that the message was also understood clearly by the 
electorate. 
 
The second part of the concept was also an opportunity to communicate with the urban 
middle classes and the capitalists. By underlining democracy, the AKP stressed that it had 
differentiated itself from the traditional MG line and appreciated the market economy and 
capitalist democracy. Indeed, as mentioned in the chapters about the RP and the February 28 
Process, seen from a Gramscian perspective, the RP was also ready to come to terms with 
capitalist democracy and market economy, but either its reconciliatory message was not 
clearly submitted to the historic hegemonic center or the historic hegemonic center was not 
very eager to receive the message. Contrary to the RP, the AKP’s luck was that it was more 
powerful than the RP against the historic hegemonic center. Its message regarding the market 
economy and capitalist democracy was more powerful and understandable and, finally, the 
historic hegemonic center was more in need of cooperation than it had been in 1997. It should 
be noted that the 2001 economic crisis was destructive for the country’s major capitalists in 
the long term, as well as being disastrous for lower-income groups in the short term. In terms 
of a Gramscian conceptualization, one part of the historic hegemonic center, capitalists and\or 
media, was in a position such that it had to defend its specific interests rather than the general 
interests of the historic hegemonic center, which meant the collapse of the hegemonic alliance 
built in the February 28 Process and the building of a new one with the AKP, even if it was 
                                                            
160 See; Akdoğan, Y. (2006). “The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity,” in The Emergence of 
A New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, M. Hakan Yavuz (eds.), 49-65. Salt Lake City: The University of 
Utah Press; Akdoğan, Y. “AK Parti’nin Siyasi Çizgisi Olgunlaşıyor”, Yeni Şafak, January 11, 2004, accessed June 
01, 2011, http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2004/ocak/11/yakdogan.html; Çelik, Ö. “Muhafazakarlık ve Demokratlık,” 
Sabah, January 11, 2004, accessed June 01, 2011, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/01/11/celik.html. 
161 “Şahin: Önceliğimiz Türban Değil İşsizlik,” Milliyet, May 24, 2006, accessed June 01, 2011, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/24/siyaset/siy02.html.  
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only temporary. The huge support of the central media for the AKP both before and after the 
2002 general elections was the chief indicator of the new alliance.162  
 
In conclusion, the political and social crises on the eve of the 2002 elections, the 
dissatisfaction of the urban middle class and the conservative electorate in the election 
process and, finally, the AKP’s ideology and communication strategy were the main reasons 
for the landslide election victory. Besides these influential factors, the attitude of the historic 
hegemonic center toward the AKP was also influential both in the election results and the 
AKP’s performance, i.e. its ability and capacity to rule the country. However this attitude did 
not remain stable towards the presidential elections. 
 
4.2. The Presidential Elections and the e-Memorandum 
 
The temporary coalition between the AKP and the capitalist wing of the Turkish historic 
hegemonic center started to dissolve during the presidential election process. The real 
problem for the capitalist wing of the historic hegemonic center was not a conservative 
president or the headscarf of a potential conservative president’s wife. The problem that 
caused a split in the alliance between the AKP and the capitalist wing of the Turkish historic 
hegemonic center was the former’s strong chance at creating a “national popular” and 
replacing the existing historic hegemonic center with a new one or, in other words, 
eliminating the traditional capitalist classes from the formation of a new historic hegemonic 
center. 
 
The AKP’s five years of majority rule had created a suitable base for the flourishing of a new 
modernity, sociality and political economy that in the end had the potential to create a new 
national popular. The change in the media industry is a good example of the creation of a new 
national popular. This time it was not only the conservative media institutions that were 
supporting the conservatives; the center media was also supporting the AKP and its societal 
base. The fact that Ömer Çelik’s columns in which he formulated and publicized the 
conservative democracy ideology had been published in Sabah was just one of the indicators 
of the changing balances in the historic hegemonic center. Another example of this shift was 
the increasing visibility of conservative popular figures on TV channels. Figures like Fehmi 
                                                            
162 The reports and comments from the center media indicate support for the AKP; “Anadolu Ihtilali,” Sabah, 
November 04, 2002; “Sosyal Patlama Sandıkta Oldu,” Hürriyet, November 4, 2002; “AKP Tek Başına İktidar,” 
Milliyet, November 4, 2002; 
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Koru163 became increasingly sought-after commentators for newscasts and current affairs 
programs while discussing government policy. The conservative bureaucrats who had been 
removed from their posts over accusations of being reactionaries in the February 28 Process 
started to return to civil service in higher ranks and they joined the existing conservative 
bureaucrats whose promotions had been increased by the AKP. The story of Central Bank 
Director Durmuş Yılmaz is a good case for understanding the promotion of conservative 
bureaucrats. Yılmaz, who was appointed as the bank’s director in 2006, was the third name 
sent to the President by the government for appointment because the previous candidates’ 
appointment had been blocked by President Sezer due to their supposed incompatibility with 
the basic principles of the republic – principles that were mentioned in the speech of then-
Army Commander Yaşar Büyükanıt, which quoted previously. Although Yılmaz was also 
incompatible with the secular character of the Republic, President Sezer somehow accepted 
his appointment. However, the appointment was harshly criticized by the center media, which 
claimed that the professional qualities and lifestyle of Yılmaz did not meet the criteria for 
being a Central Bank director. In the end, Yılmaz, whose term finished in May 2011 and who 
was then appointed as chief advisor to the President, was regarded as one of the most 
successful Central Bank directors.164  Parallel to these developments in the bureaucracy, 
conservative businessmen that had been exposed to a witch-hunt based on the claim that they 
represented a reactionary danger got their seats reserved on the plane of the prime minister for 
foreign visits in order to sign international trade agreements. İmam-Hatip high school 
graduates and students whose right to higher education had been crippled in the February 28 
Process, and as a result continued their university education abroad, started to return to 
Turkey as bureaucrats, white-collar workers and academicians.165  
 
In 2007, the hot topic on the political agenda was the possibility of a change in the post of the 
presidency paralleling the direction of the change in the bureaucracy, the media and the 
business world. While the discussion on the profile of the new president was continuing, 
Sabih Kanadoğlu, an ardent Kemalist and retired chief prosecutor of the Court of Appeals, 
claimed that a qualified majority (3/5) of the parliament was needed as the meeting quorum 
for a presidential election.166 When Kanadoğlu first put forward his argument, his claims were 
                                                            
163 Fehmi Koru is a conservative columnist and political analyst. Koru has close ties with AKP member politicians. 
In particular, his close friendship with President Abdullah Gül, who had been prime minister and minister of 
foreign affairs before being elected as president, attracted significant public attention.  
164 Ertuğrul Özkök, who in the beginning thought that Yılmaz’s appointment was not professional but political, 
later apologized to Yılmaz and commented that he was one of the most successful directors not only for himself 
but also for the international authorities; Özkök, E. “Meğer O Ayakkabıyı Biz Ters Giymişiz,” Hürriyet, April 15, 
2011, accessed June 01, 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/17551589.asp  
165 For more informatiom about İmam Hatip Graduates after the February 28 Process see; Çağlar, İ. (2011). From 
Symbolic to Physical Diaspora: İmam Hatip Graduates in Europe. Unpublished Research Report. Utrecht 
University.  
166 Kanadoğlu, S. “AKP Tek Başına Seçemez,” Cumhuriyet, December 12, 2006, p.8. 
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not taken seriously and were regarded as the desperate efforts of an old-school Kemalist. 
However, as the presidential election drew nearer, the historic hegemonic center realized that 
there was no option other than this so-called 367-formula to prevent the election of a 
conservative as the president.  
 
While these discussions were going on, the media did not find it difficult to use its traditional 
means of opposition to the conservatives and began to publish news and comments about the 
gradual Islamization of the country and the AKP’s weakness in defending the country’s 
interests against PKK: 
 
“As the controversy grew more bitter, secular media outlets run by the Doğan 
family began publishing the illustrated life stories of the headscarf-wearing wives 
of AKP ministers and high-level civil servants. Such, the coverage implied, would 
be the permanent fate of Turkish women if the headscarf ban were not maintained. 
And not only that: Turkey would become an Islamic state. The conspiracy theories 
about Islamization, oddly enough, are fueled by strong anti-American 
sentiment.”167 
 
Like the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, in this period a series of rallies were 
organized under the name of “Republican Rallies,” “Cumhuriyet Mitingleri”. Again the main 
hegemonic civil society apparatus of the historic hegemonic center, i.e. the Kemalist NGOs, 
were on the scene as the organizers of the rallies. While the rallies were being organized by 
the ADD, which was led by Şener Eruygur, the retired commander of the gendarmerie, on 
April 12, two days before the ADD’s first meeting in Ankara, Chief of General Staff Yaşar 
Büyükkanıt explained that he hoped not a “fake,” “sözde” but a “real,” “özde” secular 
president would be elected. The Ankara Republican Rally took place at Tandoğan Square 
with the participation of thousands of people, who later walked to Anıtkabir and finished the 
rally there.168 The Republican Rallies continued after the e-memorandum issued by the TSK 
on April 27. Other crowded rallies took place on April 29 in Istanbul and on May 13 in Izmir, 
in addition to smaller ones organized in Çanakkale and Manisa on May 5.  
 
                                                            
167 Elver, H. “Lawfare and Wearfare in Turkey,” Middle East Report Online, April, 2008, accessed September 09, 
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168 The exact number of participants in the rallies was controversial. The organizer ADD claimed that the number 
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Besides controversy over the number of participants in these rallies, there were also 
ambiguities regarding the socio-political composition of the crowds and the message they 
wanted to give. First of all, the organizers and participants of the rallies should be 
differentiated. Among the organizers and prominent figures that took the stage and delivered 
speeches there were NGO’s like the ADD, the ÇYDD and the Republican Women’s 
Association and figures such as Türkan Saylan, Nur Serter, Necla Arat and Tuncay Özkan. 
Türkan Saylan, Nur Serter and Necla Arat are retired old-school Kemalist academicians who 
were chief actors behind the headscarf bans in universities in the 1990s. Tuncay Özkan is a 
journalist who supported the center-right Mesut Yılmaz in the 1990s and turned out to be a 
Kemalist-nationalist, ulusalcı, against the AKP in 2000s. Now Özkan has been arrested and is 
accused of being a member of an intra-state criminal organization that planned a coup d’état 
against ruling AKP. Both the outlook of the organizing community and the speeches they 
delivered in the rallies were a far stretch from democratic norms and values. However, 
fortunately, the “thinly veiled pro-military”169 message of the organizers was not shared by 
the participants.170 The middle class urban participants171 were not in conformity with the 
militarist tone that could be heard from the stage. The participants, who chanted the slogan 
“Neither Shariah, nor coup, but fully independent Turkey,” “Ne Şeriat Ne Darbe, Tam 
Bağımsız Türkiye” clearly stated that they were against a military intervention.  
 
As a result of the manipulation of the historic hegemonic center and the media, participants in 
the Republican Rallies were fearful about the dangers of reaction and Kurdish separatism that 
supposedly awaited Turkey in the near future under the rule of the AKP. The alternative 
modernity offered by the AKP to the less modernized segments of Turkish society and the 
resulting increase in public visibility for these previously less-modernized segments in the 
high-status spheres that were previously totally defined and therefore dominated by the 
middle-class urban participants of the Republican Rallies, created a desire to preserve and 
protect modern lifestyles.172 As will be demonstrated in the discourse analysis chapter, this 
sensitivity was manipulated by the media into a fear of creeping and gradual Islamization and 
subsequently mobilized in the form of Republican Rallies. The stress on a “fully independent 
Turkey” in the slogans chanted in the Republican Rallies was the result of the rising 
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nationalism in the country that was again affected by the tone of newspaper discourse in the 
period.  
 
Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt’s press conference on April 12 was another important 
turning point in the discussions about the presidential election. In the beginning, the focus of 
the press conference was not the presidential election, contrary to what was expected by the 
journalists who attended the conference. Only at the end of the conference did Büyükanıt talk 
about the presidential election and state that the TSK was expecting a president who was 
“really, not superficially (pseudo),” “sözde değil özde,” in full conformity with the basic 
principles of the Republic. These words from Büyükanıt and the reactions of the journalists in 
attendance reflected the militant position of the journalists in Turkey. Among many other 
questions, after noting that it was not allowed for military officers’ wives to wear a headscarf 
and that the president was the supreme commander of the TSK, Taki Doğan of the Habertürk 
Television Channel asked what the TSK’s reaction would be if someone whose wife wore a 
headscarf was elected as president – the supreme commander of the army by definition.173 
Büyükanıt reacted to the question by stating that he understood and accepted the question but 
would not answer it. After Doğan, Murat Yetkin of Radikal took the floor and, noting that 
Büyükanıt had explained his desire for the election a president who was really in conformity 
with the basic principles of the Republic, Yetkin asked whether Büyükanıt felt any doubt 
about that. As an answer Büyükanıt had a negative attitude to the question, and he only said 
that he had no doubts about the election of a president who was in conformity with the basic 
principles of the Republic. Büyükanıt was far from showing the iron fist that had been 
expected and provoked by the attending journalists. Finally, unsatisfied with Büyükanıt’s 
reply, Emin Çölaşan of Hürriyet grasped the microphone from Yetkin and, mentioning that 
there was a certain name that was supposed to be the candidate for the presidency, asked 
whether “that certain name” was really in conformity with the basic principles of the Republic. 
Büyükanıt, clearly more civilian-minded than Çölaşan, said he did not want to talk about 
particular names. 
 
Not taking the 367-condition and the Republican Rallies seriously, the AKP seemed 
uninterested in these discussions. When asked about them, prime minister answered that the 
presidential elections would not be on their agenda until election time. Furthermore, Erdoğan 
stated that the opposition parties played with the presidential elections like children playing a 
game.174 Not heeding the historic hegemonic center’s threats regarding the quorum and 
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military intervention175, Erdoğan delayed declaring his party’s candidate for presidency until 
the last minute. On April 24, three days before the first round of elections and the last day of 
the applications for the candidacy, Erdoğan declared Abdullah Gül as the AKP’s candidate 
for the presidential election. 
 
Normally, Erdoğan’s declaration of Gül as the presidential candidate was not something 
problematic or unexpected due to the democratic standards of Turkey and earlier precedents. 
The last three presidents before Gül had been the only Turkish presidents without a military 
background. Özal, the first of these, was the leader of the ANAP that was the majority ruling 
party during the election period. Süleyman Demirel, the second, even lacked the majority 
Özal had. He was the leader of the DYP, which was the winner of the last elections and the 
bigger partner in the ruling coalition government. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the third, was the 
president of the Constitutional Court and nobody even considered his name among the 
potential candidates until Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit of the post-February 28 Process 
mentioned his name. As a result of the constrained and artificial political atmosphere of the 
period, a great consensus was reached around Sezer, who displayed a democratic character 
until he was elected as the president and was known by the liberal and pro-freedom speeches 
he delivered once a year in the opening ceremonies of the Constitutional Court. Considering 
these past practices, Gül’s candidacy for the presidency would not have been an unexpected 
situation in terms of the political tradition of Turkey. Furthermore, Erdoğan did not nominate 
himself, but chose a more moderate figure, Gül, for the presidency. However, Gül’s 
presidency was opposed on the grounds of a lack of a consensus. This was a condition, just 
like the 367 quorum, that had never been sought for previous presidents. 
 
The AKP was the only party and Abdullah Gül was the only candidate that was present in the 
parliament when it gathered for the first round of the presidential election on April 27. At the 
end of the first round, Gül took 357 votes but could not reach 367, which was the majority-
quorum needed for being elected in the first round. However, 367 was also the meeting 
quorum according to the CHP and, therefore, the opposition party brought the election before 
the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was expected to explain its decision before 
the second round that would be held three days later. However, the TSK took the initiative 
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from the Constitutional Court and issued a memorandum on its website at midnight on April 
27.176 
 
 The e-memorandum started with the cliché of a reactionary danger that had been increasingly 
targeting the secular Republic in the recent past. After that, examples of this rising reactionary 
danger were mentioned. The first example was from Şanlıurfa, regarding a children’s choir’s 
singing of religious songs in a meeting organized for the celebration of the Prophet 
Muhammed’s birthday. However, it was not the first time the same organization was cited as 
an indicator of rise of rising reactionary danger. The organization was previously reported by 
Milliyet on April 24.177  The second example was also an event in the context of the 
celebrations of the Prophet Muhammed’s birthday. It was again religious songs and a 
children’s choir that were regarded as a sign of the rise of reactionary danger in Denizli and it 
was again Milliyet that previously reported the event.178 After the demonstration of the 
evidence of the crime, the e-memorandum declared the culprit: it was the administrative 
organs that let the events be organized. The e-memorandum stated that the attitude of the 
administrative organs toward these kinds of reactionary actions did not comply with the chief 
of general staff’s definition of real seculars. In its final section, the e-memorandum brought 
the presidential election to the center of the argument and stated that as a result of the cited 
examples of rising reactionary danger, the secular character of the republic had begun to be 
discussed in the presidential election process. The e-memorandum concluded with the threat 
of a coup d’état as in the MGK press release of February 28: The TSK is a party in the 
discussions on secularism and the presidential election and it shall display its attitude and 
actions when it is needed.  
 
Contrary to the usual discourse of the TSK, what was unique in this incident was the counter-
memorandum issued by the government’s spokesperson, Cemil Çiçek, the day after the e-
memorandum. 179  Instead of retreating like previous governments against the military’s 
opposition, the government clearly stated that the e-memorandum was regarded as a 
declaration made against the government and that this was unacceptable in a democratic 
system. Furthermore, reminding its audience of the fact that the TSK was an official 
institution under the command of the Office of the Prime Minister, any kind of statement by 
the TSK that targeted the government was not acceptable. The government’s counter 
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memorandum also underlined the timing of the proclamation and concluded that the e-
memorandum would be regarded as an attempt to influence the Constitutional Court in its 
decision about the presidential election. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s decision to invalidate the first round of the presidential election 
with the excuse of the absence of the majority quorum (367) came almost immediately after 
the e-memorandum. The decision, which would have been questioned even if the TSK had 
not issued the e-memorandum, entirely lost its social and legal legitimacy. However, it was 
still binding for the presidential election. On May 6, the parliament met again to repeat the 
first round of the presidential election. The parliament was again incapable of meeting the 
quorum because of the absence of the CHP. The government therefore decided to call for 
early elections, as required by the constitution in the event of a failure to elect a new president. 
The election of the new president became the first task of the new parliament that would be 
established after the general elections. However, the deadlock in the presidential election 
process was not because of the quorum or any other secondary factors such as the personality 
of the candidate or his wife’s headscarf. The deadlock was in the relationship between the 
AKP and the historic hegemonic center.  
 
4.3. Reading the AKP and the Historic Hegemonic Center 
 
There is a very significant body of literature on the AKP. Many scholars from different 
theoretical schools have discussed various characteristics of the AKP. Of course, like every 
other body of academic work, the literature on the AKP is also subject to certain criticisms. 
The criticisms may be about the general shortcomings of the theoretical body within which 
the scholars prefer to speak or they may be based on the particular features of a given analysis. 
However, with regard to the literature on the AKP, most of the analyses unfortunately have 
two specific shortcomings regardless of the capacities of the various theoretical tools used 
and the personal tendencies of the analyst.  
 
The first common shortcoming of such analyses is a kind of problem of anachronism. Most of 
the time analyses of the AKP deal with an account of how the AKP became successful in 
ruling the country in the fields of education, health, transportation and the economy. 
Moreover, once a comparative perspective with the record sheet of Turkey’s traditional right 
and left-wing political parties is offered, it becomes nearly impossible for the reader to not be 
convinced by the arguments that display these successes as the reasons for rise of the AKP. 
But while they are extremely convincing in explaining the electorate’s continuing support of 
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the AKP in the 2007 elections, they say nothing about the first success of party in the 2002 
elections.  
 
The other characteristic of existing literature on the AKP is retrospective analysis. Scholars 
precisely “designate” the presidential election crisis as the starting point of the analyses and 
then continue with the results of the presidential election crisis, the fault lines and strategies 
of the AKP and the other parties in the crisis. Most of the time the analysis finishes with an 
evaluation of the “results of the crisis” if the presidential election process finished by the time 
the article was written; or predictions – unfortunately most of the time wishes – for the 
possible results of the presidential election crisis if the presidential election process had not 
finished by the time the article was written. In both cases the presidential election crisis is 
treated as a unit that naturally started before the presidential election, continued during the 
election process and finished with the election of Abdullah Gül as the new president. 
Unfortunately, none of these analyses answers questions such as these: Why did the AKP and 
the other parties in the presidential election crisis not settle on a middle way like they did in 
many cases between 2002 and 2007? What was the role of previous developments in the 
disagreement between the AKP and the other parties in the crisis? What was it that changed 
with the election of a president like Abdullah Gül, rather than somebody else? 
 
To answer these questions together with many others, to overcome the two major 
shortcomings of the existing AKP analyses and, finally, to generate a more accurate account 
of the AKP, a literature analysis seems to best way to begin. Grouping will be an effective 
means to start the analysis of existing literature on the AKP. However, it should be mentioned 
that grouping will be used as a methodological tool, which means that the groups will not be 
exhaustive or exclusive. Although it is possible to mark some scholars who strictly follow a 
theoretical school in the analysis of the AKP, the majority of scholars can be placed in several 
schools. In addition to the diversity among the different works from a given scholar, it is even 
possible to observe different theoretical explanations in a single work. With these 
methodological reservations in mind, the following grouping is suggested: (1) Orientalism 
and Modernization Theory, (2) Political Economy Theory, (3) Social Movement Theory, (4) 
Modernity and Civil Society Theory. 
 
As a result of the abundance of literature on the AKP, it is impossible to cover all the 
examples of a theoretical explanation. Therefore, there must be some limiting of the amount 
of literature that will be covered for each theoretical explanation. The first of the selection 
criteria will be the type of publication. Articles and chapters in edited volumes will be 
preferred to books because they are more focused on a single issue. Secondly, well-known 
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and established scholars advancing a theoretical explanation will be preferred to others. 
Finally, typical examples of a theoretical explanation will be preferred to others regardless of 
the reputation of the author. 
 
Using this criteria an overview of orientalist and modernist explanations for the rise of the 
AKP can be made as follows: 
 
4.1.1. Orientalism and Modernization Theory 
 
In their explanations for the rise of global Islamic movements in general and the Turkish AKP 
in particular, culture, tradition and nature are the concepts used most often by the disciples of 
orientalism and modernization theory. According to the scholars of these schools, there are 
fundamental cultural differences between the East and the West and these cultural differences 
make it impossible for eastern cultures to abandon traditional values and norms for modern 
ones. Moreover, scholars who are closer to orientalism than modernization theory claim that 
the nature of Islam is very political and, therefore, not compatible with modern notions of 
democracy, human rights and freedom. 
 
Scholars of orientalism and modernization theory who study conservative movements and the 
AKP of Turkey claim that the AKP as a successor of the MG tradition is hostile to the secular 
character of Turkish Republic. However, because of the harsh reaction of Turkey’s civil and 
military bureaucracy to religious fundamentalism, the AKP has to hide its real aims and keep 
the Islamization of Turkish society as a hidden agenda. Otherwise, the Turkish Constitutional 
Court would ban the party with many other further sanctions like the ones that were applied to 
former political parties of the MG. Therefore, the AKP prefers methods of gradual 
Islamization. It uses small and underground attempts rather than direct confrontations with 
the defenders of secularism.  
 
Michael Rubin’s piece is a typical example of the orientalist and modernist explanations of 
the AKP. In his article Rubin makes a reference to the “hidden agenda” discussion and writes 
that Erdoğan’s actions contradict his rhetoric: 
 
“His actions often contradict his rhetoric. He has endorsed, for example, the 
dream of Turkey’s secular elite to enter the European Union, but only so far as to 
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enact reforms demanded by Brussels to dilute the role of the military, which 
traditionally serves as guardian of the Turkish constitution.” 180 
 
The claim that, rather than fully adopting the European Union’s norms on democracy and 
human rights, the first aim of the AKP’s reforms is to limit the political influence of the 
military is also accepted by other scholars in the field. However, by invoking the TSK, which 
violated the Turkish constitution through direct and indirect coups several times in the history 
of the Turkish Republic, as a “guardian of the Turkish constitution,” Rubin manipulates the 
conflict between the AKP and the TSK, and presents the TSK as the defender of democracy 
and constitutional rule.  
 
Rubin further claims that Erdoğan and his AKP are applying a policy of gradual Islamization 
and threatening Turkish secularism. According to Rubin, education, the judiciary and other 
segments of the civil bureaucracy are domains in which the AKP is applying its gradual 
Islamization policy. Rubin claims: 
 
“Traditionally, Turkish students had three choices for their secondary education: 
they could enroll at so-called Imam Hatip religious schools and enter the clergy; 
they could enter vocational schools to study a trade; or they could matriculate at 
secondary high schools, enter university, and then move into either the public or 
private sectors. Erdoğan changed the system: by equating Imam Hatip degrees 
with high schools degrees, he enabled Islamist students to enter university and 
qualify for government jobs, despite never having mastered Western 
fundamentals.” 181 
 
It is clear that Rubin lacks some basic information on Turkey, Turkish politics and the 
Turkish education system. It seems that Rubin does not know that from 1971 onwards İmam-
Hatip School graduates, like graduates of other vocational schools, had the right of university 
admission, but that this right was taken away in the February 28 Process and that, therefore, 
the AKP was not trying to equate the degrees of İmam-Hatip graduates with high school 
degrees, but was attempting to return to the pre-1998 status quo. As a result of Rubin’s lack 
of information on Turkey - and on Islam as well - he thinks that there is a distinct class of 
clergy in Islam and that by graduating from İmam-Hatip Schools in Turkey, people can 
become a part of Rubin’s imaginary clergy. Also, with the final sentences quoted above 
                                                            
180 Rubin, M. (2007). “Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?” American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Research, February (1), p.3. 
181 Rubin, M. Will Turkey Have an Islamist President?, p.4. 
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Rubin equates being an İmam-Hatip student with being an Islamist student and this is only 
possible with the essentialist and holistic interpretations of orientalism. Finally, the claim that 
İmam-Hatip graduates “never mastered Western fundamentals” shows a lack of basic 
information that can be obtained with a simple web search.  
 
There are many other examples of a fundamental lack of information in Rubin’s piece. 
Although it is not worth discussing and analyzing them in a detailed way, some other cases 
can be cited as examples, such as his mention of “a Saudi-style headscarf” worn by the 
prospective first lady of Turkey182 , a Turkish private finance institution named “Eski 
Finans,” 183  a “Higher Education Board composed of university rectors,” 184  Erdoğan’s 
“multimillion-dollar villa in Istanbul,”185 and “the very real threat of street violence that might 
lead Erdoğan to call early elections.”186 
  
R. Quinn Mecham’s piece is the second example of orientalist and modernist explanations of 
the AKP.187 However it should be noted that, compared to Rubin’s article, Mecham’s work is 
less orientalist and can be considered within the boundaries of academic literature. Mecham’s 
article starts with an analysis of the FP. This party was established as the successor of the RP, 
which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court as a result of the February 28 Process. 
Mecham explains the political language and priorities of the FP and claims that because of 
“the possibility of military intervention, a fear of legal closure by the courts, and the need to 
maintain and expand their electoral constituency”188 the FP adopted a more democratic and 
liberal attitude. Mecham mentions that with the split in the MG after the closure of the FP, the 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) constituted the traditional wing and the AKP constituted 
the moderates. According to Mecham, the landslide electoral victories of the AKP can be 
explained as follows: “Felicity was the successor to previously banned parties, and thus a 
party that was unacceptable to secular forces in the political establishment. As the AK Party 
[AKP]189 appeared to have a greater chance of maintaining its legality, voters searching for a 
Islamically-minded alternative to the government strategically opted for the AKP, believing it 
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had a greater chance of becoming an important player.”190 Mecham also mentions that the 
majority of the electorate that previously voted for the RP and the FP were not ideologically 
Islamist. Rather, they were “sympathetic to Islamic issues but voted for Erbakan’s movement 
as an act of protest against the existing political establishment.” Therefore, the AKP´s 
moderate stance gained support from the electorate.191 Additionally, he claims that the “most 
important reason for the AK Party’s dramatic success […] was a series of strategic decisions 
by party leaders to moderate their message and image in an attempt to appeal to the more 
secular-minded center-right.”192 
 
Mecham defines the self-fulfilling true direction for conservative politics in Turkey as 
abandoning an ideological stance and instead adopting capitalist democracy. Moreover, 
ignoring the historical background of discussions about secularism in Turkey, Mecham claims 
that the electorate’s expectation from a conservative political party is also compatible with the 
self-fulfilling direction he defined for conservative politics. In conclusion, although his taking 
of the FP as the starting point for analysis and his comparison between the AKP and the FP 
are worth mentioning as strengths the Mecham’s piece, it should still be criticized for its 
modernist tone, lack of broad historical perspective on the discussion of secularism in Turkey 
and its lack of regard for the other factors behind the rise of the AKP, such as political 
economy.  
 
In general, the orientalist and modernist explanations ignore the Turkish experience of 
secularism and, therefore, Turkish historicity. In the absence of these considerations, the 
orientalist and modernist explanations depend on ideal types and reductionist and generic 
explanations. However, conservative movements in Turkey are not simply anti-regime, 
fundamentalist movements, but a complex set of demands and ideologies related to the 
economy, identity, politics and cultural differentiation. Therefore, although the orientalist and 
modernist explanations are accurate in pointing out the AKP’s shift in discourse and the role 
of legal and extra-legal constraints in this shift, they entirely ignore the transformation that 
the conservatives underwent and the interaction between the AKP’s shift in discourse and the 
transformation of the conservatives in the country. Furthermore, what the orientalist and 
modernist explanations missed was the influence of political economy on the rise of the AKP.  
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4.1.2. Political Economy Theory 
 
Scholars of political economy studying Islamism in general and the AKP in particular, focus 
on economic factors in order to explain the rise of the AKP. Political economy explanations 
focus on class relations, unemployment in cities, especially among university graduates, rural 
to urban migration and provincial businessmen. Furthermore, they interpret the social and 
political dissatisfaction of traditional groups as a reflection of an economic situation. 
 
Although it does not directly refer to the AKP, the article by Fuat Keyman and Berrin 
Koyuncu193 is one of the leading works that brings the social and political dissatisfaction of 
traditional groups into the discussion. Their explanation of Turkey’s recent political economy 
starts with a detailed analysis of the economic crisis Turkey faced in 2001,194 which is 
generally missing in the work of other scholars studying the same subject. At the end of the 
analysis, Keyman and Koyuncu conclude that the reasons for and the solution to the 
economic crisis are not only economic, but also political.195 They write: 
 
“A long term, effective and democratic solution not only to February crisis, but 
more importantly to the structural problems of the state-centric Turkish 
modernity lies in an attempt to restructure state-society relations by taking into 
consideration the changing sociological and institutional nature of the political 
economy of Turkish capitalism.”196  
 
They proceed to explain that “the changing sociological and institutional nature of the 
political economy of Turkish capitalism” brings with it “the legitimacy crisis of the strong-
state tradition” and “the emergence of alternative modernities.”197 They further claim that 
these two processes cannot be understood without reference to “the process of globalization, 
which involves mostly Turkey’s full-membership application to the EU.”198 At that point 
Keyman and Koyuncu mention that “despite the differences with respect to their specific 
claims to identity and modernity, the economic actors all locate themselves as strong 
supporters of the process of European integration.”199 MÜSİAD is one of these economic 
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actors and “today, it is not possible to analyze the globalization of Turkish economic life 
without reference to MÜSİAD and the dissemination of its sub-units through the country.”200 
 
On the subject of the AKP, Ziya Öniş is one of the leading scholars of the political economy 
school. Among his numerous works on the AKP, the book chapter titled “The Political 
Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party” is a good example for analysis.201 In 
the chapter Öniş suggests three factors in order to understand the rise of the AKP. Firstly, 
according to Öniş, “the party has been extremely successful in constituting a cross-class 
electoral alliance, incorporating into its orbit both winners and losers from the neo-liberal 
globalization process.”202 Secondly, “the strong track record of the AKP’s predecessors, the 
Welfare and the Virtue Parties at the level of municipal governments is another key element 
of importance.”203 Finally, “the failures of the conventional or established parties of either the 
center-right or the center-left in achieving sustained and equitable growth, in avoiding costly 
financial crises, and in tackling the problem of pervasive corruption have also paved the way 
for the party’s unprecedented electoral success in the recent era.”204 Further, Öniş claims that 
the question of whether the AKP will be successful in sustaining its electoral success is also 
mainly about the economic performance of the party: “Clearly, an adequate answer to this 
question requires a systematic and critical analysis of the AKP government’s performance, 
notably in the economic realm.”205  
 
Öniş mentions that AKP’s chief strength in bringing together the losers and winners of global 
neo-liberal policies is its ability to appeal to “diverse segments of Turkish society using 
religion as an effective mechanism of mutual trust and bondage.”206  Through such an 
explanation Öniş pays attention to non-economic factors that have been essential in the rise of 
the AKP. In doing so, he tries to overcome the major loophole in the political economy theory.   
 
Yıldırım’s book chapter on the AKP207 and its relations with workers is a good sample of the 
political economy perspective on the party. Yıldırım analyzes the dual approach of the AKP 
to workers, who constituted both the party’s major source of electoral support and the major 
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group that was affected negatively by the party’s liberal economic policies.208 The major 
strength of Yıldırım’s piece is that, although it takes economical factors as the starting point 
of analysis, it is not confined to economic relations but includes identity politics that 
sometimes - as in the case of the AKP - dominate the field of economy. Therefore, although 
economic explanations have an important role in explaining the rise of the AKP, non-
economic factors such as the role of elites and activists, resource mobilization, and 
opportunity structures also offer insights into the party’s ascendancy. 
 
4.1.3. Social Movement Theory 
 
Social movement theory basically focuses on the role of activists and elites in the 
transformation of conservative politics and looks at resource mobilization and opportunity 
structures to explain the rise of the AKP. Scholars of this school claim that the Turkish 
conservative elites and activists, seeing the harsh secular opposition of the primarily military 
bureaucracy, developed a moderate policy and rhetoric as a result of a political learning 
process.209  
 
According to Çınar210 the transformation of conservative politics began immediately after the 
February 28 Process with the FP. Underlining the split in the FP as one between the older and 
younger generations, Çınar claims: 
 
“The younger generation […] favored an Islam-sensitive, rather than Islamist, 
political stance and employed a more comprehensive and consistent language of 
democracy and human rights. In this way, they hoped to be able to fill the 
political vacuum created by the February 28 Process, to make inroads into 
Turkey´s power structure and to better represent the interests of Islamic identity 
without risking their own political survival.”211 
 
As quoted above, the February 28 Process not only stimulated a political learning process for 
the AKP, but also created an opportunity structure which Çınar describes as “the political 
vacuum created by the February 28 Process.”  
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Somer212 explains the transformation as a middle-class phenomenon and talks about a conflict 
between secular and religious elites: 
 
“The religious-conservative elite are challenging the status of the secularist state 
elite. The new elite ascended power by challenging old-style Islamists of the 
Erbakan tradition and culturally Muslim –conservative yet secularist politicians 
of the Demirel tradition. Economically competition is occurring between the 
secularist big business elite and the recently emerged Islamic-conservative 
business elite.”213 
 
Çarkoğlu’s “The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey”214 also pays attention to the new 
generation of conservatives that appeared as an alternative to both the traditional conservative 
elites and also the secular elites. In contrast to the majority of analyses of the AKP, which 
depend on quantitative surveys, Çarkoğlu’s research takes into account new trends in the 
Turkish electorate and the position of AKP supporters according to these new trends. In the 
end, one of the major conclusions of the research is as follows: “The electoral base of AKP in 
November 2002 were primarily coming from a relatively younger generation having 
significant religious conservative traits.”215  
 
As a general evaluation of the social movement accounts of the AKP, one of the basic 
strengths is the stress on the transformation of conservatives after the February 28 Process. 
While explaining this transformation, social movement theorists differentiate themselves from 
the modernists and orientalists that regard the transformation as discursive and pragmatic. 
Social movement theorists tend to explain the transformation as an internalized one. Although 
figures like Çarkoğlu concentrated on electoral behavior, the question of how the masses 
supported the transformation should be answered; that is, if they really supported the 
transformation and whether the modernity and civil society approach can explain their 
support for the conservative transformation. 
 
4.1.4. Modernity and Civil Society Theory 
 
Modernity and civil society accounts are more explanatory in terms of the point where the 
social movement theory fails in its explanation of the conservative masses’ support for the 
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transformation of the elite and activists. Indeed, modernity and civil society theorists do not 
ignore the role of activists and elites. However, they also introduce new experiences of civil 
society and different “modernities” in order to explain how the masses participated in the 
transformation. At this point Göle introduces the difference between Islamism and post-
Islamism in her “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities”: 
 
“The actors of Islamism acquired professional profiles, increased their diversity 
and their public visibility. This was true not only of the militants and politicians, 
but also of engineers, lawyers, intellectuals, novelists, and journalists; all 
contributed to the production, transmission, and dissemination of Islamic values 
and discourse. In addition to political activism, forms of artistic and intellectual 
expression entered into the domain of Islamic cultural criticism with the 
publication and circulation of newspapers, periodicals, novels, films, and music. 
[…] In other words, Islamism is concomitant with the formation of new middle 
classes and is on the way to creating its own intellectual, political and 
entrepreneurial elites, drawing on their increasing public visibility and 
commercial success. We can speak of a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is 
losing its political and revolutionary fervour but steadily infiltrating social and 
cultural everyday life practices.”216 
 
Therefore, it can be said that the diversification of professional profiles from politicians to 
novelists and musicians and increasing public visibility are the major factors behind the 
spread of the transformation from the elites to the masses. Of course, civil society is the major 
medium of the spread together with (alternative) modernity; 
 
“They [the new actors of Islamism] often became “Islamist” by following a 
common path: after moving from their small provincial towns to cities, they 
encounter, during their years in high school and university, the works of authors 
who set up the landmarks of contemporary Islamist ideology.”217 
 
Educational capital, therefore, is seen as the major way of experiencing modernity: 
 
“As new actors of Islamism are endowed with two sources of educational capital-
religious and secular-they communicate Islamic idiom to the public debate. New 
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actors of Islamism regain authority through the use they make of religious 
knowledge, but also through their criticism of modernity as cultural program.”218 
 
Considering the effectiveness of the İmam-Hatip graduates in conservative politics in general 
and the AKP in particular, the attention Göle pays to the role of education seems useful.219 
However, the same İmam-Hatip graduates were also on the scene in the pre-February 28 
period. Therefore, one should ask why the transformation took place during the AKP period 
rather than some other period. Göle answers this question by referring to the snapshots she 
picked in her article: 
 
“These snapshots may indeed be considered as marginal, not representative of 
the Islamist movement. Stories about veiled students, the Islamic writer, the sex 
scandal in a religious order, an Islamic hotel for summer vacations, the Muslim 
sociologist - all may seem trivial. But it is precisely with these seemingly 
insignificant and unconnected threads that we intend to weave a new vision.”220  
 
Göle claims that the articulation and accumulation of “these seemingly insignificant and 
unconnected threads” has contributed to the transformation of conservative activism in 
Turkey. In other words, it is a matter of time for these snapshots and “seemingly insignificant 
and unconnected threads” (read as alternative modernities) to form modernity.  
 
Yavuz is another figure who has paid great attention to the notion of Islamic modernity and 
civil society in explaining the AKP. In the introduction to his edited volume,221 Yavuz claims 
that as a result of the liberal economic policies of the state, a new conservative bourgeoisie 
emerged and this new bourgeoisie is the real factor behind the transformation of the AKP.222 
Where Yavuz differs from the other disciples of the modernity and civil society school is that 
he does not presume an inevitable clash between the secular state and conservative civil 
society. In fact, Yavuz claims that there is a mutual relationship of transformation between 
the two and that, thanks to the transformation of the Kemalist state, opportunity spaces were 
opened for conservative civil society and, in turn, conservative civil society facilitated the 
Kemalist state’s transformation.223  
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It is clear that Yavuz’s explanations, like most of the others overviewed so far, are valuable 
for understanding the different factors contributed to the rise of the AKP, but cannot help 
explain how a party came to be the majority government less than one year after its 
establishment. An alternative reading is required to answer this question.  
 
4.1.5. An Alternative Account 
 
Putting aside the Orientalist explanation because of the criticisms put forward, the other three 
theoretical explanations - political economy, social movement and civil society - have useful 
elements for understanding the rise and evolution of the AKP. Although they do not qualify 
as exhaustive and exclusive explanations, the current theoretical explanations can be good 
tools of analysis for the AKP’s rise from 2002 onwards and especially for the 2004 local 
elections and the 2007 general elections. Yet they say almost nothing about the party’s rise in 
2002, when less than one year had passed after its establishment. They offer only 
explanations about limited specific perspectives of the case.  
 
An alternative account that attempts to explain all aspects of the case that are not covered by 
the existing explanations should depend on the political and social atmosphere after the 
February 28 Process; in other words: the developments of the period between 1997 and 2001. 
The political and social atmosphere after the February 28 Process was a typical example of 
what Gramsci has conceptualized as “hegemonic crisis.” Especially the dissatisfaction of the 
traditional classes that always constituted the backbone of hegemony and the display of this 
dissatisfaction as rallies are the key elements of the hegemonic crisis in terms of this study.  
 
The hegemonic crisis in itself constituted the real reason for the February 28 Process and 
deepened afterwards. The hegemonic crisis also offered one of the most valuable chances for 
power for the AKP in the hegemonic struggle. As mentioned before, it was not only the 
dissatisfied electorate that supported the AKP in the hegemonic struggle. On the eve of the 
2002 election and for a long time after the election, the relative support of capital and media 
for the AKP also continued. According to Gramsci, there is a relationship similar to a political 
division of labor between the different political actors as a result of their separation at the 
point of interests but if they require each other – Gramsci claims they do - they will unite 
when vital and major issues are in question.224 According to this explanation, the moments 
when vital and major issues are in question are not the test moments of a historic bloc; rather 
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they are its formative moments. The pre-2002 period in Turkey was a crisis moment for 
capitalist democracy and that is why the historical elements of capitalist democracy agreed on 
articulating the AKP in order to overcome the crisis.  
 
At this point questioning the reasons for the shift in the AKP’s discourse requires more 
examination in terms of the new alliance between the AKP and the capitalists. The harsh 
opposition of the Kemalist establishment was counted as the main reason for the shift in the 
AKP’s discourse.225 According to this explanation, as a result of the February 28 Process, the 
conservative politicians “recognized the red lines of Turkish secularism” and for Erdoğan in 
particular this lesson cost four months in prison.226 Although agreeing that conservatives 
passed through a political learning process that was stimulated by the February 28 Process, 
what must be asked is whether it was Turkish secularism or Turkish capitalism that taught the 
lesson. Furthermore, this line of questioning will also bring the conceptualization of the 
historic hegemonic center into the discussion.  
 
Throughout its long history, conservatism in Turkey as an oppositional movement has always 
been aware of the red lines of Turkish secularism and it has always been harshly and clearly 
warned once it even came close to forgetting its place. Conservatism in Turkey has been very 
well aware of the coercive capacity of political society and has also tried to challenge or short 
circuit it. What was alien to Turkish conservatives until they met with the February 28 
Process was civil society and its hegemonic capacity. For example, conservatives always 
knew the importance of the parliamentary majority for ruling the country, the limits according 
to which they can challenge the Turkish secularism with a parliamentary majority, and the 
results of challenging the secular character of the country. Yet, they did not have any idea 
how quickly they could lose their parliamentary majority or how rapidly they could lose their 
electoral support once they challenged the historic hegemonic center of the country, 
especially the capitalists. Also, they discovered that they needed the support of the media as 
well as popular or parliamentary support. Therefore, the AKP generated its new message, and 
shifted its discourse not only for the state apparatus but also for its traditional electorate, 
capitalists and the media.  
 
On the eve of the presidential elections, the AKP enjoyed electoral support that increased 
every day and the support of the new class of capitalists, which started to form before the 
AKP but reached its peak with the AKP, as is mentioned by the political economy theorists. 
                                                            
225 See; Taşpınar, Ö. (2007). “The Old Turks' Revolt,” Foreign Affairs, 86(6), 114-130; Dağı, I. (2004). 
“Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey,” Critique: Critical 
Middle Eastern Studies, 13(2), 135-151. 
226 Taşpınar, Ö. The Old Turks’ Revolt, p.123. 
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At this time the party was creating its new sociality, as mentioned by the social movement 
theorists, and its new modernity and elites within this new modernity, as mentioned by 
modernity and civil society theorists.  
 
Under such conditions, the election of a conservative president would constitute the roof of 
the building of a new historic hegemonic center whose basement was the majority rule of the 
AKP and whose body was the shift of power in the media, bureaucracy, business and civil 
society. Once such a structure was built, the need of the AKP for the capitalist wing of the 
existing historic hegemonic center as a conveyor system would decrease. Furthermore, in 
terms of the existing historic hegemonic center, this also meant the emergence of new 
opponents. The election of a conservative president meant the starting point of the road 
leading to the point of no return and therefore marked the split of the alliance between the 
AKP and the capitalist wing of the historic hegemonic center. As a result of this split, the 
media, as part of the existing historic hegemonic bloc, participated in the April 27 Process 
through textual, discursive and social practices that will be analyzed in the following chapters. 
The theoretical tools of Gramsci and Mardin and an analysis of case studies, the February 28 
and April 27 processes, and media discourse are crucial for understanding how the media 





5. Theory, Case and Analysis 
5.1.Theory and Case 
 
The theoretical framework of Gramsci and Mardin is crucial while analyzing the sub-
dimensions of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Therefore in the following section, it 
is necessary to establish a link between theoretical perspectives and the factual history of the 
February 28 and April 27 Processes. 
 
The center-periphery model of Mardin presents a sufficient foundation for understanding the 
major characteristics of the secularism discussion in Turkey, and more specifically during the 
intervention periods. According to the aforementioned theoretical framework by Mardin, two 
intervention processes can be considered as one of the recent cases, in which the underlying 
conflict of the center and the periphery was active. After drawing a general perspective with 
the help of Mardin’s theory, Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony offers various 
explanations to how civil society and the media acted during this process.  
 
While explaining the February 28 and April 27 Processes with the help of Mardin’s and 
Gramsci’s models, it is necessary to begin with a clarification of the relationship between 
Mardin’s center and Gramsci’s hegemonic center. Concerning this case, the phenomenon 
addressed by Mardin’s center and Gramsci’s historic hegemonic center is the same: The 
Kemalist establishment that was the major force against the conservative politics. Using 
Mardin’s concept, the Kemalist establishment represents the center of society as it dominated 
the main cultural, economic, social and political institutions. In addition the intervention of 
the military with the help of civil society during those two processes can also be regarded 
within this framework. On the other hand, the Gramscian analysis of hegemony supplements 
understanding as to how and why such an intervention occurred.  As essentially a conflict 
between the hegemonic center and the subaltern periphery, the first task to understand this 
conflict is to define the conflicting sides. 
 
The “historic hegemonic center” refers to the part of society which is also named as the 
“Kemalist establishment” in the previous sections of the text. Kemalism in this formation 
does not only stand for an ideology but also for the material alliance adhering to this ideology 
in spite of the ideological disintegration of some components of the alliance. Although this 
may sound a bit paradoxical the hegemonic situation unites the historic hegemonic center in 
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spite of the ideological disintegration. As Yavuz mentioned “The raison d’être of the 
Kemalist establishment is to keep the Islamic ‘other’ at bay, and this struggle is what unifies 
the military-bureaucratic establishment.” 227 The “other” was the rising reactionary danger in 
the February 28 and April 27 processes, the utilization of the discourse of communist threats 
against leftists and, more recently, the utilization of a separatism discourse against Kurdish 
political activism. More specifically, the military and the civilian bureaucracy, the center-
based capital including media corporations, the universities and Kemalist civil society formed 
the historic hegemonic center against the conservative subaltern periphery during the 
February 28 and April 27 Processes.   
 
From the components of the historic hegemonic center, the ideological position of the center 
capital was deeply different from the others. The center capital embodied in TÜSİAD had 
occupied a more liberal and democratic position before the February 28 Process. For example, 
TÜSİAD prepared many policy papers, which were very critical of the bureaucracy, for the 
democratization of Turkey. Moreover, they were also critical of other business associations 
and trade unions for their support of the current political system in Turkey. However, when 
the hegemonic exclusive domain of the center was threatened by the subaltern periphery, this 
association took its place within the historic hegemonic center together with its partners, 
including the bureaucracy, other business associations and trade unions which it had criticized 
in the past.  A similar change was also observable in TÜSİAD’s stance during the April 27 
Process.  
 
As aforementioned, the integrative capacity of the historic hegemonic center is one of the 
major prerequisites for hegemony. During the February 28 Process and partly during the April 
27 Process, it is possible to observe the functioning of the integrative capacity of the historic 
hegemonic center. The primary executor of integration during the February 28 Process was 
the center's media. The role of the media as a part of the historic hegemonic center is best 
explained by the intellectual and moral leadership concept of Gramsci. On the other hand 
during the April 27 Process, some media institutions covered in the study and many others 
that are not covered were not so eager to participate in the Process even though it was still 
possible to talk about media as a part of the historic hegemonic center. The footprints of 
change in the media’s position during these two processes can be traced to the change in their 
capital structures. However, for now it is more appropriate to postpone the analysis of media 
ownership to the preceding sections as to not distract from the analysis of the nature of the 
relationship between the media and the historic alliance.   
                                                            
227 Yavuz, H. Cleansing Islam From the Public Sphere, p.25. 
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The media functioned as the intellectual and moral leadership by manipulating the perception 
of the conservative threat against the center’s hegemony as the rising danger of reaction. The 
creation of popular consent among the urban middle classes only became possible by media 
manipulation. It was risky to target conservative values, ideas and politics openly because 
such a strategy had the probability of bringing about mistrust from religious people. Therefore, 
the media firstly manipulated the distinctions of good and bad Muslims, which had been a 
typical topic of Kemalist discourse since the 1920’s, and transferred all the negative 
characteristics of bad Muslims to conservatives. The inception of terminology was one of the 
critical functions of the media’s intellectual and moral leadership. When the subaltern classes 
adopted the language of the leading classes, they start to interpret the world in the way 
leading classes do as a result of that adoption. Considering its historical and ideological roots 
the Turkish media was well suited to the task of producing the language of the leading class.  
Since the first generation of journalists in Turkey, a positivist and didactic attitude has been a 
leading characteristic of Turkish media.228 A discourse on good and bad Muslims is a 
language generated by the Turkish hegemonic elites, especially the journalists and politicians. 
As a result, once the good and bad Muslim talk was adopted and internalized by the subaltern 
periphery as a hegemonic language, the subaltern periphery has been unable to follow its own 
interests. One such example can be found with the trade unions cooperating with TÜSİAD 
against the conservative peripheral segments of the society, with which they surely have more 
common interests, values and life styles. 
 
In addition to intellectual and moral leadership, economic and corporate sacrifices also served 
as tools that contributed to the maintenance of the hegemonic bloc.229 The leading class in the 
Gramscian230 sense, or the center in Mardin’s conceptualization, should make some sacrifices, 
and reorganize economical activities in order to fulfill the interests of its elements, and in this 
case namely the media. Concerning the February 28 Process, we can see that after the 
establishment of the new coalition government, or more specifically the government that 
succeeded the RP-DYP coalition Government, the Turkish media industry was amply 
rewarded with privatizations in the energy and concessions in the banking sector in which the 
Turkish media industry had already started to invest.231 By 1998, the five largest media 
                                                            
228 For a detailed account of early journalist in Turkey see: Kocabaşoğlu, U. (2010). “Hürriyet”i Beklerken: İkinci 
Meşrutiyet Basını. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.  
229 Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, p.183. 
230 The basis of Gramscian distinction of class is more diverse than the classical Marxist conceptualization of class. 
Marx defines class in economical terms whereas Gramsci offers a combination of economic, social and cultural 
elements. According to the Gramscian conceptualization, even labor union leaders can be a supporter of the 
hegemony of the leading class by contributing to the continuation of it. 
231 Adaklı, G. (2001). “Yayıncılık Alanında Mülkiyet ve Kontrol,” in Medya Politikaları, Beybin Kayanlıoğlu, 
Sevilay Celenk, Gülseren Adaklı (eds.), 145-203. Ankara: İmge, p.185-7, 190-7. 
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conglomerates- the Doğan Group of Aydın Doğan, the Medya Group of Dinç Bilgin, the 
Rumeli Group of Cem Uzan, the İhlas Group of Enver Ören and the Avrupa Group of Erol 
Aksoy- held 80% of the market in Turkey.232 In addition to the cartelization of the media 
sector, these conglomerates also invested in non-media sectors such as insurance, banking, 
marketing, and energy. For example, the Doğan Group, the largest conglomerate, owned 
Dışbank, POAŞ (Petrol Office Joint Stock Co.), Ray Insurance and Doğan Energy. The 
second largest Medya Group owned İnterbank, Etibank, Çukurova Steel Industry, and Halk 
Insurance.233 However, without an ideological position as a part of the historic hegemonic 
center, such economic endeavors would not be enough to gain strong media support for the 
process.  
 
As a result of the media's manipulation of good and bad Muslims, the consent of the urban 
middle classes to the Processes was secured. The consent and support of the above-mentioned 
classes to the Processes constituted the civil society dimension of the interventions. Moreover, 
there was an existing branch of civil society such as the Kemalist NGOs for which a consent 
creation process was unnecessary, as historically they had identified the Kemalist hegemony 
as the number one issue on their agenda. However, these organizations lacked popular 
support. During these Processes, either popular support was channeled to these organizations, 
or these organizations diverted attention and popular support, as in the cases of the Susurluk 
demonstrations and Republican Rallies.  
  
The motivation behind university support for these Processes were more or less similar to the 
motivation of the bureaucracy, as they occupied a central position in the ideological 
formulation of the hegemony of the center. In other words, the creation of consent, which was 
needed in securing the support of civil society, was not necessary for universities, as they 
were closer to the ideological center of the historic hegemonic center. Academicians, as a part 
of traditional intellectuals, were historically very committed to Kemalism. Although they can 
adopt different ideological positions as leftists or liberals, their position in the center-
periphery conflict has been always pro-center. Turkish academia is still under the influence of 
the positivist and elitist tradition of the Young Turks, especially in the spheres related to 
religion and populace.234 
  
                                                            
232 Medya Dökümantasyon Birimi (1998). Mediascape Türkiye 98. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi 
& Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 54. 
233 Adaklı, G. Yayınclık Alanında Mülkiyet, p.164-165. 
234 For a more detailed analysis of historical accounts of the Turkish intellectuals’ interpretation of Islam see; 
Demir, A. İ. (2004). Cumhuriyet Dönemi Aydınlarının İslam’a Bakışı. İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat.  
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Generally the efforts of the Kemalist establishment and especially the military, to include 
civil society in the Processes were not for democratic purposes. Rather it was for the halting 
of any kind of democratic evolution which would lead to a decline in the military’s role in 
Turkish politics. This paradox in the mobilization of civil society demonstrates the suitability 
of Gramsci’s model in the explanation of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. For 
example, the protests about the Susurluk incident were valuable in terms of democratization 
of Turkey and the growing role of civil society in Turkish politics. However, the anti-
democratic ends derived from the protest were at odds with the initial aim of the Susurluk 
protest, namely open, cleaner politics and society. The following lines of Cizre and Çınar235 
offer accurate concluding remarks on the discussion of civil society during the process; 
 
“In trying to undermine the RP’s popular appeal and create an order 
characterized by social discipline centralized authority, and hierarchical 
integration. The military has been very successful in establishing a new 
relationship with targeted groups in society. It has appealed directly to the 
organized groups of the modernized urban-secular sectors—the business world, 
media, academia, public prosecutors, judges, leaders of civil societal 
associations—and even held briefing meetings with them to warn of the extent 
and magnitude of the Islamic threat. The rising salience of civil society for the 
general staff, however, has not arisen from the search for a free public space, 
rule of law, limited state power, democratic consensus and compromise over 
power sharing. On the contrary, there is a widespread belief among the secular-
urbanites that the intensity of the Islamic threat may require the suspension of 
democratic freedoms and limitation of representative principles and institutions. 
To this end, these sectors have given the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] a strong 
hand in crushing what they see as a threat to the regime’s existence”  
 
Kemalist NGOs were also at the scene during the April 27 Process in an attempt to hijack the 
Republican Rallies and presidential elections discussion, with the purpose of creating an 
opportunity for the military’s intervention in civilian politics.  
 
Not the existence of the subaltern periphery, but rather its efforts to remove its own subaltern 
characteristics and to move towards the center of the society was a problem that could not be 
tolerated by the historic hegemonic center. A move towards the center also meant an attempt 
to form a hegemonic position, and therefore not only the ideology of the RP and AKP, but 
                                                            
235 Cizre, Ü. & Menderes, Ç. Turkey 2002, p. 232. 
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also the societal and political bases of their political success were unacceptable for the 
Kemalist establishment. By stating the societal and political bases of their political success, 
this refers to the political opportunity structure and resource mobilization of the RP and AKP, 
which are mentioned in the previous chapters of the text.   
  
The real line of confrontation in the processes was not the ideology of conservatives or their 
discourse. It does not seem plausible to claim that the Processes were totally against the 
Islamic ideology of the RP and AKP because they were in search of ways to reconcile with 
the Kemalist establishment when the Processes started. Therefore, this fact offers crucial 
support for the claim of the intentions of the historic hegemonic center, and especially of the 
military, during the Processes; it was never about the danger of rising reaction but rather the 
danger of losing its hegemonic position. Therefore, discourse was the basic tool for 
manipulating the danger of losing the hegemonic position and turning it into the danger of 
rising reaction. Critical discourse analysis is the tool to show how this manipulation worked.  
 
5.2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
As the role of the media in the processes is one of the main focuses of my study, my research 
naturally centered on the Turkish media. Of the different forms of media, the written press is 
the most convenient to study. Therefore, daily newspapers published during the processes will 
be the main materials for analysis. However, considering the huge number of dailies 
published during the period under review, I needed to set a limit to make the study feasible. 
As I focused on the ideological positions of the Turkish media as members of the historic 
hegemonic center, the media ownership structure and other economic activities of the media 
owners, I limited my research according to media ownership structures and ideological 
positions. Therefore, Milliyet of Doğan Group as vanguard of the Turkish media capital, 
Cumhuriyet as core Kemalist media, Sabah for the sake of following the effects of change in 
the media ownership, and finally Akşam for Çukurova Group’s search of a place among 
media conglomerates are the four most applicable samples. In this sampling each newspaper 
corresponds to a different position. Milliyet was considered the most statist among the papers 
of the Doğan Group and Cumhuriyet has a unique position and importance, as it is the core 
and trademark of Kemalist media in Turkey. On the other hand, Sabah was a good sample 
with its urban middle class reader profile and liberal stance; and Akşam targeted urban lower 
classes with its more populist tone.  
  
 102 
Firstly, Milliyet represents the modern industrial bourgeoisie. With its investments in fields 
from banking to the automobile industry, Doğan Group stands at the center of capitalist 
relations in Turkey and has become one of the three largest and financially strongest group of 
firms in Turkey.236 Besides Milliyet’s economic position as a part of the Doğan Group, its 
societal relations are also crucial considering the urban classes and newspaper readership in 
Turkey. Doğan Group has several newspapers in Turkey and each of them addresses a 
different part of the society. For example, nowadays Radikal has a more intellectual and 
leftist editorial policy and readership whereas Posta has a more jingoist and populist line. 
Like Radikal and Posta, Milliyet has a specific policy and readership. Milliyet’s readership 
was the urban middle classes and the daily specifically addressed them. As the urban middle 
class formed the backbone of the center during the mobilization during the Processes, Milliyet 
also had an ideological importance as well as an economic one.  
 
Secondly, Cumhuriyet has a more statist and elitist discourse. Ideologically it follows the 
positivist state ideology and its readership consists mostly of elitist Kemalists. It can also be 
said that Cumhuriyet still follows the elitist and didactic tendencies of the first representatives 
of the Turkish Press in the nineteenth century, as Heper and Demirel state: “[…] the elite 
journalists of the time (as well as those of later periods) took on the role of didactic 
intermediaries between an idealized West and a backward society.” 237  Thus, both the 
readership profile and ideological position of Cumhuriyet correspond to the historic 
hegemonic center. 
 
Sabah with its more liberal attitude targets urban middle classes and white-collar workers. 
The analysis of the newspaper was expected to offer ideas about the position and 
manipulation of young, educated, urban dwellers. On the other hand, the capital structure of 
the newspaper is also useful for analyses. During the Febrary 28 Process, Dinç Bilgin owned 
Sabah. During the April 27 Process, Park Group of Turgay Ciner owned the newspaper and it 
was in need of political support for its ongoing court cases. In the middle of the Process, as a 
result of the cases, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency confiscated Sabah as part 
of the group’s bankruptcy.  
 
Finally, Akşam was expected to give insight into the mobilization of the urban poor, artisans 
and craftsmen. The newspaper which was owned by Erol Aksoy in February 28 Process, was 
sold to the Çukurova Group after the Process. Furthermore, the quest of the Çukurova Group, 
                                                            
236 For more information about the Doğan Group and its economic activities see; 
http://www.doganholding.com.tr/index.asp 
237 Heper, M. & Demirel T. The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey, p. 109. 
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which is the conglomerate that owns Akşam, for finding a place among the media 
conglomerates of Turkey, also offers insight into the formation of traditional and new 
hegemonic alliances.  
 
After elaborating on the criteria of inclusion, mentioning the criteria of exclusion is also 
required for accuracy of the sampling. The Turkish newspapers representing the conservative 
media, as well as other parts of the center media and the radical leftist media were excluded. 
Beginning with the conservative media, their position in the Processes was irrelevant as they 
were against the historic hegemonic center by their nature. However, there can be some 
discursive differences in challenging the Processes according to their different origins, but 
these discursive differences by definition are not included within scope of this study. 
Secondly, other parts of the center media at that time such as the Rumeli Group, were also 
excluded as the Doğan Group, Medya Group and Çukurova were the largest media 
conglomerates in Turkey and their analyses gave idea about the general nature of media 
ownership structures in Turkey. Finally, the radical leftist media was excluded, as their 
readership was far away from the historic hegemonic center, and therefore irrelevant 
concerning the effect of this kind of media on the historic hegemonic center.         
  
Considering the preparation period before the process and the incidents after the fall of the 
coalition government, this particular study covers a two-year period for the analysis of 
February 28 Process. As Prime Minister Erbakan’s term of office started on June 28, 1996, 
and ended on June 17, 1997, the period covering 1996 and 1997 will be exhaustively 
analyzed in terms of the preparation period and the consequences of the process. At first sight, 
the coverage of periods from the beginning of 1996 to the beginning of Prime Minister 
Erbakan’s office in June 1996, and from the end of prime minister’s term of office in June 
1997 to the end of the year is inappropriate. However, considering the fact that the 
preparation stage of the February 28 Process started even earlier than the beginning of 1996, 
as the RP’s first conspicuous rise was at the local elections of 1994 and the stage in which the 
results came to fruition started after the prime minister’s resignation in June, the coverage of 
these periods becomes more apparent. In regards to the April 27 Process, a shorter period of 
analyses was sufficient as the April 27 Process was more compact in terms of preparation and 
results. The discussions about the presidential election, which were held in April, did not start 
earlier than the beginning of 2007. Therefore, contrary to the February 28 Process, tracing the 
analysis to earlier dates was not needed for the April 27 Process. On the other hand, the 
general elections on 22 July constituted a certain final point for the April 27 Process, and with 




Different interpretations of critical discourse analysis vary between the macro-sociological 
society and power perspective of Michel Foucault and the micro-sociological actor 
perspective of Ron Scollon.238 Furthermore, Siegfried Jager’s approach can be named as the 
most structuralist approach as it is close to the Foucauldian perspective, and Teun van Dijk’s 
approach as the “social cognitive approach.” 239  Among the many different accounts 
Fairclough’s attention to text as well as discourse, his methodological inquiries and the scope 
of the society-power relations, seem to make his model the most convenient. Fairclough 
offers a three dimensional model for critical discourse analysis as his attention focuses on text, 
discursive practice and social practice.240 As Titscher states, critical discourse analysis for 
Fairclough is “the analysis of relationships between concrete language use and the wider 
social cultural structures. […] He attributes three dimensions to every discursive event. It is 
simultaneously a text, discursive practice – which also includes the production and 
interpretation of texts- and social practice.”241 According to Fairclough every social practice 
is a construction of social identity; a construction made through the different representations 
of the social world.242 The discursive practice is one of the mediums through which different 
social practices become possible. In the relation to text, discourse and social practice, 
Fairclough underlines the concept of production as, “a social practice as a practice of 
production brings together different elements of life into a specific local relationship – types 
of activity, spatial and temporal locations, material resources, persons with particular 
experiences, knowledge and wants, semiotic resources including language.”243  
 
Content analysis and coverage of the newspapers will be the first step of critical discourse 
analysis. In this first step, newspapers’ textual activities in relation to basic incidents in the 
February 28 and April 27 processes will be analyzed. The February 28 Process is rich, in 
terms of incidents such as the establishment of the Refahyol government, the Susurluk 
incident, the Fadime Şahin incident and military briefings, for observing textual practices. 
The newspapers’ coverage of the TSK’s memorandum will be the major object of analysis 
with regard to textual practices in the April 27 Process. 
 
                                                            
238 Meyer, M. (2001). “Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA,” in 
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer (eds.), 14-31. London: Sage Publications, 
p.17. 
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240 Fairclough, N. (2000). “Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform,” 
Journal of Sociolinguistics, 4(2), p.167-9. 
241 cited in Richardson, J. E. (2007). Analysing Newspapers: An Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.37. 
242 Fairclough, N. Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research, p.167-8. 
243 Fairclough, N. Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research, p.168. 
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After content analysis, discursive practices will be second part of discourse analysis. More 
specifically how the good and bad Muslims were presented to the reader and what kind of 
characteristics defined these two categories. Furthermore, in this type of discourse analysis of 
newspapers, what is not written is as important as what is written. Actually, the very aim of 
defining the true version of Islam in this case is to label, define, and then repress a false or 
bad version of Islam. Therefore, figuring out the false and bad version of Islam and answering 
the question of why they are considered false and bad will be the concluding remarks of this 
part of the analysis. Moreover, two other major discursive practices, i.e. Moderate and 
Creeping Islamization and the Sudden Islamic Revolution, of the period, will be also analyzed 
in the same way. 
 
Finally, considering the social practices section of the critical discourse analysis offered by 
Fairclough, aforementioned theoretical analysis will be at work at this stage. The results 
derived from textual and discursive practices will be located in the hegemonic analysis of the 
two intervention processes, with a special focus on the activities of other members of the 
historic hegemonic bloc. In conclusion, a link will be developed demonstrating the various 
dimensions of hegemonic relations in Turkey and textual analysis of the media in the 
February 28 Process is a good starting point for developing this link.  
 
5.2.1. The February 28 Process 
5.2.1.1. Textual Analysis 
 
After the national elections, the media campaign against the RP and DYP started although 
they were not in power yet.  At this stage of the campaign, the Cumhuriyet seemed more 
enthusiastic than others, as the general atmosphere found in the Cumhuriyet’s pages were 
very negative about the results of the elections. In essence, the Cumhuriyet columnists were 
belittling various kinds of government projects, as Mustafa Balbay wrote “the Hodja’s 
[meaning Erbakan]244 tours are futile, Çiller’s tours are a fashion show.”245 Any effort of the 
coalitions, either by the RP or DYP was shown as ineffective and unproductive. The tone of 
the campaign hardened when the RP and ANAP got closer to establishing a coalition 
government.  According to the Cumhuriyet, the majority of the ANAP parliamentarians were 
uneasy about the idea of a government composed of the ANAP and RP. A parliamentarian 
was complaining about the fact that, if his party sets up a government with the RP, he could 
                                                            
244 Throughout the text, explanations in square brackets belong to the writer. 
245 Mustafa Balbay, Cumhuriyet, 01.02.1996, p.19. Balbay uses rhyme here as the Turkish word for futile is nafile 
and the Turkish for fashion show is defile. 
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not look at his neighbors, daughter and wife in their eyes because of his shame.246 The 
Cumhuriyet also reported from a Sufi sheik settled in northern Cyprus that the fez and turban 
will be legal again with the help of the coalition of the RP and ANAP.247 According to the 
Cumhuriyet, the efforts of the RP and ANAP were due to the fact that both parties had ties 
with the Nakshibendi order.248 Oral Çalışlar of the Cumhuriyet claimed that: 
 
 “Another dimension of the cooperation between the two parties is the 
Nakshibendi order. There are many Nakshibendi parliamentarians in both 
parties. First of all Necmettin Erbakan, the founders of the RP and prominent 
members are Nakshibendis. Whereas in the ANAP, a Nakshibendi group of 
parliamentarians led by Korkut Özal are trying to act as a bridge in the 
formation of a coalition.”249  
 
Sabah was also uneasy about a coalition government between the ANAP and RP and 
addressed Mesut Yılmaz from its headline; 
 
“Do not sell out the Republic for the sake of your job: Yılmaz, who has 
forgotten the promises he made to the public before the elections, has started to 
make efforts to bring to power the Refah Party, whom he had indicated to be 
“the big danger”. Yılmaz started bargaining with Erbakan yesterday in order 
to form a coalition.”250 
 
The coalition efforts between the RP and ANAP turned out to be unproductive in spite of the 
claimed Nakshibendi ties and a coalition government was set up between the ANAP and DYP. 
After a short time, the coalition of the ANAP and DYP was dissolved and a new one was 
established between the RP and DYP. According to Sabah, the majority of the DYP members 
were against the coalition: 
 
“It is noted that if the impression that Çiller will form a coalition with Refah 
after the meeting of Çiller with Erbakan gets stronger, a large group of DYP 
parliamentarians, who are sensitive regarding the subject of secularism, are 
getting ready to object to this through a declaration. In addition, women who 
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support the DYP have already started to send faxes to the headquarters in 
large numbers as well.”251 
 
Once a coalition had been established between the RP and DYP, the Cumhuriyet again 
claimed Sufi order ties. It claimed that the government secured the vote of confidence “with 
the help of Sufi order ties and deputy transfers.”252 Furthermore the Cumhuriyet was not alone 
in claiming that Sufi-order ties were effective in the formation of the government, as Sabah 
claimed that Sufi Sheikhs, who described the Refahyol Government as the greatest holy 
alliance of the Republic, came into action to establish the government.”253  
 
Newspapers intensified their opposition to the Refahyol coalition government after the 
Susurluk incident. As mentioned before, the societal mobilization secured by the Susurluk 
protests were channeled against the government through the newspapers. For example, the 
Milliyet organized a campaign named “Decent and Enlightened Society.”254 The Cumhuriyet 
also adopted the same formula.255 The Milliyet reported the Minister of Justice Şevket 
Kazan’s criticisms about the Susurluk protests as “The Minister is like a Sheikh al-Islam.”256 
Furthermore, Hikmet Çetinkaya of the Cumhuriyet claimed that the Sufi order ties were also 
active in Susurluk as two major figures of the intra-state relations, “Abdullah Çatlı and Haluk 
Kırcı were also protected by a Sheikh.”257 
 
The sensitivity about Susurluk was utilized in various ways against the RP and DYP. Derya 
Sazak of Milliyet did this by linking the Susurluk and Fadime Şahin incident as, “both Fadime 
Şahin and the truck driver in Susurluk258, Hakan Gökçe, were people coming from the 
suburbs, and both saw the Refah as a source of hope and both were deceived.”259 Milliyet also 
reported that Fadime Şahin’s father and brothers were angry at the RP as they had voted for 
the RP in the elections but the RP claimed that the incident around Fadime Şahin, Müslüm 
Gündüz and Ali Kalkancı was a media fabrication.260 The general theme in both examples is 
“being deceived by the RP,” although the cases had nothing to do with the RP. Although 
Güngör Mengi of Sabah did not directly refer to the RP while commenting on the Fadime 
Şahin incident, being deceived by bad Muslims was also a common theme in his column; 
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“Fadime Şahin, who was as young as his granddaughter, was not a bait 
thrown in front of him in order to bring shame on Müslüm Gündüz.  Fadime 
was his victim.  In reality, a new example of the truck incident in Susurluk was 
experienced there on a small scale.  While the police and journalists expected 
to find an old man in black clothes, they caught a naked man and a naked 
woman in bed.  This aspect of the incident was unlucky for them but this is luck 
for the masses that are the target of those who exploit the religion.  If this had 
not happened, Fadime Şahin would not have been talked about, the masks of 
these peddlers who exploit the beautiful religion of Islam by stirring up 
misgivings in the public would not have been dropped and who knows how 
many young people would have been deprived of the chance to be warned 
against this ugly trap.”261 
 
Besides the Susurluk and Fadime Şahin incidents, there were also other incidents which were 
utilized against the RP and the government. For example, a circular issued by the General 
Command of the Gendarmerie about prayer rooms in the institution and reactions to the 
circular were represented as the rising reactionary danger. In the circular, the command issued 
some new regulations about the physical conditions of the prayer rooms and banned the civil 
staff from using the prayer rooms. As a reaction to the circular, some RP deputies issued 
parliamentary inquires to the Minister of National Defense.262 As a result, the TSK were 
uneasy about the criticisms of the circular and issued a press statement about the incident. The 
Cumhuriyet and Milliyet's reactions to the press statement were as follows: the Cumhuriyet 
used the headline, “Army raised its voice against the religion-mongers,”263 and the Milliyet 
went with “Hard rebuke from the Army.”264 Sabah preferred to display the inquiry as 
revenge; “Revenge Motion from Refah.”265 Akşam was more moderate about the circular 
incident and presented it as a “dangerous struggle”: 
 
“The other day the military responded with a harsh statement to the motion 
debate that started between the military and Refah.  Yesterday, the Ministry of 
Defense, which had been silent regarding attacks to the military, was accused.  
A military official who is close to the Office of the Chief of General Staff said 
that the army had been targeted for attrition for months and complained that 
the politicians, and especially the ministry of defense had been silent for a long 
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time.  The military official said that those pro-PKK forces who want to 
establish a Kurdish-Islamic state want to wear down the army”266 
 
The following lines of Hikmet Çetinkaya included grand narratives in the discussions of the 
circular;  
 
“People who today blame the army of being enemies of religion as a result of 
its prayer room circular, are the people who slaughtered Kubilay like a 
sheep.”267 
 
The Cumhuriyet’s and Milliyet’s interpretation of military briefings on the rising reactionary 
danger also gives clues about the centrality of their position during the Process. Although 
there are many other examples, one particular headline of a news report of Cumhuriyet is very 
revealing; “Briefings activated the opposition.”268 It seems that the Cumhuriyet’s claim about 
the effect of the briefings on the opposition was confirmed by the Milliyet’s headline; “The 
Last Warning from the Army.”269 Sabah claimed that judges and labor unions asked for a 
special briefing from the military about the rising reactionary danger,270 whereas Akşam 
preferred a more neutral wording and just reported the briefings without any comment.271 
 
Many other examples of the themes presented here and other themes which are not presented 
here were covered by the newspapers during this period. Furthermore, discursive practices 
always assisted these textual practices. 
 
5.2.1.2. Discursive Practices 
 
The discursive practices of newspapers can be grouped into three basic hegemonic discourses; 
(1) Good vs. Bad Muslims, (2) Moderate and Creeping Islamization and finally a (3) sudden 
Islamic revolution.  
5.2.1.2.1. Good Muslims vs. Bad Muslims 
 
Good and Bad Muslim concepts were important tools for the legitimization of the “cleansing 
of Islam” campaign, as they helped in the creation of an imagined Muslim identity, which 
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was favored over all other expressions of Muslim identity. The imagined Muslim category is 
defined in relation to its “other”. On the one hand, there are truehearted and pure Muslims and 
on the other hand, there are the exploiters of religion, namely the reactionary and 
fundamentalist Islamists. There are reciprocally defined characteristics for these two artificial 
categories of Muslims. Pure Muslims are honest, clean, knowledgeable and humble whereas 
bad Muslims are dishonest, dirty, ignorant and show-offs. While good Muslims are engaged 
in personal supplication to God in their private spheres, bad Muslims’ religiosity exceeds the 
limits of the personal sphere and expands into the public sphere, and as a result creates the 
rising reactionary danger in the form of either an Islamic revolution or gradual Islamization. 
 
According to the Kemalist positivist understanding, religion should not exceed its secularist 
limits. Once it exceeded its limits, the basic principles of a secular society were under threat 
and those who somehow contributed are bad Muslims like the conservative political actors of 
the February 28 Process; 
 
“Yes, exactly 73 years later Turkey has pains in the face of a big mistake.  
Moreover, these pains are created not by the “religious” people but those 
proponents of religion 272  who perceive civilization, the world culture as 
“infidelity”.    
Yes, “proponents of religion...” the “proponents of religion” who present 
themselves as “religious” and use religion as a tool for politics...”273 
 
Of course the ones who are making a big mistake after 73 years and who present themselves 
as pious people although not being so, were none other than the RP party members. The 
February 28 Process was not a fault of the military but rather a necessity that the military, 
executed reluctantly in order to fix the conservative actors’ fault.  The same logic was also 
prevalent in the perception of the General Command of Gendarmerie’s circular about the 
prayer rooms. The report of the Milliyet from military sources reflected this logic; 
 
“By mentioning that the practicing Muslims who were discharged were not 
people who are engaged in their daily praying, fasting, and supplication to 
God, Military sources stated that these kind of staff members were discharged 
because they engaged in organized activities.”274 
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In this statement, the words “organized activities” must be read as public visibility. Therefore, 
the “people who are engaged in their daily praying, fasting and supplication to God,” stood 
for the public silence of religiosity whereas people “engaged in organized activities” were 
fired from military ranks as they gained public visibility for their religiosity. The participation 
in organized activities was represented as the only determinant of being a religionist. 
Furthermore, “being engaged in daily praying, fasting and supplication to God” was supposed 
to be an exclusive and exhaustive category which meant that if a person was “engaged in 
his\her daily praying, fasting and supplication to God”, then he or she should not be engaged 
in any kind of societal activities. If he\she did, his\her prayers and religiosity could not be 
genuine.  
 
“Everybody can go and pray in silence when it is the time. The only condition 
for this is not to delay public service.”275 
 
Bülent Serim wrote these lines as a response to the discussions about the military’s circular 
about prayer rooms. Serim also claimed that public service was a material and worldly thing 
that should be clearly separated from prayers that were considered to be spiritual. The 
discussion on the military’s circular was crucial in displaying the typical element of a 
positivist understanding of religion; the restriction of its domain to individual conscience: 
 
“Islam has experienced its most respectful, most honorable and most 
authentic following under the Republican Turkey. The place of Islam became 
the free conscience of free people.  The insurance that assured this for the 
past 70 years has been secularism.”276 
 
The title of above quoted piece was, “The Sun Will Rise.” The title itself was an obvious 
reflection of a positivist understanding, with its image of the rise of light over darkness. 
However, there were some other cases in which the dark rose over light: 
 
“Quran on the computer: fundamentalist aggression towards secularism”277 
 
The report was about software which contained the text of the Quran, its Turkish translation 
and its recitation. Digital technology and the Quran were regarded as inconsistent, as one 
belonged to the material sphere and the other to the spiritual sphere and therefore the Quranic 
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software was regarded as aggression towards secularism. Anything which was material 
cannot be reconciled with anything from the spiritual sphere, and, according to the hegemonic 
Kemalist interpretation, genuine Islam was limited to the spiritual sphere: 
 
“Temples are the places of religion. Conscience, which is the almighty maqam 
[adobe], is the place of religion.”278 
 
“In the secular republic, the slogan “Islam, The True Way” can only be written 
in one place. It is the people’s conscience. It is the people’s hearts. It is people’s 
spiritual worlds.”279 
 
According to same logic not the headscarf itself, but the person who wears it and the place 
where it is worn constituted a problem. According to this positivist ideology, every place has 
an appropriate dress code: 
 
 
 “Tansu Çiller picture caption: Tansu Çiller wore a headscarf when Quran 
was being recited. Berna Yılmaz picture caption: Of course Berna Yılmaz 
also covers her hair in funerals.”280 
Picture 1 
 
There was no problem with the headscarf of Berna Yılmaz, who “of course” wore a headscarf 
during funerals, or even Tansu Çiller’s headscarf unless they wore them in the Grand National 
Assembly like the supporters of the RP. Every style of clothing had a specific place and the 
public sphere was not suitable for headscarves. Religion should be limited to a person's 
conscience, and headscarves within the private sphere. 
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The Positivist understanding of religion was also widespread in Akşam’s coverage, as it was 
idealized as the best way of being a good and genuine Muslim; 
 
“It is imperative that the officials at the top of our army are both Muslim and 
Atatürkist.  We thank God that until now such commanders have served at the 
top levels of our army and they continue to do so.  From our chairman of the 
General Staff General Karadayı to all the ranks of command need to possess 
such a qualities that we can look into our future with trust. The second element 
is the justice organization. Those who are at the head of justice also inhale the 
breath of Atatürk. The honorable head of the Supreme Court Yekta Güngör 
Özden is a real Atatürkist and the spokesman of the real Muslims.”281 
 
What is interesting in the above piece is that, although a Muslim image was idealized, its 
characteristics were not mentioned. Therefore the reader does not know on what grounds 
Karadayı and Özden were idealized as real Muslims. The only clues, which may give an idea 
about the characteristics of these people, were their official duties. Furthermore, the 
religiosity of these people did not include any public visibility. Therefore conformity to the 
state order and public visibility constituted the criteria of being a real and good Muslim.  
 
Contrary to the state official’s case, when a religious functionary was presented as a real and 
good Muslim, the proposal had to be supported with various pieces of evidence; 
 
“May he not deprive us of his intercession... Our Prophet was asked, "What is 
religion?" He replied “it is good morals."  When he was asked to explain jihad, 
which is indicated to be war with the enemy, our beautiful prophet said “real 
jihad is struggle with your own self” and thereby emphasized that the most 
important worship is purification from bad feelings, thoughts and wrong deeds. 
Our prophet was a modern person who was polite, serious-minded, but who 
could make jokes when necessary, who dressed clean, who was careful about 
cleanliness, who even brushed his teeth. […] It is a pity that today, some 
groups that claim that they follow him in the best way turn Islam into a cause 
of division [discrimination, dividing people]. We need new religious official 
types who see religion as good morals and offering services to people.  In this 
regard, a name that is becoming more prominent is the honourable Fethullah 
Gülen.”282 
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“Fethullah Hodja sees religion mostly as a divine path that looks inside human 
beings. Fethullah Hodja emphasizes religion together with being equipped with 
the information of the era we live in and enlightenment. [...] Fethullah Hodja 
also indicates that in history religion had not been turned into show as much as 
today and he calls Muslims to avoid ostentatiousness.”283 
  
Fethullah Gülen is the leader of a Turkey-based transnational religious community. Gülen and 
his movement tried to create a moderate and liberal Islamic image.284  The reason why 
Fethullah Gülen represented as a real good Muslim was a number of characteristics that were 
all some way related with each other: good manners, purification from bad ideas and feelings, 
personal hygiene, being dignified, serving to people. According to these characteristics, 
religion was confined to good manners and personal characteristics. Fethullah Gülen was the 
representative of the good interpretation of Islam against those who constitute the other side: 
show-off bad Muslims. It was again the issue of public visibility that matters in the discourse 
on good and bad Muslims. It should be kept in mind that any kind of rituals, public prayers or 
dressing codes was not accepted as a part of being a good Muslim. 
 
Once all the rules and societal aspects of religion were put aside, then the Islamic identity was 
no more a problem for the prevailing hegemonic system as you would have reduced religion 
to a matter of conscience: 
 
“The genuine religious functionary knows that the focus of it [religion] is the 
heart, and he leaves it there as a spiritual need. With this characteristic, religion 
is an abstract framework formed to take away the pains of death, etc.”285 
 
The abandoning of the formal practices of religion has a key distinctiveness in the good and 
bad Muslim categorization and also in one’s honesty; 
 
“One day I said in the classroom: “The essence of religion is to do good and 
avoid evil. We were in a session of the course named “Political Ideas and 
Regimes”. I looked at the two headscarf wearing students in the classroom. They 
were whispering among themselves. It seemed that they disagreed with my 
comment, because if they agreed with my comment, it would not be necessary to 
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follow some formal rules. At least, the necessity would decrease. In that case, 
following formal rules would not determine the genuineness of a religious 
individual. Goodness and honesty would.”286 
 
The writings of Hüseyin Batuhan are very interesting in terms of presenting the hegemonic 
discourse on religion as a matter of good manners; 
 
“We use the concept of religious for people who pay attention to religious beliefs 
and practices in their daily lives. In this sense religious is the person who tries to 
purify him\herself in terms of ethics, to glorify his humanity and in addition to 
those who try to properly fulfill religious responsibilities such as praying and 
fasting”287 
 
For the sake of the hegemonic discourse, Batuhan acted like a theologian and built a hierarchy 
between religious responsibilities, something, which actually could not even be done by a 
theologian. For him the ethical aspect of religion was more important than religious beliefs 
and practices. Besides living religion in one’s own conscience, one also needed to wear 
swimming suits in order to be genuine Muslims:  
 
“The Anatolian Muslims have practiced Islam in a reformist way for centuries. 
Instead of following the dogmatic rules of religion, they have understood Islam 
as a relationship between the human beings and God, and have regarded the 
issue as an issue of conscience. For this reason, instead of prioritizing the 
formal practices such as daily praying, fasting and the pilgrimage, they have 
paid attention to the principles such as honesty, protecting the poor and not 
oppressing other people. In the evening time, they would drink alcohol; instead 
of following the exact rules of covering themselves they would wear their 
swimming suits and go to the beach. From time to time, they would perform the 
daily prayers and fasting; there were even some of them who never performed 
these [prayers, fasting] in their entire lives.”288 
 
An important detail about Akşam’s discourse on the good and bad Muslims is that in 
conformity with the hegemonic position of Kemalism over some Alevi groups, Alevism was 
directly put forward as an example of being a good Muslim against bad Muslims. Columnist 
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Rıza Zelyut, who is an Alevi, was the leading figure in promoting Alevism as a way of being 
a good Muslim: 
 
“So what are the other conditions to be an Alevi? Firstly, one must have a 
genuine belief.  [...] This belief must not be used for material interest or 
political power. It is imperative that worship is not turned into show.  In order 
to be an Alevi, one must never transgress with regards to the rights of others.  
[...] You can never turn religion and worship into a show.  [...] Dear Erbakan, 
dear Refah party supporters, it is not easy to be an Alevi.”289 
 
The dress code has key distinctiveness in the good and bad Muslim discourse. One of the 
spheres in which Islam should not intervene, so that people could be modern Muslims rather 
than reactionaries, fundamentalists, or political Islamists, was dress code; 
 
“I am talking about the women who are dressed in black chadors that leave open 
only a few centimeter squares of their faces. […] Is it possible not to realize that 
these men and women are militants who want to show-off [about being 
religious] rather than “good Muslims” who are respected.”290 
 
The amount of attention paid to physical appearance in the formation of the hegemonic 
discourse on religion was due to the fact that the public visibility of religion had a core 
importance for hegemonic interpretation. Therefore generally acts, like wearing a headscarf 
or being a Sufi order member, could be enough for someone to be regarded as a religionist 
whereas for others it may not be:  
 
“At first sight, it is assumed that women in black chador, who are organized 
under the name of “Thursday Mothers”291, have a religionist identity. […] 
Despite wearing black chadors, Reyhan and Nuran sharply criticize many 
religionist foundations and agents.  Arguing that neither the Welfare Party nor 
the Shariah supporting media have any relation to “true Islamism”, the two girls 
got furious while discussing this.”292 
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Women who at first sight seemed to be religionists turned out not to be when they criticized 
the conservative institutions. These women in chador were saved from being religionists due 
to the fact that they were opposing the RP and Sufi orders. 
 
“Florence Breulilac is a 27 year old French woman. Her life has changed after 
a trip from Kapadokya to Konya. She started living in Turkey and she started 
to receive education in Sufism after dropping her studies in painting. 
Nowadays, she is attending dhikr [invocation] and sema sessions in Numan 
Dergahı [a Sufi lodge] twice a week.”293 
 
The tone of the news about Florence Breulilac’s religionist activities was very positive. Many 
religionists’ activities may not be that bad when they are performed by foreigners, by those 
who are “guests” and have no influence in Turkey. Therefore it is very clear that the discourse 
on good and bad Muslims was primarily about the hegemonic power discussions of Turkey. 
 
Once religion was reduced to a divine way towards inner world, then prayers and rituals were 
problematized and there cannot be any better tool than the RP parliamentarians’ Hajj journey 
for problematizing the prayers: 
 
“Have you seen the pictures of our parliamentarians at the airport?  It seems 
that they stripped to a state of being half naked in front of respectable 
passengers and these grown men posed naked.  They are going on pilgrimage, 
so it is said that they are wearing their ihrams.294 They are not aware of what 
kind of bad manners they are displaying by stripping naked in front of people, 
but at least if they looked at the ordinary pilgrim candidates around them, they 
would see that this journey can be done wearing a light jacket and a pair of 
pants.  Also, as if their family is one of barbers, they have scissors in their 
hands and they are cutting each other’s hair. What is it for? Because they are 
having a pilgrim shave.  Is such a job done at the airport in front of the 
journalists? You’ll say, “it would not be a show otherwise...” You are 
right.”295 
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At first sight it seemed that what the author criticized was not the Hajj itself but the way 
parliamentarian pilgrims behaved during their Hajj journey. However, what the author missed 
was the fact that the place where pilgrims should wear their ihram depends on whether their 
plane goes to Mecca or Medina. Parliamentarians whose planes arrived at Mecca should wear 
their ihram at their point of departure, whereas other pilgrims whose plane arrived in Medina 
could dress in their ihram in Medina. Not knowing this fact, the author supported his criticism 
about parliamentarians with the better examples; ordinary pilgrims around them. On the other 
hand, the author’s lack of knowledge was not all that important for the reproduction of the 
discourse. What the author sees as a bad Muslim show-off act was not the place where ihram 
was worn but who wore it; pilgrim parliamentarians. Again another report from Sabah, 
blames pilgrim parliamentarians for being show-offs because they fulfilled the ordinary 
necessities of Hajj; 
 
“The pilgrimage trip of the parliamentarians, who went to Mecca with a 
discount tariff, who stayed in special tents with air condition, passed mostly 
as a “show”. 6 ministers, 54 parliamentarians and the deputy speaker of the 
parliament immediately visited the Ka’ba for the “umrah” tawaf. Then they 
went to the guesthouse assigned by the Directorate of Religious Affairs and 
the show of cutting hair started.  The ministers and parliamentarians took the 
scissors in their hands and cut each other’s hair and so they left the state of 
ihram.   [...]  The parliamentarians settled in the tents near Mina, which are 
equipped with air conditions, on the eve of the Eid al-Adha..  In tents, there 
was the dhikr [invocation] show of the RP parliamentarians.”296 
 
The acts that were presented as showing off in the report were ordinary necessities of the 
Hajj.  The reason why ordinary necessities of Hajj prayer were presented as showing off was 
the identity of the pilgrims: parliamentarians. According to the positivist understanding of 
religion, being religious as much as going to pilgrimage while at the same time being worldly 
by working in politics is a contradiction.  
 
According to Rıza Zelyut one should visit the Ka’ba of the heart instead of visiting the Ka’ba 
in Mecca. In his column titled “Journey to the Ka’ba of the Heart” he said:  
 
“Those who know that the religion of Islam is based on good morals, clean 
thoughts and useful work, are unanimous that the real Islamic behavior is not 
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hurting people.  [...] All those who are sane enough know that going on the 
hajj while upsetting people, transgressing the rights of others, even embezzling 
state funds is nothing other than fooling oneself. Undoubtedly, those who turn 
going to Hajj into a show and fool the people cannot fool Allah...”297 
 
As mentioned before, the discourse of good and bad Muslims was a multilayered one and 
many components of the discourse could be presented in the same breath, as in the 
aforementioned examples. While criticizing the visibility of prayers and rituals of the bad 
Muslims, the author reproduced their dishonest image. In the end the message was clear: 
people who went to pilgrimage as a show-off act were those who appropriated others’ rights 
and the property of the state. 
 
Honesty was one of the frequently referred characteristics that belonged to a good Muslim. 
According to the discourse, bad Muslims’ religiosity was not genuine but a tool to cover their 
dishonesty. Therefore any religious act of bad Muslims should be tested by honesty and 
parliamentarians’ Hajj visit was a good opportunity for this: 
 
“Yesterday 5 ministers and 53 parliamentarians, the majority of whom are 
from Refah, went to Hajj on a special plane, together with their spouses. 
Directorate of Religious Affairs also rented a hotel in Mecca for the 
parliamentarians for whom it arranged a special discount.”298 
 
At first sight the only discursive element in the report was the stress on the special 
organization of the pilgrimage and the special discount for parliamentarians. However, the 
discursive practice was intensified with the other report that was published next to the quote 
above: 
 
“Directorate of Religious Affairs: halal income is necessary.  Hasan Şakir 
Sancaktar, who is a member of the Higher Board of Religious Affairs of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs explained the conditions of going on the Hajj 
to Sabah in this way: [...] of course in order to go to Hajj, income must be 
halal, the rights of the state and nation must not have been transgressed, one 
must put up with the pains that all the pilgrims suffer in general and one must 
perform this worship with patience.” 
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The message was so clear; they might go to pilgrimage but they did not meet the requirements 
of honesty. When it came to honesty, the category associated with following the formal rules 
and being honest at the same time was presented as an impossible category. If one followed 
the formal rules, then one could not be a genuine Muslim as he\she lacked honesty. Being a 
practicing Muslim was the chief reason for questioning of one’s honesty: 
 
“According to our religion, parliamentarians who go on pilgrimage will be 
cleaned from their sins just as newborns and will have to be very careful about 
their way of life. The prohibitions listed below will be the rule for 
parliamentarians who go on the pilgrimage: ‘He must not lie, he must not 
deceive people, he must not receive benefits through unfair means, he must not 
be engaged in trading influence, he must be tolerant, he must not gamble, he 
must not drink alcoholic drinks…’  
When they come back, we shall see…”299 
 
These lines imply that all the parliamentarians who went on the pilgrimage have the listed bad 
habits. Furthermore, the writer seemed unconvinced that parliamentarians would quit these 
bad habits when they returned from pilgrimage. However, the listed habits were potential 
forms of corruption for the other parliamentarians who did not go on the pilgrimage as well, 
and this was not something restricted to the pilgrims. Yet, they were not following the formal 
rules of religion, so they were not questioned. RP parliamentarians were more vulnerable to 
being questioned as to their honesty. The message was so clear; they might go to pilgrimage 
but they did not meet the requirements of honesty. Therefore their Hajj was not a genuine 
religious act but one aimed at the exploitation of people’s religious feelings, just like their 
role in the annual sacrifice: 
 
“Approximately 2.5 million animals are sacrificed in Eid Al-Adha.  The 
monetary value of the sacrificed animal skins exceeds 3 trillions.  Those who 
exploit the religion are stirring up a fight over “collecting skins” and thereby 
exploiting the beliefs of the plain Muslims.”300 
 
Besides the claims of exploitation of religious feelings for economic interest, more concrete 
corruption claims were also linked to the RP: 
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“He was very close to Erbakan: Erol Yarar, who is the head of the 
“Association of Independent Businessmen” of which those businessmen who 
are close to Refah are members, is accused of collective smuggling.  It is 
indicated that the machines that Yarar, who is known to be close to Erbakan, 
imported from abroad as new yet are in fact used.”301 
 
The claim that Yarar and Erbakan were close was also supported by the photo posted with the 
report. The aim of the report was to make the reader associate Yarar and Erbakan, and 
therefore reproduce the discourse about dishonesty of conservative politicians.  
 
When the subject is changed from the Hajj to the Ramadan, the same questioning and test 
were still on the table for practicing Muslims: 
 
“All right, but what kind of a Ramadan is this? What kind of an iftar302 table? 
What kind of a sahoor?303 […] Is fasting for purifying the Muslim soul from 
wrongdoing and depravity, or not? Those who are performing Islamism on TV 
have contaminated Islam in the political mud.”304 
                                                            
301 Sabah, 29.04.1996, p.1. 
302 The meal with which Muslims break their fasting. 
303 In Ramadan Muslims eat sahoor meal in the early morning before starting to fast. 
304 Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 20.02.1996, p.2. 
 122 
 
Discourse on the dishonesty of bad Muslims was not always reproduced with reference to 
formal religious acts such as Hajj, fasting, or explicit claims of corruption. In other cases, 
creating an unfavorable image about the source of a conservative actor's wealth by 
exaggerating the amount of their wealth was also a method: 
 
“The charity dinner organized by the Ankara Women’s Branch of the Welfare 
Party for Southeast Turkey witnessed an interesting auction. In the auction, 
which was introduced as, “Auction in the Refah’s Way,” deutschmarks, 
bracelets, bangles and rings from women and millions from men rained down; 
every rise in price was accepted as a donation.”305 
 
In this example the discourse was reproduced by ignoring the charitable intention of the 
auction, and instead of the intention, the amount of money and goods offered was emphasized. 
By adding the message that not only Turkish liras but also deutschmarks, and not only 
millions in money but also bracelets, bangles and rings were offered, the exaggeration effect 
was perpetuated. 
 
Another important discursive practice of the February 28 Process was the Fadime Şahin 
incident. Müslüm Gündüz, a claimed sheikh who exploited Fadime, was a useful figure and 
image to associate with the bad Muslim category, and therefore supported the discourse. 
Another negative characteristic attributed to bad Muslims was being libidinous: 
 
“The majority of those [Sheikhs] are sex maniacs. There are some who built 
harems by being slaves of their out-of-control sexual desire. Sexual desire is 
the basic instinct for those people. There is no moral code which is not violated 
and no true religious order not manipulated for this purpose.”306 
 
According to this discourse, once religious organizing became possible, people who 
organized by religious means, that is, the conservatives, religionists, followers of Shariah, or 
Islamists in hegemonic terms- started the exploitation of religious feelings and in most cases, 
this was sexual exploitation.  Doğan Heper from the Milliyet307 also preserved the same 
discourse.  However, it is not necessary to conduct an analysis of his writings as he directly 
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puts the “sex-smelling” Sufi orders on one side and the “pure”, “clean”, “genuine” Muslims 
on the other.  
 
Modern women would also become sex objects of libidinous and womanizing bad Muslims 





The picture was pertaining to a commission meeting in the parliament. In the meeting, a RP 
deputy petitioned about the scarcity of running water in his polling district and said that 
because of the scarcity even the sexual life of the residents were negatively affected. In the 
cartoon we see a bad Muslim man with his beard and cap sleeping next to a woman whose 
head is not covered. The bad Muslim image of the man was stressed while there was no 
reference or implication for the woman. It was a bad Muslim, libidinous and womanizing, 
who seduced a modern woman. 
 
A bad Muslim woman was not only a sex object, but also cast in a passive role in every aspect 
of life, even with her freedom to participate in headscarf rallies: 
 
                                                            
308 Sabah, 02.04.1996, p.11. 
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“At the Language, History and Geography Faculty, male students protested the 
requirement of pictures without headscarves from female students.  About 100 
students unfurled a green flag and demanded Shariah. [...] The students, who 
gathered in front of the university, demanded that the ban on headscarves be 
lifted. During the headscarf rally with a green flag, it was noted that male 
students were in the majority.”309 
 
In the headscarf discussion, one of the leading arguments of Kemalists is that women do not 
cover their head out of their free will but that their fathers, husbands or elder brothers make 
them cover their heads. The report made reference to this argument and mentioned the 
passive position of women in Turkish society.  
 
As is to be expected in the context of the hegemonic discourse, negative actions, thoughts and 
attitudes toward women were not depicted as the norms of Islam but as the faults of bad 
Muslims: 
 
It is said that preacher Mehmet Akyüz from Of county of Trabzon province 
gave a speech during the opening of the Culture and Cooperation Foundation 
in the county of Of. [...] I would like to say to you that we should not forget that 
there are also enlightened religious officials by sharing this with you. The 
speech was like this: "[...] Our Quran would never tolerate such a degree of 
unfairness as putting women under pressure for the sake of the people who see 
women on the streets and cannot control themselves. One must say that 
democracy should not be the freedom to develop ignorance. This would betray 
the purpose of democracy as well.”310 
 
“There are those who push the truly superior aspects of Islam to one side and 
who create thousands of wrongs in line with their own wishes and recent 
examples have shown that.  Respect, love and tolerance, which are the central 
values of Islamic morals, reach their peak in the attitudes and behavior to be 
shown to women.”311 
 
But for those, who did not understand the “real superiority of Islam,” for the Shariah 
followers in other words, the position of women was far from, “respect, love and tolerance:” 
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“Mentioning that women are only for sex for the followers of Shariah, author 
Yusuf Ziya Bahadınlı said that “A woman for these people is a machine for 
having children and a servant. A woman is both an instrument of joy, a servant 
and also an inferior being […] As soon as women and men get together, they 
remember the bed.”312 
 
Historical connections were also presented to consolidate the hegemonic discourse about the 
religionists and sex. For example, İlhan Selçuk cited excerpts from Erzulumlu İsmail Hakkı’s 
writings on the ways of increasing joy during sexual intercourse and concluded there was not 
much change from Erzurumlu İsmail Hakkı to Müslüm Gündüz, as Erzurumlu İsmail Hakkı 
was also known as a Sufi.313 
 
The gender related issues constituted a large part of the discourse concerning good and bad 
Muslims. The basic claim of the discourse was the following: “The gender relations of bad 
Muslims are deviant.” Deviance may be libidinousness or a general maltreatment and 
unapproved perception on women: 
 
“When the swimsuit crisis erupted, I remembered a “Shariah supporting 
advertisement” that I had seen recently.  These Refah people are interesting, 
they shout Shariah every day and then they deem all kinds of populism 
acceptable under the category of “we are adapting to the contemporary era”.  
We did not know, but it seems that the Refah supporting women have been 
swimming in the sea, but with special swimsuits.  The swimsuits that are in 
fashion this year have been put on sale.  It is called “haşema”.  “What does it 
mean?” you ask.  If you unravel each syllable, then it appears.  “Hakiki Şeriat 
Mayosu” (i.e. Real Shariah Swimsuit).  The swimsuit is covered from the neck 
to the ankles.  They wear a cap on the head. I asked: “So when they go into the 
sea, doesn’t this swimsuit stick to the body and display a sexy picture?” I was 
told that this does not happen. It turns out that this is the most special feature 
of these swimsuits.”314 
 
“Enjoying the sea with chador: In March, the wives of the Refah 
parliamentarians who came to the camp in Antalya Belek strolled on the 
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beaches with chadors.  The interesting life in the camp, which had been 
postponed due to the accident that Aydın Menderes had, attracted the attention 
of the people in the vicinity to a great extent.”315 
 
A woman’s image is both an indicator and a carrier of Kemalist modernization and therefore 
it constitutes one of its taboos. RP-member women in their special swimming suits were 
regarded as an attack on this taboo because these women accepted neither Kemalist 
modernization nor tradition. By swimming they rejected the traditional societal codes on the 
one hand and by wearing their own special swimming suits they rejected the Kemalist 
modernization on the other. They practiced their own modernization and also their own 
religiosity. Their own modernization contradicted Kemalist modernization, and their own 
religiosity with the Kemalists’ good Islam as well. As a result they were labeled as Shariah 
followers, i.e. bad Muslims. Another function was to alienate the conservative actors from the 
reader; the bad Muslims from the good Muslims.  Their special swimming dresses were 
presented as new, surprising, shocking news from a fantastic alien planet as if the reader did 
not have any conservative relative, friend, colleague or neighbor around. The RP-member 
swimming women and their new image were so surprising that this, “interesting experience 
attracted huge attention from the people in the vicinity.”  
 
Besides being libidinous, violence was another characteristic associated with the bad Muslims 
according to the hegemonic discourse. During the February 28 Process, the claim that 
conservatives arming with pump rifles was an urban legend produced by the MGK and of 
course reproduced by the hegemonic media: 
 
“The Festival of Municipalities”, which was organized on the occasion of the 
third anniversary of the RP taking power in the municipalities, was 
experienced exactly like a carnival. In the fair, in which each municipality 
advertised for itself, turbans, fez, pump rifles and headscarves appeared. [...] 
The Düzce Municipality booth, where there were pump rifles and handguns, 
attracted the greatest attention.  It was also noted that there were pump rifles 
and user manuals for these at the booth. [...] At the fair, men with turbans were 
assigned the job of meeting the visitors and the Üsküdar Municipality 
distributed paper fezzes.”316 
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“An action was added in parliament to the provocations of the Refah 
spokesmen.  The proposal to require a license for pump rifles was rejected in 
the commission.  It had been found by the intelligence organizations of the 
state that pump rifles have reached a number that is threatening for security 
and the MGK had taken a precautionary decision regarding this.  Even the 
most ignorant people who watch violence films on TV have learned what pump 
rifles are useful for.  A pump rifle is not a hunting weapon. Who can say that a 
pump rifle fair that is established at the religious publications fair is for the 
purpose of encouraging religious people to start hunting?”317 
 
The reports about “the arming of the reactionaries” were not always explicit like the ones 
quoted above. However, in the comprehensiveness of the hegemonic discourse of the 
February 28 Process, it was not difficult to fill in the blanks once any reference to pump rifles 
had been made; 
 
“Confusing advertisement: Yesterday the Islamist daily Akit published a 
‘meaningful’ advertisement for its readers. An advertisement published in the 
paper gives its readers a piece of good news; ‘It is the right time to buy a 
weapon…because the hunt is starting’.”318 
 
It was not so difficult to guess what was there in the omitted parts of advertisement published 
in the daily Akit. However, by taking away the advertisement out of its context the Milliyet 
tried to plant doubts about the supposedly violent agenda of the RP. 
 
The reproduction of discourse on violence was not limited to pump rifles. On the contrary, 
hegemonic media exploited any occasion that was somehow suitable for the propagation of 
the discourse. The following news report was about an attack against President Süleyman 
Demirel. At the end of the story, it became clear that the aggressor was a mentally unbalanced 
person and this was not his first crime. However, this was not an obstacle to reproducing the 
discourse of violence:  
 
“It was reported that Ibrahim Gümrükçüoğlu, who attempted to assassinate 
President Demirel, is from a “sufi order” and that “dhikr” gatherings are held 
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at his home.  A jalabiya, turban and a flag with a crescent and Arabic writings 
on it were found in the basement of his home.”319 
 
In order to empower the attack story and strengthen the image of violent bad Muslims, it was 
necessary to find more elements that could be associated with violence. In the absence of 
guns, bullets and blood; a jalabiya, turban and flag with crescent and Arabic writing, all of 
which were found in his basement, filled the gap. 
 
Regardless of the condition of the person who made the claims, any indication of violence 
and crime about bad Muslims could find its place in Akşam’s coverage: 
 
“The man who escaped from Refah: Akşam reporters have found the Beykoz 
Municipality Accounting director Suat Doğan, who is reported to have 
confiscated the funds of Beykoz Municipality and absconded. Suat Doğan 
said that he would surrender to the police and disclose all of the documents 
he had in his possession if his safety was ensured.  He said: “The day after I 
disclose the documents the Refah administration at the Beykoz Municipality 
would be dismissed from their jobs. The RP-Mafia relations would be 
revealed in every detail.  It would become obvious who hired people to get 
Yusuf Ekşi of the DSP shot.”320 
 
The man speaking in the report was a suspect of embezzlement and wanted by the police. 
However, because the incident took place in a RP-run municipality, the suspect was depicted 
as a victim escaping from the RP members.  
 
The excerpts quoted below are another example of the fact that the scarcity of guns and 
bombs did not prevent the use of this discourse: 
 
“Refah party leader Erbakan was welcomed with a military ceremony in 
Konya, where he was conducting his first trip as prime minister. Erbakan used 
the Prime Ministry’s ATA aircraft for the first time. Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan made his first domestic trip after receiving a vote of confidence in 
Konya, which is known as the fortress of his party. Contrary to expectations, 
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Erbakan was met in a more low-profile manner in Konya compared to the trips 
he made when he was the leader of the opposition.”321 
 
The title of the report quoted above was “Erbakan Displayed Power in Konya” and, together 
with implicit references such as Konya being the “fortress” of the party, it included military 
tones that drew associations with violence. Violence was an important theme of good vs. bad 
Muslims discourse. According to this theme, violent bad Muslims will not refrain from using 
violence in order to introduce Shariah, but until that time they will be moderate and deceitful 
to secure the necessary conditions for its establishment.  
5.2.1.2.2. Moderate and Creeping Islamization  
 
During the February 28 Process, the Turkish political domain witnessed the intensive use of a 
certain term in political discussions: takiyye. The Arabic origin of the word and the fact that it 
is especially important in Shi’i Islam made the concept very effective in the reproduction of 
the hegemonic discourse regarding conservatives. The usage of the takiyye discourse and the 
social practices at which the use of the discourse in February 28 Process was aimed was 
bidirectional. The first usage was a more traditional one: the conservatives hid their real aim 
of establishing a Shariah state and instead worked toward the gradual Islamization of society, 
which in the end meant the same thing as a Shariah state. This type of takiyye is essentially 
dissimulation. On the other hand, the second usage of the discourse aimed at the conservative 
masses and tried to put distance between the conservative masses and conservative politicians. 
With many reports and comments about the rich and luxurious lifestyles of conservative 
politicians, the discourse aimed at transmitting a message to the conservative masses: “Look! 
They are not like you. They only seem similar to you. They exploit your religious feelings for 
their economic and political interests.” This second usage of takiyye essentially means 
hypocrisy. Ultimately, the common points of both dissimulation and hypocrisy were the 
misleading presentation of oneself and the deception of people for one’s own advantage. In 
dissimulation it was the secular republic and its supporters who were deceived: Dissimulating 
bad Muslims hid their real goal of an Iran-style state and presented themselves as moderate 
Muslims. However, they continued with the gradual Islamization of Turkey. In hypocrisy it 
was the genuine Muslims who were being deceived: Hypocritical bad Muslims hid their real 
goals of growing richer or abusing women and presented themselves as innocent Muslims.  
 
According to the discourse, there is nothing these dissimulators would not do for their 
interests. They could even deny their religion: 
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“The Hodja is a complete Machiavellian!  
He will almost renounce religion and faith for the sake of being in power. He 
sees all means as acceptable in order to be in the position of the prime minister. 
It can even be said that he is a master of takiyye.”322 
 
Of course, the dissimulative image went hand in hand with an image of unreliability:  
 
“There were two paths that Erbakan, who is really like a pair of pliers, 
believed in and would never give up walking with determination: one is the 
“national outlook” and the other is “power.” While walking on these two 
paths, it is thought that the September 12, 1980 coup delayed him from 
reaching his target for seven years. Yet he has managed to turn every event 
that seemed to be against him in his favor: military interventions had a positive 
impact on him and his path to power was shortened a little more.”323 
 
A person who could make use of any condition to achieve his goal of power could also make 
use of religion and this was the expected attitude of a bad Muslim.  
 
A well-known bogeyman of Turkish secularism, i.e. Iran, was also used in the context of 
takiyye. Iranian secularists were also not aware of religious reaction until it was too late, 
thanks to the dissimulation of Iranian religionists: 
 
“General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı emphasized his sensitivity with regard to the 
subject of secularism at the reception he gave on the occasion of the August 
30 Victory Day and he narrated an anecdote related to the Iranian 
commanders who fled Iran after Khomeini overthrew the shah’s regime. His 
memory is like this: [...] "One night we had the opportunity to chat with one 
of the force commanders [of the Shah’s regime]. We were together at dinner. 
Of course they have left their country, their armies have been dispersed, they 
are in a bad state psychologically. They told me such things that I could not 
help asking: “So were you not aware that such a reactionary development 
was taking place?” The Iranian commander replied: "Dear general, if you 
look at a flower constantly, you cannot see that that flower is growing. For 
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example, you cannot even realize how a rose is opening. This is what 
happened to us.”324 
 
The message was clear: under RP rule, Turkey also faced the danger that Iran had faced 
before the revolution and, therefore, in order to avoid becoming like Iran, the army must take 
measures. The fact that the same story was also told in same words in the April 27 Process is 
helpful for understanding the fear-mongering function of the hegemonic discourse. 
 
Of course, conservatives needed an army to establish a theocratic state like Iran. With talk of 
pump rifles, the historic hegemonic center armed the Islamist “army” and the excerpt quoted 
below gathered the army itself: 
 
 
 “This is what Refah wants, students as loyal as soldiers.”325 
Picture 4  
 
The subject of the column from which the photo was taken was the debate over imam-hatip 
high schools which had started after the February 28 MGK meeting. The message the writer 
wanted to convey was as follows: İmam-hatip high schools were not only high schools, but 
also army barracks where a reactionary army was gradually being trained. 
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During the February 28 Process, the conservative actors frequently referred to universal 
concepts such as democracy and human rights to defend themselves. The adaptation of this 
new language was also seen as an instance of dissimulation. Besides stoking the general 
discourse about sexual abuse, the cartoon below326 also insulted the conservative discourse 
about universal concepts: 
 
 
 (Democracy, Human Rights) 
Picture 5 
 
In the cartoon, the adaptation of the concepts of democracy and human rights was equated 
with the hegemonic discourse of üfürükçülük, healing with breath.327 According to this 
discourse, religionists deceived genuine Muslims and engaged in sexual abuse under the 
pretext of üfürükçülük. The discourse about deception was also linked to the issues of 
democracy and human rights. In the cartoon the young lady, deceived by a reactionary bad 
Muslim, corresponds to the Turkish Republic and the message was the same: dissimulating 
bad Muslims deceiving the Turkish Republic through the use of the concepts of democracy 
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and human rights were just like hypocritical bad Muslims deceiving innocent Muslims for 
their sexual ends. 
 
The discourse on women had a fear mongering character in some cases. It was generated and 
circulated as a message that the existence of these “interesting and strange” women was not 
only a source of attraction, but also a danger for others because they try to gradually 
transform the rest of society to fit their own norms: 
 
“Ayfer Yılmaz, who used to wear skirts above the knee when she was the 
undersecretary of treasury and when she was a minister in the DYP-ANAP 
coalition, immediately changed her style when her party entered into a 
coalition with Refah. [...] Minister of state Yılmaz kept the hemline of the skirt 
of the light green suit she recently had made long, down to the ankles.”328 
 
 
Cartoon Tag: Mesuth [Mesut Yılmaz] wants to join the government, but… 
Mesut Yılmaz: What can we do, Berna. I told you that you would have to deal 
with it for a while. 
Picture 6329 
 
The message was clear: Anyone involved with these “strange” and “interesting” bad Muslims 
would be gradually transformed like Minister Ayfer Yılmaz, who started to wear a long, 
green skirt or Mesut Yılmaz’s wife, who would start to wear the chador if her husband 
formed a coalition government with the RP.  
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However, it was not only Ayfer Yılmaz who started gradually changing her lifestyle. Even the 
Grand National Assembly was being changed: 
 
“After the Refahyol government received its vote of confidence, 40 women who 
wore turbans and chadors came to the Parliament yesterday.  The women came 
to the Dikmen gate together, took visitor cards and entered the general 
assembly hall. […]Women who wore turbans sat together at the parliament 
lodge and watched the discussion on the parliamentary research motion given 
by the RP on the obligatory savings deduction. The guests listened to Ertan 
Yülek of the RP.”330 
 
“After the Refah party came to power, the human scenes at the parliament 
changed rapidly. After the coming of women who wore turbans and black 
chadors to the Turkish Grand National Assembly last week, the Parliament was 
also the scene of interesting scenes yesterday. However, this time the guests 
were not only natives. Foreign guests also came with their distinctive clothing. 
Among those who came to the parliament were Mecca Aziziya Mosque imam 
Sheikh Nimetullah Hodja and Osman Özdemir from among the Erzurum 
Naqshibandi sheikhs. Nimetullah Hodja and the Naqshibandi sheikh attracted 
attention to themselves with their interesting clothes.”331 
 
While the discourse of delusion targeted a wider audience, the aim of the hypocrisy discourse 
was the conservative masses. The hegemonic media tried to put distance between the 
conservative masses and conservative politicians. To this end, the “luxurious” and “wealthy” 
lifestyle of the conservative politicians was displayed in an exaggerated manner. Not only 
political figures, but also their families became a target of the discourse of hypocrisy. The 
image of great wealth was used to raise questions about the sincerity of conservative 
politicians: 
 
“Nermin Erbakan, who is the first turban wearing first lady, uses a 300S 
Mercedes, which she owns. The car, which is worth 3.5 billion liras, was given 
by Necmettin Erbakan to his wife. Nermin Erbakan accessorizes her clothes 
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with modern boots and shoes and she wears diamond rings and diamond 
bracelets.”332 
 
The report was more about Nermin Erbakan’s car and jewellery than about the fact that she 
had become the first lady. The report about Erbakan’s daughter Elif’s school is similar: 
 
“The Directorate of Student Affairs at Bilkent University said that the 
registration of Elif (who was a student at the department of interior 
architecture and decoration) was deleted because she had been dismissed. 
[…]Her friends said that Elif is an introvert, that the biggest problem for her 
had been the drawing classes and that she had skipped the drawing classes 
because the students were required to draw pictures using live models. Her 
friends said that a green Mercedes brought her to the school.”333 
 
Her reluctance with regard to using naked models, the color and the model of her car were the 
basic elements in the report rather than the current situation of her studies. But the Erbakan 
family’s ordeal with Mercedes cars was not finished with Elif: 
 
“The night blue Mercedes coupe driven by Prime Minister Erbakan’s son Fatih 
Erbakan is the hot item of the day in the capital. […] There are three 
possibilities behind the Mercedes: 1. Fatih Erbakan bought it by saving his 
pocket money. 2. His father gave it to him. 3. The car belongs to the RP.”334 
 
The analysis of the possible ways in which Fatih Erbakan acquired the night blue Mercedes 
coupe offers insights into the efforts aimed at producing doubts about the RP. To start with, it 
was very difficult for a university student to buy a Mercedes by saving his pocket money. The 
stress on “saving pocket money” implied the impossibility of this option. The second option 
was that Necmettin Erbakan had given him the car. The text implies that, under normal 
conditions, there would be nothing interesting in the issue to merit being “the hot item of the 
day in the capital” if the car had been a gift from Necmettin Erbakan. Therefore, the only real 
possibility was the third option, which meant that the RP bought the car for Fatih Erbakan 
with money donated from its supporters, people whose way of life drastically differed from 
that of the Erbakan family and who were deceived by the religious image of the Erbakans. 
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The following lines from Akşam clearly indicated the intended effect of the hypocrisy 
discourse on the conservative masses. Furthermore, by making references to Erbakan’s iftar 
dinner in the prime minister’s residence, a hot item of discussions on religious reaction in the 
February 28 Process, the column’s capacity of reproducing this discourse doubled. Mercedes 
cars once again made an appearance: 
 
“Remember the latest iftar meal issue... what were left in people’s minds most 
strongly were the Mercedes cars of the honourable effendi. Driving around in 
these Mercedes cars in front of the eyes of this poor nation and then talking of 
religion and faith has no place in the eyes of Allah.”335 
 
Driving such cars in front of poor people was not the only evidence of hypocrisy and the 
deception of poor, genuine, good Muslims: 
 
“A wedding without a bride: The wedding of Merve Baş, who is the niece of 
Mustafa Baş from the RP, brought together RP members at the Hidiv Palace. 
Bride Merve Baş did not allow her pictures to be taken despite the fact that her 
family gave permission. [...] The guests sat in gender-segregated fashion and 
they were offered an extravagant banquet in open buffet style. A firework 
display was also made. [...] It was found out that 3 billion [lira] were spent for 
the wedding, where 2,000 guests attended and contractor Mehmet Emin Erkan 
gave his son a Mercedes of the latest model.”336 
 
People that spend 3 billion lira for a wedding are still regarded as supporters of an Islamic 
revolution. This is the power of discourse: these bad Muslims who are so articulated to the 
capitalist system and consumption society are feared to be planning an Islamic revolution as 
in Iran, Algeria, or Afghanistan.    
5.2.1.2.3. The Islamic Revolution  
 
Next to the danger of a slow and surreptitious takeover, the danger of a “reactionary armed 
uprising” was one of the chief motifs of the discursive practices of the February 28 Process. 
Claiming that a slow and surreptitious takeover is underway and that, at the same time, a 
sudden armed uprising is imminent is nonsense, of course, but it is not an obstacle to 
generating discourse. The reactionary armed uprising discourse was reproduced with 
reference to both international and domestic events. Among the international cases there 
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existed Iran, Afghanistan and Algeria, whereas incidents like Sivas and Menemen were the 
domestic ones.  
 




Newspaper: Religious fundamentalists slaughtered seven more women in Algeria. 
Man: Oh!!! How backward these men are! Haven’t they heard about pump rifles? 
Picture 7337 
 
The claims about pump rifles, which were a discursive theme and media fabrication, were 
used in order to establish a similarity between Turkey and Algeria.  
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With talk of violence and the danger of Islamic revolution, the reproduction of the discourse 
became stronger. The first task for newspapers was to fabricate evidence ex nihilo because 
one of the major characteristics of the MG was their non-violent attitude. For example, four 
MG parties were banned until now, but in none of these cases did the court claim any kind of 
violent agenda for the parties, although all were banned because of “being a focus of 
reactionary acts.” However, with the help of this grand narrative and media fabrications, 
attempts were made to create an association with violence in the minds of the people. False 
claims about the arming of the RP can be shown as an example of these media fabrications: 
 
“Prime Minister Erbakan today depends on his militia forces. That is why 
Oğuzhan Asıltürk [one of the leading figures of the RP] is always saying “Our 
armed force is our faith” and he goes on threatening eighty percent of the 
society. […] If you have the guts, take to the streets and shout: ‘Shariah will be 
introduced, the Seculars will die miserably’. Come to the streets and we shall 
show you. You cowards!”338 
 
It is possible to observe here the manipulation of a conservative cliché to reproduce the 
discourse about the violent tendencies of the RP. It is very clear that Asıltürk uttered the 
slogan “Our armed force is our faith” to deny claims about the arming of the RP. However, 
Hikmet Çetinkaya reversed this and presented Asıltürk’s words as threatening the people who 
did not vote for the RP. 
 
After the fabrication of evidence of violent intentions on the part of conservatives, a second 
and harder task awaited the newspapers: denying the claims of success of an armed 
reactionary uprising and assuring people that the TSK was capable of defeating such a 
potential threat: 
 
“People who say “Civil war starts when a military intervention takes place” are 
whistling in the dark… because of fear. Will they resist the army by using pump 
rifles? The absence of any difference between the weapons that the people have 
and those of the army is something for which there is no example even in the 
decline period of the Ottomans.”339 
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Thanks to these lines from Kışlalı, Cumhuriyet readers were assured that they would be safe 
from an Algerian-style civil war with the help of the beloved TSK. That meant that Turkey 
would not be Algeria, but that it still might become Afghanistan: 
 
“ [quoting from a conversation with an Afghan taxi driver in USA] the cab 
driver turned out to be a namesake. He is an Afghan immigrant. He became 
very warm to us when he found out that we were Turks. He is a big guy with a 
black beard. Tarık Şara teased him about his beard: ‘The Taliban who came to 
power in Afghanistan made it mandatory to grow beards. Hey look, you don’t 
need to be afraid!’ The Afghan driver laughed: ‘Look at yourself! In less than a 
month, Sheikh Necmettin Erbakan is going to make you grow a beard, too.’"340 
 
When it came to the case of Iran, the status of women was the subject referred to most often 
in order to associate it with Turkey. Columnists always underlined the subordinate position of 
women in Iran and warned readers about the danger of becoming like Iran. Cüneyt Arcayürek 
gave a good example of this method when he was commenting on Iranian President 
Rafsanjani’s visit to Turkey. He made a comparison between Iranian first lady Faize 
Rafsanjani and Turkish first lady Nazmiye Demirel and asked whether Turkish women 
wanted to be like Mrs. Rafsanjani or Mrs. Demirel. The answer was easy: Turkish women 
should be aware of the danger of the Iranization of Turkey under RP rule, if they did not want 
to be covered like Mrs. Rafsanjani.341 
 
Tansu Çiller’s gender constituted a valuable opportunity for the media in terms of “Iran and 
women talk.” For example, while commenting on the coalition government between RP and 
DYP it was stated that: 
 
“Coercion is now useless. There could not have been an agreement between 
the DYP, which has the West as its objective, and the RP, which is focused on 
the East. They said, ‘It happened,’ but it is seen that it could not happen. This 
was a mut’a marriage, both sides obtained an important part of what they 
wanted. Tansu Çiller, who escaped the High Court342, obtained what she 
dreamt of and so she was able to sleep again.”343 
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In this report, the narrative reproduced the womanizing characteristic of bad Muslims. The 
nature of the partnership between the DYP and the RP was mentioned together with muta 
marriage, which is a kind of a fixed-term marriage strictly forbidden in Sunnism, but 
permissible in most Shi’i schools and practiced particularly in religious circles in Iran mainly 
in order to fulfill sexual desires. Although the report did not directly associate the Turkish 
case with Iran and did not contain any elements of armed uprising, it was a good example of 
how such discourse functions. It established the relationship in an indirect way through the 
element of muta marriage, which was also widespread in Iran before the revolution but 
became a focus of interest in Turkey after the revolution as an element of the “Iranization of 
Turkey” discourse. 
 
Akşam also did its share in reproducing the discourse on armed Islamic uprising. However, 
being more moderate, Akşam used an implicit style: 
 
“At the show of the RP supporters who prayed a janaza prayer344 for the 
Palestinians who died in Jerusalem, a group unfurled a green flag and shouted 
the slogan ‘long live Shariah.’ The demonstrators also burned the Israeli flag 
at the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara. The group did not let Ahmet Tunç, a 
member of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Council from the RP, speak 
and shouted, ‘This arena does not belong to the RP, but to Muslims.’ Then the 
group shouted the slogan ‘long live Shariah’ and started to march toward the 
Israeli embassy. The police tried to stop the group by spraying water with 
paint.”   
 
“Friday prayer through coercion with weapons: Taliban in Afghanistan forced 
3 thousand people into a mosque and forced them to pray the Friday prayer at 
gunpoint. Those who objected to the order were threatened with death. 
Extremist religionist Taliban forces, which seized power in Afghanistan, forced 
the people of Kabul to pray the Friday prayer at gunpoint.”345 
 
Both reports found their place on the first page of Akşam next to each other. In the first one 
the standard elements of a bad Muslim rally, i.e. the green flag and call for Shariah, were 
generously offered. The report claimed that the rallying call for Shariah was organized by the 
RP-members, but somehow these RP organizers did not let another RP member speak and 
shouted, “This arena does not belong to the RP, but to Muslims.” Despite the existence of 
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contradicting elements, the report was still an effective tool to combine the violence of bad 
Muslims with the Islamic revolution grand narrative thanks to the second report placed next 
it: Coercion and prayer were central elements in both reports. 
 
During the February 28 Process, any demonstrations or rallies organized by conservative 
groups in order to seek their rights were presented as a type of Sivas Incident. On July 2, 1993, 
after an event organized by the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi-based NGO, the 
Madımak Hotel in Sivas, which was hosting participants from the conference, was set on fire 
and 33 people died. The people who set the hotel on fire claimed that Aziz Nesin, one of the 
participants, had insulted Islam.  
 
“Militants with turbans [headscarf], jalabas, black chadors and beards 
marched at Üsküdar Anadolu Imam Hatip saying that religion has been 
insulted. This is an incident like Sivas.”346 
 
With supplementary elements like turbans and beards, the protest of conservative people 
against eight-year mandatory education, was presented as a Sivas-like incident.  
 
The discourse on armed Islamic uprising was so effective that in some cases even telling the 
story without naming it was also enough: 
 
“[...] About 100 reactionaries who revolted after 8 people who insulted Atatürk 
were detained, attacked the police directorate building and rescued their 
friends. [...] According to the report prepared by the delegation sent to Sorgun 
by the CHP, the incident developed like this: When the police directorate of the 
county detained 8 people upon the order of the prosecutor, students from the 
AKABE student dorm and members of the Association for the Protection of 
Poor Youth gathered 100 people by saying: ‘The prosecutor is gathering 
people from the mosques. Muslims have been detained’ They set off for the 
police directorate of the county. The crowd shouted slogans against the 
prosecutor and ‘Allahu Akbar’ and they were stopped by the county governor 
near the police directorate. Pro-reaction demonstrators said that they would 
not give up the action unless their friends were released. As a result of 
bargaining, 8 people were delivered to the mayor of Sorgun from the RP with 
‘bail’ and the crowd dispersed.”347 
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The above-mentioned report was a very good example of the extent to which a grand 
narrative can become effective. In this example there was no direct reference to the Sivas 
Incident of 1930, but the plot was the same: Some bad Muslims, i.e. AKABE Association 
members, gathered people claiming that Muslims had been arrested. A final detail that 
associated AKABE Association members with RP members was the complementary element 
of the discourse. The incident was associated with Sivas and the RP members are associated 
with the bad Muslims in Sivas who set the hotel on fire. Of course, like very discursive 
practice, this one too has a social aim. 
 
5.2.1.3. Social Practices 
 
As mentioned before, according to Fairclough, every discursive practice aims at a social 
practice and it is a prerequisite of a social practice. During the February 28 Process, the aim 
of the social practice was to silence all conservative claims and cleanse Islam from the public 
sphere because conservative actors, the periphery/subaltern groups, were regarded as threats 
to the hegemonic position of the historic hegemonic center. Therefore, the allies of the 
historical center campaigned in order to push the conservative actors away from the center of 
the society. In this section, the role of the historic hegemonic center in this campaign will be 
presented. 
 
Together with civil society, the media played a key role in the campaign against the 
conservative actors during the process. The existence of the historic ties between the media 
and civil society as the members of the historic hegemonic center can be understood through 
the activities of the historic hegemonic center just after the elections. After the elections, as a 
member of the historic hegemonic center, and owner of the largest business conglomerate, 
Rahmi Koç called on other center-right and left parties for unification against the RP: 
 
“Rahmi Koç, who is the head of the administrative council of Koç Holding, 
indicated that Turkey had a tradition of being ruled by two big parties and 
said: ‘The right should unite on the right and the left should unite on the left of 
center. […]If the parties want to survive, they must definitely unite, otherwise 
one of them will be eliminated.’ [...] Koç said the following on the Refah-army 
discussion "Our army is the most institutionalized, organized force in Turkey. 
If they said something, they must have felt the need to say something.”348 
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The unification of the center parties against the danger of the RP was a common theme during 
the process. Similar to Rahmi Koç calling for unification just after the election, this time 
Akşam itself called for center-right unification after the February 28 crisis: 
 
“The Turkish people want an end to the fight within the center right as soon as 
possible in order to solve problems rapidly and to ensure political stability. 
The secret of success: Citizens indicated that the crisis in Turkey was quickly 
moving toward a dangerous point and that they miss the days when the center 
right made Turkey experience breakthroughs by coming to power on its own 
during the Menderes, Demirel and Özal periods. Longing for the golden age: 
Most of the society believes that the center right can only return to its golden 
days with the coming together of Çiller and Yılmaz. People are saying that 
"Turkey can only move forward like this when entering the 2000s.”349 
 
Akşam’s discourse during the process was more moderate than other media groups analyzed 
in this study. It always tried to follow a balanced policy between the historic hegemonic 
center and subalterns and sought the government’s support against the other major media 
conglomerates, namely the Doğan and Medya Groups. However, the timing of the above-
quoted report shows that, as a result of the closure case against the RP, Akşam lost its hope of 
support from the RP against its opponents and therefore invested in the prospects of a post-RP 
process. 
 
As major elements of the historic hegemonic center, trade unions and associations were also 
part of the discussions during the process. The discussion on the trade unions and associations 
started after the general elections because the trade unions’ and associations’ elections also 
took place in the same period. Newspapers claimed that the RP assisted its supporters in 
taking control of trade unions and associations: 
 
“MÜSİAD has designs on the trade associations: The Association of 
Independent Industrialists and Businessman (MÜSİAD) interfered with the 
chamber elections after the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce elections. 
MÜSİAD, which acted to capture the Chambers of Mechanical Engineers and 
Chambers of Architects, started to organize gatherings on behalf of the ‘Group 
of Call for Solidarity’ […] Mustafa Aral, who defined his group as democratic, 
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secular and patriotic, called attention to the attempts of the anti-secular RP to 
be organized in the ranks of the chambers.”350 
 
“The Mosque Debate in the Chamber Elections: MÜSİAD uses demagogy in 
order to capture chambers that seemed to be an obstacle to its expectations.”351 
 
“Democrats won the chamber elections: RP proponents, who were supported 
by Tayyip Erdoğan and MÜSİAD, lost”352 
 
“The ‘chambers war’ of Refah is not ending: The Refah Party, which obtained 
the highest votes in the early general elections, is making efforts to bring those 
who are close to its image into the administration. [...] Refah supporters, who 
have lost the elections of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of 
Industry, Chamber of Mechanical Engineers and Topographical Engineers, 
have now mobilized for the Chamber of Civil Engineers.”353 
 
It is possible to observe the effectiveness of the discourse of good and bad Muslims in the 
campaign against peripheral subaltern elements. The reference to MÜSİAD’s “demagogy” 
about mosque building and the “democratic, secular and patriotic” character of the opposing 
groups located the chamber elections within the overall picture of good and bad Muslims. The 
message was clear: MÜSİAD, the subaltern class, the periphery, the bad Muslims, were again 
using religion, demagogy about mosque building, against democratic, secular and patriotic 
members of the chamber and were thereby against the historic hegemonic center and good 
Muslims. 
 
Not only newspapers’ discourse about the elections, but also the chambers’ activities with 
other parts of civil society solidified their position as members of the allied center, as seen in 
the example of the Chamber of Physicians’ actions just two weeks after the MGK meeting of 
February 28. Furthermore, a close look at the activities of chambers during the process gives 
insights about their importance and why conservative actors’ quest for a role in the chambers 
resulted in intense opposition from the central elements: 
 
“Doctors’ Response to Reaction: Doctors who gathered for the Medicine Day 
celebrations in front of the Taksim Republic Statue expressed their demand for 
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a “secular state”: Celebrations were held around the country to observe 
Medicine Day. Visiting Anıtkabir, Deans of the Faculty of Medicine explained 
that they will not compromise with regard to the principles of secularism, 
democracy, and the rule of law.”354 
 
Under normal circumstances, it would be good for a democratic civil society to hear the 
diverse ideas of different segments of society about on-going political discussions in the 
country. However, the problem in the Turkish case, which makes the statements hegemonic 
rather than democratic, was that the explanations of the different segments of society were not 
diverse in any sense. The content of the civil society organizations’ explanations seemed to be 
cast in the same mould: 
 
“Basic Principles Trodden Under Foot: Pharmacists want intellectuals to 
claim republican gains: Chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Pharmacists 
Mustafa Türenç said that the basic principles of the republic are being trodden 
upon and the existence of their professional problems are ignored in addition 
to the problems that emanate from the regime crisis in Turkey.”355 
 
“The pro-Shariah party shall be closed: Full Support to Savaş [the chief 
prosecutor who filed the case to ban the RP] from the general assembly of the 
Turkish Bar Associations: Turkish Bar Associations Chairman Eralp Özgen 
said that the demand for the continuation of the existence of political parties 
that did not accept the principle of democracy, that aimed at changing the 
unchangeable articles of the constitution, which are concerned with the basic 
characteristics of the state and that even consider shedding blood for this sake 
is open to questioning.”356 
 
The chambers were mobilized and, as a result, they, along with Eralp Özgen, started to 
become aggressive. He participated in reproducing the hegemonic discourse against the RP 
by referring to the “blood shedding aims” of the RP. Furthermore, the professional identity of 
the speaker made the case tragic, as it seemed that ideological concerns came before 
professional ethics.  
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The bargains between the government and the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions were 
another example of ideological concerns being prioritized above professional ethics. There 
were also other labor unions bargaining with the government for a labor agreement. HAK-İŞ 
was one of those who made a deal. As a result, the chairperson of TÜRK-İŞ accused HAK-İŞ 
of compromising.357 Furthermore, the TÜRK-İŞ chairperson claimed that HAK-İŞ signed the 
agreement as a result of its ideological position. However, the signing of the same agreement 
under the same terms by seven labor unions which were affiliated with TÜRK-İŞ358 and later 
by almost all of the other trade unions359, and the subsequent deposing of the chairpersons of 
the labor unions who had agreed with the government in collective bargaining by the TÜRK-
İŞ administration360 demonstrated that it was TÜRK-İŞ that was acting ideologically by not 
coming to terms with the government over collective bargaining. 
 
Not only chambers and trade unions, but also official institutions took their place in the 
historic hegemonic center against conservatives: 
 
“During the ceremony that was organized at the High Court of Appeals on the 
occasion of the start of the judicial year and in which President Demirel and 
Prime Minister Erbakan also participated, the harsh speeches of High Court of 
Appeals Chairman Müfit Utku and chairman of the bar associations Eralp 
Özgen caused tension. Utku said in his speech that ‘the point we reach when 
we put reason at the foundation of the state is secularism, and the point we 
reach when we put religion at that foundation is Shariah.’ Utku’s words were 
applauded by the audience, and it was seen that Erbakan and the ministers 
from the RP became annoyed and did not applaud the chairman.”361 
 
It is important to note that the judges raised these criticisms two months after the 
establishment of the coalition government between the RP and the DYP in a time period 
when neither controversial incidents like the Fadime Şahin or Sincan cases, nor the MGK 
meeting, had occurred yet. Therefore, it can be said that, like other elements of the historic 
hegemonic center, the judges did not act against the rising danger of reaction, but rather 
directly produced this rising danger in the discursive realm.  
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The historic hegemonic center against the coalition government was so extensive that in 
addition to official institutions, it also included football clubs, which were normally known as 
apolitical. Commenting on Tansu Çiller having been greeted with boos and jeers by football 
fans, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı of Cumhuriyet congratulated these fans and invited other fan 
groups both to jeer the government and support the ADD.362 
 
These remarks of Ahmet Taner Kışlalı very well reflected Kemalist civil society and its tasks 
in the Gramscian sense: 
 
“[…] are we at the point of ‘either coup d’état or counter-revolution’ ?  
No! 
Because the unarmed forces have not said their final word. There is hope in the 
process that brought together those who gave up hope – from DİSK to TÜRK-
İŞ, from the ADD to the tradespeople and trade unions, from the ÇYDDs to the 
women’s organizations and professional chambers. And in the 
parliamentarians who are affected by the process and say no to the 
dictatorship of the chairpersons. Now a Kemalist ‘call’ is being signed as the 
common view of the ‘unarmed forces’ … forces that unite around the right 
things… people who grow strengthened as they share the right things… The 
darkness of the country will shrink as this light gets bigger.”363 
 
The ideological position of the historic hegemonic center also corresponded to the classic 
center-periphery fault line of Turkish politics. It is possible to observe the urban middle and 
upper-class projections in the campaign. Moreover, the geographic distinction was also 
influential. The campaign was supported by the well-educated urban middle and upper classes, 
although the support was presented as if it was nationwide. For example, Cumhuriyet reported 
the protests after Susurluk under the headline “The People Enjoyed This Rally Very 
Much.”364 However, the text was about demonstrations in Ankara, İzmir and İstanbul. The 
sub-headings in the text were “Enthusiasm on Mumcu’s Street,”365 “Protest with Candles in 
İzmir”, “Torches in İstanbul.” All the stories of the rallies were from the three largest cities in 
Turkey. Cumhuriyet’s attitude of accepting İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir’s support as being 
sufficient to conclude that “the people” enjoyed the rally also offers insights about the historic 
hegemonic center’s perception of “the people.” The other example of the support of “the 
people” for the rally was: 
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“154 civil society organizations, including labor and business confederations, 
chambers, many associations and labor unions, made a simultaneous 
declaration in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir.”366 
 
“320 academicians from METU [Middle East Technical University, based in 
Ankara], Ankara, Hacettepe [based in Ankara], İstanbul, Boğaziçi [based in 
Ankara], Ege [based in Izmir] and 9 Eylül [based in Izmir] Universities 
declared that Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s attitude has been flouting 
science and scientists as a result of his explanations.”367 
 
The discussions around eight-year mandatory education provide a fruitful path to trace the 
historic hegemonic center. Just after the MGK memorandum, some deputies from different 
parties brought a bill for eight-year mandatory education. 368  While the discussions 
surrounding the issue of mandatory education were continuing, Milliyet organized a fund 
drive. Deniz Baykal supported Milliyet’s campaign, the logo of which was a candle and 
whose motto was as follows: “A Light for Enlightened Future.”369 Various trade unions and 
associations supported Milliyet’s campaign both politically and financially.370 The plotline of 
the campaign made it more of a hegemonic than a democratic civil society organization. The 
military dictated the necessity of eight years of mandatory education. After that a group of 
parliamentarians introduced a bill, then a newspaper organized a fund drive and an opposition 
party and various non-governmental organizations, which supported the military’s 
intervention for the overthrow of the government, supported the campaign. 
 
The motives of the historic center were economic as well as ideological. The case of green 
capital was an informative one for understanding the economic motivations of the historic 
hegemonic center. Two weeks before the February 28 MGK meeting, Milliyet reported that 
the conservative bourgeoisie were not limited to a few peripheral merchants, but rather that 
they had started to own large conglomerates.371 In the period when conservative capital 
constituted one of the hottest items of the rising reactionary danger debate, many news reports 
related to investigations against Islamic capital found space in newspapers like this one in 
Cumhuriyet: 
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“Whilst the chief prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals filed the case with 
the Constitutional Court, it has been said that the cash flow and resources of 
conglomerates and private finance institutions that work with Islamic capital 
and are known to be connected to the RP are under investigation.”372 
 
It seemed that these investigations reached a conclusion when Milliyet reported that the TSK 
had created a green capital list and ordered its units to boycott the listed companies and 
further called on other people and institutions that were sensitive about secularism to boycott 
them.373 
 
The words of Yalçın Doğan from Milliyet reflect the center-periphery character of the 
February 28 Process and the recent expression of the center-periphery cleavage through the 
public space and ways of life. Doğan’s remarks made a further conclusion unnecessary for 
this issue: 
 
“Refah is Everywhere: We may be up against the ‘most widespread, most 
calculated, and most resourceful organization which reaches all segments of 
the society!’ The ‘fabulous body’, which composes the political existence of the 
Welfare Party, gradually strikes its roots on a daily basis. The organization, 
which spreads from sports to the health sector, from the business world to the 
media, is now right in front of our eyes. Using the advantages of being in 
power, the RP is rapidly developing in every sphere and in every corner of 
Turkey.”374 
 
The reason the writer of the above lines felt so threatened and targeted, and tried to make his 
readers feel the same way, was not the rising Islamic influence of the RP or any kind of 
turning away from republican ideals. Rather, it was the RP’s coming to terms with republican 
ideals and trying to take its space within the play. Using the same logic, the RP would not 
have been so threatening for the historic center if it had preserved its radical tone also in the 
government. A RP that isolated itself in its ideological ghetto, did not try to reach wider 
segments of the society and preferred to talk and act only for its traditional societal base 
would not be so problematic for the historic hegemonic center, because naturally it would not 
be an alternative national popular party. Therefore, the story of the RP was the story of 
“center-alization” of the periphery in Turkey. It was the story of the periphery that started to 
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be seen in the center. The February 28 Process was one of blocking the “center-alization” of 
the periphery. With the same logic, also AKP was regarded as a threat to the secular character 
of the republic and the April 27 Process was aimed at stopping the AKP from creating its own 




5.2.2. April 27 Process 
5.2.2.1. Textual Analysis 
 
The Turkish Armed Forces issued the e-memorandum at midnight on April 27. Newspapers 
did not have much time to develop a strategy for presenting the memorandum in their April 
28 issues. In the limited time period between midnight on April 27 and the early morning of 
April 28, when newspapers have should begun to be printed, newspaper editors and owners 
did not have the time to change their developing strategy by negotiating with actors such as 
the government, the TSK, the bureaucracy and non-governmental organizations on how to 
present the TSK’s clear threat of a coup. Therefore, it is clear that the urgent reaction of the 
newspapers and, therefore, the newspaper owners, only depended on their general hegemonic 
positions, which were, of course, directly related to their economic and ideological positions. 
Although it does not make much difference for the analysis of Cumhuriyet’s stance, this 
urgency makes great sense in the analysis of the textual practices of the newspapers that had a 
more moderate and middle-way stance in the whole process. 
 
To start with Sabah, this newspaper tried to formulate a policy of balancing between the 
government and the TSK. The TSK’s e-memorandum could only find a place in the middle 
pages of the newspaper.375 The news report titled “Midnight Notice from General Staff” did 
not include any commentary about the incident. The editors of Sabah found it sufficient to 
cite the text of the e-memorandum. By choosing the word “notice” instead of 
“memorandum,” it also avoided any connotations of a military intervention in the text of the 
report. The tendency of Sabah was to report the TSK’s e-memorandum as if it were an 
ordinary and natural part of the presidential election process. 
 
In the next day’s issue, April 29, although it refrained from opposing the TSK’s memorandum, 
Sabah seemed more committed to supporting the government. The headline of the April 29 
issue was “No to the Coup: The midnight notice of the Command of the General Staff caused 
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a big discussion. Even the opposition, which criticizes the government, united on the point 
that the only solution is democracy.”376 A cartoon from Salih Memecan also indicated the 





In Salih Memecan’s cartoon the image of a single man marching military-style in the wrong 
direction and being warned by somebody else, made Sabah’s stance clear. The second major 
item that found its place on Sabah’s front page was government spokesperson Cemil Çicek’s 
counter memorandum to the TSK. Although in the report it also presented Çicek’s words that 
directly targeted the armed forces, in the leading section of the report Sabah avoided 
confrontation with the military and preferred a quotation from Çicek that seemed to represent 
a general call to all parties: “Let us foil such efforts: Çicek made a call to foil attempts to 
bring about a confrontation between the government and the command of the General Staff.” 
In this text Sabah did not directly criticize the Armed Forces, but merely presented timid 
support for the government, as if supporting democracy.  
 
Akşam also preferred to place the e-memorandum in its inner pages, rather than in the 
headlines.378 The Akşam report was titled “Harsh ‘Secularism’ Warning from the Army” and 
it focused on the military’s threat of direct intervention: 
 
“The Command of the General Staff indicated that the recent discussion of 
secularism was being watched with anxiety and said that ‘one must not forget 
the Turkish Armed Forces is a party to these discussions and that it is the 
absolute defender of secularism.’ They will put forward their attitude clearly 
when it becomes necessary.” 
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Akşam also highlighted the e-memorandum’s references to the TSK’s expectation of a 
president who was “really, not fake,” “sözde değil özde”, in full conformity with the basic 
principles of the Republic and the military’s “stable determination” in protecting the principle 
of secularism. Akşam also focused on the consensus on the e-memorandum among the high 
ranks of the TSK: 
 
 “It was done with the approval of all of them: It was found out that the 
statement that was issued late last night by the Command of the General Staff 
was done with the approval of all of the force commanders. The force 
commanders, who met two days ago upon the call of Chief of General Staff 
Yaşar Büyükanıt, addressed the discussions that were taking place in the 
process of the presidential elections. The commanders agreed on making a 
statement, but they waited for the completion of the first round of the 
presidential elections.” 
 
Although Akşam did not blame the government directly, it supported the e-memorandum. 
However, Akşam’s support changed the next day. On 29 April, Akşam adopted a more 
balanced policy between the government and military and made a call to both parties from its 
front page with the following headline: “Do Not Ruin This Country: A Call for Common 
Sense from Akşam.”379 Akşam’s editor-in-chief, Serdar Turgut, explained the reasons for the 
newspaper’s call in an editorial published on the front page: 
 
“Both the parties to the discussion and the opposition parties are afraid that 
an economic fluctuation will result on Monday (tomorrow) if a compromise is 
not reached. In fact, this is the most important problem of the Turkish people. 
People who have not forgotten the pains of the last crisis expect the state to 
prevent a new crisis. When speaking of the events, many politicians reminded 
people of those who suddenly became unemployed, the work places that were 
closed, the sadness that was suffered in the last crisis. The government and 
the military must not forget this.” 
 
Without making any reference to the arguments of the government or the military, in the 
second day’s coverage Akşam warned both the government and military not against the 
danger of reaction or the danger of military intervention, but against the threat of an economic 
crisis. It did not seem interested in the first lady’s headscarf or the democratization of Turkey, 
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but in a potential fall in the markets on Monday. Furthermore, the government’s counter-
memorandum also found its place on the cover page of Akşam’s April 29 edition. Quoting 
spokesperson Cemil Çiçek, Akşam highlighted the government’s warning to the military as 
follows:  
 
“Implying that you are under our orders: The harsh secularist practice of the 
Command of the General Staff wreaked havoc on the agenda. Erdoğan, Gül 
and 10 ministers held an urgent meeting. Minister of Justice Çicek warned 
General Büyükanıt in front of the cameras: “You are subordinate to the Prime 
Minister.” 
 
When citing Çiçek’s explanation, Akşam again emphasized a potential economic crisis and 
claimed that Çiçek gave the military the following message: “If negative developments 
emerge in the economy, you are responsible.” 
 
Milliyet used the headline “Harsh statement from the Command of the General Staff” when 
reporting the e-memorandum on its front page on April 28. Milliyet’s first page coverage was 
devoted to the key parts of the e-memorandum. There was also another report on the inner 
pages, but it was neutral and did not include any commentary.380 On the other hand, Milliyet’s 
coverage on April 29 was rich in terms of comments that gave clues about Milliyet’s stance. 
Parallel to the first day’s headline, Milliyet’s chose “Harsh response from the government” for 
the second day’s report on the first page. What was illuminating in Milliyet’s coverage for the 
second day was the editorial that was published anonymously on the front page: 
 
“When holding an election for such a sensitive office, which should embrace 
everybody, seeking a compromise as wide as possible was required by common 
sense. Taking such care would be the most effective behavior to prevent the 
country from entering the territorial waters of tension. It is obvious that the 
party in power has failed to manage this process well. The AKP, which won 2/3 
of the seats in the parliament with only 34% of the votes of those who voted in 
the election, has managed the presidential election as it liked with the 
understanding that “the majority has the power over all things” and it 
refrained from dialogue with the main opposition party. In this process, the 
fact that “being religious” could be defined as a criterion for the competence 
of the president has been a sad situation for a secular country.”381 
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It is clear that Milliyet saw the government’s approach as more problematic than the e-
memorandum, which it continued to support.  
 
Cumhuriyet reported the e-memorandum in a headline on its front page on April 28 as 
follows: “Statement from the Military: Command of the General Staff: the Turkish Armed 
Forces is a party to and defender of secularism. It will put forward its attitude clearly when 
necessary.”382 Cumhuriyet was the only newspaper that reported the TSK’s threat of military 
intervention as a highlight on its front page. Other key points of the e-memorandum, 
according to Cumhuriyet, were as follows: “Nobody Should Doubt,” “It is Serious That 
Precautions Were Not Taken,” and “We Shall Fulfill Our Duty.” Such a formulation and 
presentation of the key points of the e-memorandum highlighted the TSK’s threat of direct 
military intervention. 
 
What made Cumhuriyet’s stance peculiar among the other newspapers was its 
(non)presentation of the government’s response to the e-memorandum. While other 
newspapers preferred to highlight the government’s response, Cumhuriyet reported it as an 
unimportant detail. The highlight of Cumhuriyet’s 29 April edition was “Ankara is Tense: 
The Statement of the Command of the General Staff Has Put the Government in Trouble, the 
Opposition Has Demanded Elections.”383 The government’s response could only find its place 
as follows: 
 
“The statement of the Command of the General Staff caused hectic hours in 
Ankara. Prime Minister Erdoğan assessed the situation after meeting with 
Abdullah Gül and other ministers. Cemil Çiçek, who explained the opinions of 
the government, asserted that the warnings were aimed at influencing the 
decision making process of the Supreme Court and said that ‘the Command of 
the General Staff is subordinate to the Prime Minister.’ TBMM Speaker Arınç 
pointed out: ‘The Turkish Armed Forces are expressing their sensitivity 
regarding secularism. This is very natural.’”  
 
Cumhuriyet was reluctant in reporting the government’s response to the TSK, but it was not 
nearly so hesitant in its discursive practices.  
5.2.2.2. Discursive Practices 
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Just as in the case of the February 28 process, there were also three grand narratives that were 
used for the mobilization of urban middle classes against the ruling AKP during this process: 
(1) Good vs. Bad Muslims, (2) Moderate and Creeping Islamization and, finally, (3) sudden 
Islamic revolution.  
 
5.2.2.2.1 Good vs. Bad Muslims 
 
Republican Rallies took pride of place in the reproduction of the discursive distinction 
between good and bad Muslims, sincere and show-off Muslims, Anatolian and Arab Muslims 
in the April 27 Process: 
 
“The participants responded to the words of Prime Minister Erdoğan, who had 
referred to ‘Infidel Izmir,’ with placards such as ‘Infidel Izmir will put the false 
Muslims in their place.’”  
Picture 9384 
 
A clear distinction between good and bad Muslims can be seen in the report and in the 
accompanying image. As an example of good Muslims, the old lady with her traditional 
headscarf and the Turkish flag she held stood against the false Muslim referred to in the text. 
Furthermore, the resemblance between the old woman with her traditional headscarf and the 
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Turkish flag she held and Mustafa Kemal’s mother, Zübeyde Hanım, whose image that can 
be seen on the left-hand side of the same photo, is also noteworthy as a discursive practice. 
 
“It attracted attention that among the participants in the rally in Manisa were 





The woman above with her black headscarf entirely overlaps with the image of a woman that 
could easily have been shown in Akşam, or any other newspaper covered in the study, as the 
image of a woman that was attending a “Shariah-supporting, reactionary” rally. Had she been 
at such a rally, her clothing would be defined as a black chador. But, because she attended a 
Republican Rally, she did not threaten the secular character of the Republic. 
 
The chief motif in the background of the Republican Rallies was reduced to the issue of the 
covering of women’s bodies and this issue was politicized through the libidinousness of bad 
Muslims. The two excerpts below from the same column were good examples of this 
politicization and its connection with bad Muslims: 
 
“A young girl from among one of my university students said this about the 
Çağlayan rally: ‘It was a packed crowd. There were no incidents of 
harassment for hours. I did not even feel a single symptom. On the contrary ... 
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the young men around us almost protected us, a group of young girls. 
[...]Remember the Taksim Square scandal four months ago. What kinds of 
things those lumpen bums did to the young women in that crowd. Both the 
people in Taksim and those in Çağlayan are the people of this land but ... the 
consciousness and culture of the gatherings are very different. For those who 
cannot find a name for the flood of people in Çağlayan, this is called: ‘The 
Notice of the Unarmed Forces.’[…] In the rally square, CNN Turk reporters 
were walking among the people and asking for their opinions. One of them had 
covered her head as Turkish women have done for centuries. That is, she had 
tied a knot under her chin. The reporter asked: ‘Slogans such as ‘Çankaya is 
closed to the turban’ are being shouted. You cover your head, too, but you are 
at the rally. Why?’ The covered woman replied: ‘I wear a headscarf, but it is 
not political or anything.’”386 
 
As someone turns into a bad Muslim once engaged in politics, the headscarf also becomes the 
sign of a bad Muslim when it is worn at Çankaya, in the presidential residence of the 
Republic. On the other hand, it is the traditional and innocent cloth of Turkish women when it 
is worn at Republican rallies. Not surprisingly, when good Muslims wore good headscarves at 
Republican rallies, it was impossible to come across any sexual harassment.  
 
The distinction between the sincere Muslims and those who exploit such people was the chief 
motif in the analyses and comments on the AKP and presidential election process, as in this 
piece387 from Orhan Erinç: 
 
"Since it is known that nobody would object to those citizens who can be defined 
as ‘dininde diyanetinde,’388 the effort to have "sıkmabaş" [a derogatory term for 
a type of head covering that does not show any part of the hair or neck] 
perceived in the same way was intensified in order to take advantage of this.”
  
The term “dininde diyanetinde” had a key role in the effectiveness of this discourse. As 
mentioned in the piece, nobody objects to those who are “dininde diyanetinde.” A person 
defined as “dininde diyanetinde” is someone religious who strictly follows religious 
instructions. What makes a “dininde diyanetinde” individual different from a reactionary is 
the domain in which religion becomes effective. For a “dininde diyanetinde” individual, 
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religion is a matter of personal belief, conscience and personal ethics, while, for a reactionary, 
it also includes the social, political and economic domains. Therefore, those who did not limit 
their actions to the boundaries of “din-diyanet” or those who were also interested in political 
activity, e.g. candidacy for presidential elections, were met with criticism and disapproval.  
 
Seemingly unrelated reports or comments that did not directly refer to the presidential 
election, but implicitly connected to conservative politics in other ways, were also used as 
supporting pillars of the good and bad Muslim discourse. Religion, i.e. good religion, was the 
one that was reformed or modernized:  
 
“Atatürk was not content with this [Turkish translation of the Quran] either. He 
had artists named Fahire Fersan and Refik Fersan read these chapters for 
gramophone records and had them distributed across the country. Those who 
have a mullah’s mind have a lot to learn from Atatürk with regard to ‘religion’ 
and ‘secularism.’ If this attempt by Atatürk had been completed, if the process of 
becoming contemporary through enlightenment had continued, maybe we would 
not have been still discussing secularism.”389 
 
According to this discourse there was always something, some modern components, absent in 
religion and this absence should have been filled by Atatürk’s attempts at creating a Turkish 
Islam. Furthermore, the usage of mullah, i.e. the religious functionary in Shiite Islam, 
functions as a reference to the theme of the Iranization of Turkey. Although bad Muslims and 
those who were exploited by bad Muslims frustrated the plans of Atatürk, there is still some 
chance for this, such as a technological articulation of religion: 
“Imam Özdemir, who made the Kemalpaşa Mosque in Izmir leap forward by 
an era, doubled the number of people in his congregation. The imam, who puts 
a laptop on the rahle [a small table for holding the Quran], preaches digitally 
using a wireless microphone.”390 
 
The missing part of the religion, in terms of being modern, was filled by the use of a remote 
microphone and a laptop. The major reason for the “leaping forward by an era” of the mosque 
was the replacement of the Quran, which is normally put on the rahle, with the laptop. 
Cumhuriyet would regard this replacement as a threat to secularism because positivist 
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ideology is more hardcore in Cumhuriyet’s discourse, as in a 1996 news report titled, “Quran 
on the computer: fundamentalist aggression toward secularism.”391 
 
In other cases, the absence of modernity in the religion was filled not by a modern addition, 
but by the exclusion of some traditional element, as in the case of supposed Mevlevis: 
 
“Again striking questions came from young people in the program in which 
Rumi was discussed in all aspects. Why was the head of Esin Hanım, the 
granddaughter of Rumi and someone close to religion, uncovered? Is the 
Mevleviyet a sufi order? […] How did Atatürk see the Mevlevis? Here are some 
headings for you from this different program:  
- The Mevlevis were among the greatest supporters of the War of Liberation. 
They were awarded with the Medal of Independence with a green ribbon. 
Abdülhalim Çelebi was a deputy of Mustafa Kemal in the first parliament.  
- Covering is a matter of personal preference. Judging people based on their 
clothes is the biggest of mistakes.  
- One should not see the Mevleviyet as a sufi order. This is a path, a way of life, a 
custom, a culture.”392 
 
Where there was no modern inclusion and no abandonment of a traditional element, the good 
and sincere Muslim could only exist as a nostalgic case: 
 
“We are in the month of Ramadan. We have innumerable iftar [Ramadan 
dinner] invitations in front of us. The religious information that I received in 
my childhood taught me that iftar was observed with the family or that it was 
provided to the poor. However, now the iftars of today are offered as a 
political show.”393 
 
Only the traditional Anatolian village was the location of the pure, sincere Muslim. 
Religiosity that was expressed within the limits of the pastoral life of Anatolian tradition was 
sanctified, whereas the same religious expressions in urban life were disapproved of. Any 
kind of religious expression that was brought to the city was not reconcilable with the 
positivist understanding of religion, because religion was regarded as something that was only 
suitable to the primitiveness of the pastoral life. 
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Although the conservative political actors were not a part of the imagined category of 
“Anatolian religion,” the masses who were good Muslims were a part of it and, of course, it 
was only because of being deceived by the bad Muslims that those good Anatolian Muslims 
voted for the AKP: 
 
“While rightfully reacting to the people who politicize Islam and politicize the 
headscarf, some people started to move this away from the axis of the AKP and 
began to insult Islam and the headscarf. This attitude offends the sincere 
Muslims and those citizens who wear the headscarf because of their beliefs. This 
attitude may push those people, who do not like the AKP, toward the AKP and 
make them fall out with the country.”394 
 
In conformity with the discourse of the politicization of Islam, any expression of Islam that 
went beyond the limits of personal life was disapproved of and regarded as an act of bad 
Muslims. The AKP, i.e. bad Muslims, deformed the elements that characterized traditional 
Anatolian Islam and put foreign factors both from the East and the West in their place: 
 
 
                                                            




The first message of this image was related to the religiosity of the AKP, which was entirely 
different from the religiosity of the Anatolian people, the sincere Muslims. They did not 
worship God as the traditional, sincere Muslims of Anatolia. They worshipped the USA, the 
EU and the PKK and exploited the religious feelings of genuine Muslims.  
 
Besides the general distinction between the good and bad Muslim, there were other themes 
and characteristics that were used to support the image of the bad Muslim. What is important 
for these sub-themes is that the categories of good and bad Muslims were generated as 
holistic categories at the discursive level. Therefore, any act that corresponded to one of the 
sub-themes automatically implied that the perpetrator belonged to the category as a whole.  
 
Women were at the forefront among these sub-themes. The discourse about the bad treatment 
of women by bad Muslims, the womanizing character of bad Muslims, and the subordinate 
position of women against bad Muslim men were the frequently used elements for the women 
theme. Like the general category of good and bad Muslims, the women sub-theme was also 
generated both by specific references to the presidential election process and by the more 
general references to conservative politics and actors. In accordance with the historical 
perception that the Republic was represented by a young lady, whereas the bad Muslims were 
deceivers of the young lady,396 any reference to sexuality in the frame of the presidential 
elections gains a discursive dimension, as in the front-page cartoon shown below: 
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This cartoon, which was published before Gül’s election, depicts the construction of a harem 
at the residence of the president. Then-president Sezer asks the first lady whether she has any 
information about the construction of the harem. Literally, harem means forbidden. In the 
context of housing, it means the part of the house that is used by women and forbidden to 
male strangers. As a discursive element, construction of a harem makes references to the 
womanizing character of bad Muslims in accordance with the orientalist image of the 
Ottoman Imperial Harem, which is thought of as a place full of women whose only task was 
to fulfill the Sultan’s sexual desires. 
 
It is interesting to see that the historic hegemonic center’s perception of the AKP-oriented 
president is close to the orientalist painters’ image of the harem. As in the case of the 
categories of good and bad Muslims, the Islamic good treatment of women was something 
that could not be seen in modern life, only in the ruins of history: 
 
“In the Selçuk state, mayors were always women. They were called “hatun.” 
Wine was drunk at the meals and banquets. Human figures were also used in the 
decorations of the mosques. Omar Hayyam was able to continue his life by 
moving from Iran to the Selçuk regime. The Selçuk state experienced 
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enlightenment long before the West. The Selçuk state created Anatolian 
Islam.”398 
 
Staying within the limits of the text, it is very easy to see how enlightenment was understood 
and what were considered as its inevitable components or indicators. According to the text, 
because of the participation of women in politics, alcohol consumption and the usage of the 
human image in the decoration of mosques, the Selçuks experienced enlightenment earlier 
than the West. Also, the enlightenment that the Selçuks experienced made their interpretation 
of religion legitimate and this legitimate version of Islam is called “Anatolian Islam”. At this 
point, the concentration of Kemalist romanticism and fantasy on Anatolia should be noted. 
 
Although tales of sexual abuse were not as widespread as in the February 28 Process, it was 
also possible to came across the libidinous character of bad Muslims: 
 
“A married imam deceived three young girls by sending the message ‘I am 
seeking serious girls who are considering marriage’ on TV in subtitles”399 
 
At first sight the news seemed to be the report of a criminal act. However, upon closer 
investigation, the report was referring to the deception of Fadime Şahin by Müslüm Gündüz 
during the February 28 Process. According to the discourse, a bad Muslim could not see 
anything else but a sex object whenever he looked at a woman, even if she wore a headscarf: 
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While normally accused of being a bad Muslim and part of the rising reactionary danger, a 
woman who wears the headscarf can at the same become the victim of male bad Muslims. 
According to this, women do not wear a headscarf of their free will, but are forced by their 
fathers and brothers to do so. This overlaps with the deception of good Muslims – women 
who wear the headscarf but do not actually want to do so - by bad Muslims; in this case, their 
fathers and brothers: 
 
“Those women in sıkmabaş401 were married off by their fathers when they were 
15 and had to drop out of high school, could not go to Nevizade Street,402 the 
cinema, the theatre, listen to jazz with their girlfriends all their lives. They were 
not seen with a glass of wine in their hands even once, they did not swim in the 
sea with a swimsuit.”403 
 
Amongst these sub-themes, the issue of dishonesty has a key role. According to this sub-
theme, dishonesty was a sine qua non of the bad Muslim identity, whereas honesty was a key 
characteristic of good Muslims and, therefore, any bad Muslim who ran for the presidential 
election should prove his\her honesty: 
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“Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [...] is determined to become a candidate for the 
presidency. This is his preference… and his right as a citizen. But he has to 
convince the nation before becoming a candidate that he has nothing to do with 
these ‘sufi order’ rumors. With his actions and discourse… This cannot be 
done by having billboards prepared “from the state coffers” and by saying 
‘may I be sacrificed for its crescent and the star.’”404 
 
The connection with Sufi orders was again used as an identity marker that fit into the bad 
Muslim category. This time Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s potential candidacy for 
the presidential office was opposed due to presumed ties to the Sufi community. Furthermore, 
the claim that the prime minister used state resources for his personal campaign adds the 
element of dishonesty to the discourse. The stress on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s need to prove, 
both with his words and acts, that he was not linked with Sufi orders is a good indicator of the 
period’s frequently used discourse of fake and real secularists. 
 
The themes of Sufi orders and the deception of good Muslims for economic and political ends 
recurred frequently in the process, as seen above. By definition the bad and disapproved 
version of Islam was not authentic; it was not a belief derived from the original core of Islam, 
but manufactured by conservative politics in order to exploit the religious feelings of sincere 
Muslims for political ends: 
 
“In the Prophet Muhammad’s period there were no Sufi orders or religious 
communities... 
such skills were invented later on... 
The money that is off the books that appeared after the multi party period in 
Turkey is not accounted for... 
Because both Sufi orders and religious communities are economic interest 
organizations at the end of the day... 
So, when we say democracy and elections, what happens in the end?... 
Will the members of sufi orders or religious communities vote with their free will 
and according to their political-economic positions and ideas?... 
Or will the members vote according to the will of their sheikhs?...”405 
 
                                                            
404 Sabah, Hincal Uluç, 07.02.2007, p.19. 
405 Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 02.06.2007, p.2. 
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By stressing the multi-party shift in Turkish politics as a turning point in the exploitation of 
religion for political and economic gains, the writer again referred to another representation of 
religiosity which exceeded the limits of being “dininde diyanetinde.” With the normalization 
that took place during the multi-party shift in Turkish politics, religion became the object of 
political bargaining and negotiation processes, which was regarded as an absolute deviation 
from the positivist understanding of religion. Furthermore, the same trend of being the object 
of political bargaining and negotiation was not only regarded as a deviation from the 
authentic Islam, but also as a deviation from the authentic Turkish Islam, Anatolian Islam:  
 
“The AKP is the name of a political movement which attempts to inject some 
imported and invented religious behaviors that do not exist in the Anatolian 
Islam tradition, saying “this is who we are!” to some Western people and 
institutions that are ignorant of Turkey and with the slum-dwellers that leave 
the villages but cannot become urbanized either by wrapping it up with 
political ambition and with the political and bureaucratic support of a greedy 
bourgeoisie.”406 
 
Once bad Muslims are concerned, any usage of money must contain a hidden catch. In the 
example quoted below, the problem was not the way bad Muslims, the NGO that was linked 
with a Sufi order, gain money, but the way they used it. Normally funding needy students is 
an approved act, but when bad Muslims do it is not and it also makes the funding Muslim 
community bad Muslims, members of Sufi orders: 
 
“Mesudiye mayor Ahmet Baki Yılmaz said that Mesvak was connected with the 
Sufi order that is also known as “Süleymancı” 407  and that they [the 
municipality circles] were disturbed by the small courses that this organization 
had opened in recent years. He said that in relation to these courses, deeper 
Sufi order links were provided to the students under the guise of 
scholarships.”408 
 
The dishonesty was also associated with the conservative politicians with the help of the 
claim that they were hiding their real aims and their real outlook: 
 
“Some words are striking, they irk you... 
                                                            
406 Cumhuriyet, Erendüz Atasü, 17.05.2007, 2. 
407 A Turkish religious community that mostly concentrated its efforts on religious education.  
408 Sabah, 15.02.2007, 16. 
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For example, two words: 
Fraud ... 
Deceptiveness... 
Both are the same thing!... 
Yet in today’s Turkey, the religious people who claim to be Muslims are engaged 
in deception by exploiting sacred values...”409 
 
It is very clear that conservative politicians were not regarded as Muslims, but as people who 
pretend to be Muslims in order to use the advantage of being a Muslim, to gain political 
support due to the high value attached to being a Muslim. Furthermore, the ultimate aim of 
this was personal interest, which is contrary to Islam: 
 
“The rule of the AKP has turned into theft, bribery, exploitation, deception, 





[the rule of the AKP turned into the rule of] people of takiyye, in the mobilization 
of kin and relatives!... 
Is it these people who are Muslims?... 
These are people who use sacred Islam to rob the country, to sell it to foreigners 
and for embezzlement from state resources... 
These people are the enemies of Islam... 
These are tricksters who use being a Muslim for their dirty politics...”410 
 
Besides the claim of dishonesty attributed to bad Muslims, any kind of wealth or money-
related issue was also designated as a negative characteristic for the bad Muslims. Anybody 
can have a lot of money and spend it in any way, but not a Muslim, because Islam and wealth 
cannot be reconciled, as one belongs to the sphere of conscience and the other to the world: 
 
“Those who want to live close to the leader of the İsmailağa community411 or 
the mosque in Istanbul Çarsamba are paying TL 100-135 more in rent. The 
houses that are on sale cost TL 20,000 more.[...] A house of 240 square meters, 
                                                            
409 Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 09.06.2007, p.2. 
410 Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 06.04.2007, p.2. 
411 One of the largest Nakshibendi groups in Istanbul.  
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which belongs to Fatih Talu, who is one of the teachers of the community, is on 
sale for TL 500,000 without any bargaining.”412 
 
One of the basic rules of the market was at work, but it was presented as something 
extraordinary and unexpected. The extraordinary and unexpected character of the case was 
due to the work of market rules for a Muslim community. According to the positivist 
Kemalist understanding, market rules were not expected to work in a Muslim community 
because the former was mundane, whereas the latter was other-worldly. The religious 
community mentioned in the report, which is one of the most widespread Naksibendi groups 
in Turkey, was a good tool for distinguishing bad Muslims.  
 
Violence was another sub-theme that was utilized during the process as a negative 
characteristic of bad Muslims. Two cases that were given as examples of rising reactionary 
danger in the military’s e-memorandum were derived from newspapers and were examples of 
the violence discourse: 
 
“The children who appeared on the stage with uniforms and headscarves in the 
Holy Birth413 Conference sang devotional songs. Men and women in the 
audience were segregated in the hall.”414 
 
In the report being referred to, an effective element of discourse is used: the uniform. The 
uniform evokes a linkage with the army that will be used for the declaration of Shariah. The 
typical usage of the uniform as a discursive element was to point out its appearance on the 
bodyguards of the conservative politicians, as presented in the previous chapters. Also, the 
existence of children as part of the discourse made it more effective, because it addressed the 
discourse of creeping Islamization. By working on children, bad Muslims slowly steal the 
enlightened future of the Republic: 
 
“It was disclosed that children were brainwashed every morning in the al-
Qaida home named ‘Adayış Child Club’ in Konya. The chidren, who are 
between the ages of four and seven, are made to swear an oath saying, ‘I will 
become a martyr for jihad’ [...] The ‘oath’ that is recited at the kindergarten 
named ADAYIŞ is like the philosophy of the al-Qaida organization. Each 
morning, the children are forced to swear an oath saying ‘keeping my promises, 
                                                            
412 Milliyet, 28.05.2007, 01. 
413 Celebrations of the Prophet Muhammed’s birthday. 
414 Milliyet, 24.04.2007, 23. 
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sacrificing my existence for the cause, for the sake of Allah’ instead of saying, 
‘I am a Turk, I am truthful.’”415 
 
The Quran Course Oath is an example of the cult theme in newspaper reports on religious 
reaction. In this example, the location of the oath, Konya, which is known as a conservative 
city, and the international group al-Qaida were two supporting and refreshing factors that 
updated the cult theme for 2007, just a few months before the presidential elections. 
 
The usage of the violence sub-theme in the April 27 Process was not limited to being one of 
the inspirational sources of the e-memorandum. In 2006 and 2007 Turkey witnessed a series 
of ultra-nationalist murders. First, on 5 February, 2006, the catholic priest of the Santa Maria 
Church in Trabzon was murdered. After that, a Turkish national Armenian journalist, Hrant 
Dink, who was on trial accused of insulting Turkish identity, was murdered on 19 January, 
2007. The most violent of these ultra-nationalist murders was the Zirve Publishing House 
massacre in Malatya, in which two German and one Turkish catholic missionaries were 
murdered. All of these murders were the results of a stream of ultra-nationalist sentiment that 
escalated in opposition to the ruling AKP. However newspapers were also very effective in 
establishing a rising danger of reaction on the basis of the murders of Hrant Dink and 
missionaries in Malatya just before the presidential election:416 
 
“Hizballah-Style Execution: In Malatya a group that raided a publisher that 
distributes Bibles tied the hands of three people, one of whom was a German, 
behind their backs on a chair and cut their throats. The manner of the 
execution brought Hizballah to mind, but there are still doubts as to the 
circumstances behind the incident.”417 
 
 “The brutality in Malatya drew attention to the latest meeting of the National 
Security Council. The latest NSC statement had emphasized that ‘the activities 
of the terror organization of Hizballah and the measures taken against it were 
reviewed.’”418 
 
                                                            
415 Akşam, 17.03.2007, p.1. 
416 Etyen Mahcupyan, a Turkish national Armenian journalist, was one of those who pointed out the manipulation 
of the ultra-nationalist murders against the ruling AKP: Mahcupyan, E. “Hrant’s Parasites,” Today’s Zaman, 
February 2, 2012, accessed March 26, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-270333-hrants-
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417 Akşam, 19.04.2007, p.1. 
418 Akşam, 19.04.2007, p.14. 
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Although the examples cited above made reference to the violence of bad Muslims, they did 
not link the murders to the presidential elections. However, in other cases the presidential 
election and other political elements were clearly present: 
 
“Turkey is ruled by the government of a prime minster who says ‘secularism 
and being a Muslim do not belong together, you can either be secularist or a 
Muslim’ and ‘Hitler was secular too.’ In the ruling period of this government, 
religion is constantly a material of trade and an excuse to boast. The speaker 
of the parliament is bragging, saying, ‘We will elect a religious president.’ He 
is dividing the society into religious and non-religious people... 
As you push secularism to the side, of course you remove religious toleration 
as well... Of course religious toleration gets replaced by religious fanaticism, 
especially in less developed minds. These pawns are then easily manipulated. 
The murders of Priest Santoro and Hrant Dink and the Malatya murders are a 
result of this climate and environment.”419 
 
“Former chairman of the Imam-Hatip Graduates and Members Association 
İbrahim Solmaz said the following:  
‘There are drugs and prostitution in all schools except the imam-hatip 
schools!’ 
This education system is producing a mass that can elect someone who thinks 
everybody other than himself is a prostitute and a junkie. Then people get 
‘agitated,’ as you know, then people get burned and lynched, as you know.”420 
 
Grand narratives regarding bad Muslims were used as constructive elements in the above-
mentioned excerpts in which political elements were explicitly used. In the first excerpt, 
religion’s treatment as a matter of pride was perceived as a deviation from secularism and 
presented as the reason for the murders of Priest Santoro and Hrant Dink and the Malatya 
Incident. Less developed minds were the key element in the causal relationship. Religion is 
perceived as something that belongs to less developed minds. However, once it was made a 
matter of pride, it exceeded the limits of less developed minds and as a result it became the 
reason for the above-mentioned murders. In the second excerpt, the word “agitation,” 
“galeyan,” was the constructive element which established the link with the grand narratives. 
The stress on burning people was a reference to the Sivas Incident. 
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“When the Sufi order-supported feudal culture takes over Turkey: 
- there are no values, no rule left in the society. 
- people want to solve problems through violence, even murder. [...] 
Who are those who condition the voters by intertwining urban looting and 
religious education and those who surrender Turkey to the feudal slum culture 
which is supported by the assistance of the Sufi orders? 
Those who sacrifice the intellectuals to the hit men?”421 
 
The writer claimed that conservative political actors acquired their position with the help of 
the Sufi orders and that the reason the Sufi orders were so successful in building this kind of 
influence over the electorate was the poverty of the sincere Muslims and their lack of 
education. Once a relationship between the Sufi orders and conservative political actors was 
constructed, the establishment of a relationship between the Sufi orders and violence was the 
easy part, as has already been addressed in the beginning of this section. In the end, the whole 
set of relationships was connected to “the murder of the intellectuals.” The theme of “the 
murder of the intellectuals” was updated with the murder of Hrant Dink:  
 
“A note was recorded in his personal records that the head of the intelligence 
department, Ramazan Akyürek, who became the focus of the instigator-informant 
debates after the Hrant Dink murder, was a ‘supporter of Fethullah Gülen’ when 
he was the deputy director of İstanbul’s security.”422 
 
“I don’t know if eyes will open after the murder of Hrant Dink. 
Will the murderers be found? 
If they are found, what will happen? 
The murderers who bombed Cumhuriyet were caught after they raided the 
Council of State and committed murder. What happened?... Nothing... The 
catching of the hit men did not solve anything. Where is the solution?... In this 
question: Are you aware of the danger?” 423 
 
“[writing about the Hrant Dink murder investigation] However there are claims 
that the teams conducting the investigation have faced obstruction ... and even 
                                                            
421 Cumhuriyet, Emre Kongar, 05.02.2007, p.3. 
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that they could not get the necessary support. The role of Sufi orders organizing 
in the security institutions is also implied!”424 
 
According to above quoted lines, Sufi orders and conservative actors were associated with 
violence in general and the Dink murder in particular. 
 
The violence sub-theme as a characteristic was also generated without any reference to actual 
discussions of the presidential election process. Although they did not contain any references 
to the political discussions of the period, they reproduced the theme with supporting elements: 
 
“[...] Because of a ‘foster mother’ scandal in one of the largest child care 
centers in Istanbul, the ‘religion teacher’ who was the group official was 
dismissed. The job contracts of three ‘foster mothers’ were cancelled.”425 
 
The report was titled, “the guilty one is the religion teacher”. The report was about 
maltreatment in a childcare center. At the end of the investigation three foster mothers who 
were found to have engaged in maltreatment and a supervisor who was a religion teacher 
were dismissed. However, in the title and body of the report the religion teacher was 
presented as the perpetrator of the maltreatment, with a special focus on his or her area of 
expertise: religion.  
 
The linkage with a Sufi order was a functional tool that was also activated for the sub-theme 
of violence: 
 
“Gülden, who is the wife of municipality employee Hasan Akkaya, said, ‘My 
husband was in a Sufi order for 13 years. Recently he wanted to leave, but they 
did not let him. Every day he was asking for his past wrongdoings and mistakes 
to be forgiven when leaving the house [as one would do in the Islamıc tradition 
when one thinks that death might be imminent]. The Sufi order gave the 
punishment of abstaining from eating. He did not eat for 20 days."426 
 
With the claim that leaving was not possible, Sufi community membership was presented as a 
one-way path. With the help of this one-way path, Sufi community membership was equated 
with the mafia, which it is also not possible to leave. On the other hand, people were 
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426 Sabah, 13.01. 2007, p.20. 
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estranged from the Sufi communities, which were presented as so powerful as to be able to 
force an individual to not eat for 20 days. 
 
As a result of rising nationalism during the April 27 Period, another good-bad discourse was 
generated which was not on the scene during the February 28 Process. In accordance with the  
“fake and real seculars,” “sözde ve özde laikler,” which was used by Chief of General Staff 
Büyükanıt in his explanations about the real and fake secularists, a similar real/fake discourse 
was generated for everything: 
 
“Büyükanıt said, "I hope that a person who is attached to the basic values of the 
republic, who is really attached to the ideal of a secular, democratic and social 
state of law, but attached to this in the real sense, not just in words, and who 
reflects this in his behavior, will be elected as president”427 
 
“What our fake intellectuals, fake professors and fake scientists do not know or 
do not want to know is that the number of real Atatürkist people who will put 
them in their place and who will confront those who make efforts to turn our 
country into a ‘outdated’ and ‘backward’ state by separating our country from 
his principles and revolutions is not insignificant at all!”428 
 
The lion’s share in the real/fake discourse was held by nationalism. Traditionally, nationalism 
has been the ideology of the right. As such, left wing actors, which Cumhuriyet considered 
itself to be, used to distance themselves from nationalism. However, from the April 27 
Process onward, nationalism has become one of the major elements of the Kemalist 
discourse. At that point, the Kemalist circles needed to differentiate themselves from the 
traditional religiously conservative nationalist line, milliyetçilik in Turkish, and, therefore, 
they preferred using the term ulusalcılık. Literally, both terms have the same meaning, but in 
the political arena ulusalcılık corresponded to a more secular, anti-EU and anti-USA form of 
nationalism.429 Due to the emergence of ulusalcılık as a distinct and influential political 
discourse, the composition of traditional nationalism, milliyetçilik, as it was perceived by the 
Kemalist circles has changed. Reactionary elements which are associated with the bad 
Muslims were also attributed to the bad nationalists: 
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“The fact is, apart from the efforts of some to present ‘ulusalcılık’ as equivalent 
to nationalism and racism in order to destroy the concept of national interest 
[...], mutual influence on the basis of religion, sects, Sufi orders, and customs 
have more weight in the rising nationalism and chaos of concepts.”430 
 
Hrant Dink’s murder, which was actually a result and, at the same time, an indicator of rising 
nationalism, produced a paradoxical position for Cumhuriyet. Normally, by claiming that the 
AKP government was weak in defending national interests against minorities, including 
Armenians, who were supported by the EU and the USA according to Cumhuriyet, the 
newspaper positioned itself on the nationalist front. However, after the murder, Cumhuriyet 
made an effort to differentiate itself from the nationalists. At that point the discourse of the 
violent character of the bad Muslims was a life vest for Cumhuriyet: 
 
“Some people want to drag Turkey toward a ‘blind nationalist line’ ... [...] 
Köfte-maker431 Nihat Acar in Gelibolu is lumpen and he has nothing to do with 
patriotism. He is a religionist, nationalist and fascist like the hit man and 
instigator of the Hrant Dink murder. [...] In this country, it is very easy to find a 
lumpen hit man, an action man who says "homeland-nation" ... Let us desist 
from picking on each other, making fun of the real patriots…don’t forget that 
every socialist, every revolutionary is a patriot!”432 
 
Supporting the rising nationalism and generating a discourse on nationalism also had certain 
side effects: a series of ultra-nationalist murders, such as the murders of Hrant Dink and Priest 
Santora and the Malatya murders. In order to overcome this side effect, the real/fake 
nationalism discourse was activated: 
 
“A campaign of conflating concepts and hitting below the belt is being 
conducted using the Hrant Dink murder. For example, there is an intense effort 
to conflate the concepts of ‘murderer’ and ‘ulusalcı.’ Can a murderer who is 
the man of fascists or the pawn of imperialists be an ‘ulusalcı’?[...] Ulusalcılık 
is republicanism, secularism, Atatürkism and independence… It is an anti-
imperialist attitude.”433 
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Once the causal relationship between murders and ultra-nationalism was nullified with a self-
evident argument, the next task was to relate murders and rising nationalism with religious 
reaction, i.e. the bad Muslims: 
 
“Two racisms are unfortunately escalating by feeding off each other... ‘Reaction’ and 
‘racism...’ Do not narrow the angle by thinking that one is less dangerous than the 
other. It would be useful to take a look at the discussions of ‘Is the danger facing 
Turkey racism or reaction?’ from this perspective.”434 
 
Intra-state criminal organizations were the other undesirable components of ulusalcılık and 
they were, therefore, also positioned on the same side as the bad nationalists: 
 
“A ‘patriotic forces union’ has been talked about for some time.  
At the moment, 21 people have been detained and 15 people have been 
arrested... 
Who are these people? What do they do? 
In the operations, false soldier IDs, drivers licenses, yellow press cards, 
weapons, bullets and bombs were seized... 
It is definite that these people are in a religionist-fascist structure... 
Their job is working in a militia... 
The job of collecting checks, bonds!!... [...] 
There is a religionist fascist structure in this matter, but an “ulusalcı” identity is 
presented for the incident and, thereby, the real patriots, Atatürkists, are being 
blamed for whatever reason...”435 
 
Once those undesirable characteristics of ulusalcılık were attributed to traditional nationalism, 
which was already a bad category, it was easier to associate them all with the AKP and bad 
Muslims: 
 
“The proof that this current of Turkish-Islam synthesis, which pushes citizens 
into a marginal position, which is being built on the basis of the cemaat, which 
includes the Sufi orders, which completely contradicts the Atatürkist nation-state 
concept, in which religionism and racism are intertwined, has nothing to do with 
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the Atatürkist nationalist current is that AKP was first in the listing of the most 
nationalist parties among those who participated in Milliyet's survey.”436 
 
The real/fake nationalist discourse was also visible in Milliyet’s coverage in conformity with 
the rising nationalism of the period: 
 
“As is known, the shame bill, (sorry, the oil law) that was returned by 
President Sezer had passed from the parliament with the votes of the AKP 
parliamentarians. So, wasn’t there any objection from the AKP to the bill to 
which the Chambers of Geophysicians and Petrol Engineers, the Petrol-İş 
trade union and similar organizations, as well as the CHP, DYP and ANAP all 
objected? Let us say it immediately: there was… 
AKP Adana parliamentarian Başoğlu not only objected to many articles in the 
bill, but also added an annotation in the text that passed from the 
commission.”437 
 
The title of the column from which the above- sample quoted was “Patriotic AKP Member”. 
As a result of his opposition to the law on the oil market, Atilla Başoglu, an AKP 
parliamentarian, became a patriot. On the other hand, other AKP parliamentarians, i.e. those 
except Atilla Başoğlu, became traitors because they supported a law that was not 
advantageous for Turkey but for the USA and the EU, as in the case of a military action 
against Northern Iraq in order to stop PKK: 
 
Picture 14438 
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The massage of the photo was clear; the real nationalist Turkish army, which is at the same 
time the fearless defender of the Republic against the bad Muslims, wants to take a military 
action against PKK in Northern Iraq, but it is prevented by the fake-nationalist and bad 
Muslim government, which is clearly a product of the USA, as indicated by the label attached 
to it.  
 
In other cases rising nationalism and the discussion of nationalism were directly used to 
support the investments of media conglomerates, as when Serdar Turgut of Akşam used the 
nationalism discourse to support the communication company of the Çukurova Group: 
 
“Since the government has recently started to give special importance to 
nationalism, I especially wanted to give this example. You know that Turkcell is 
a real national company. It is a company that was created with the 
entrepreneurship of Turkish capitalists and the creativity of Turkish 
infrastructure and a company of which every person who calls himself a 
nationalist should be proud. [...] I am asking those who try to engage in 
nationalism with billboards and vacuous slogans: What kind of nationalism is 
this? Do you have the right to trip up the businessmen and capital of this 
country in this way? Would the Turkish people, who have always loved those 
who gave them jobs and food, forgive the people who do this?”439 
 
Serdar Turgut activated the real/fake nationalism discourse for the Turkcell Company, which 
was owned by the same conglomerate as Akşam and against which the Ministry of Finance 
had taken legal action. Serdar Turgut suggested that real nationalism requires supporting 
companies like Turkcell, not blocking their efforts. 
 
By definition, discursive practices have a huge effect on reproducing the perceived reality for 
their target group. However, discourse is not confined within the limits of the reality that was 
reproduced by it. In other words, any discursive practice that aims at a social practice can 
include the reproduction of contradictory realities for the sake of the intended social practice. 
The relation between the discourses of sudden Islamic revolution and of moderate and 
creeping Islamization, shared a contradictory existence for the sake of the same social 
practice.  
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5.2.2.2.2. Moderate and Creeping Islamization 
 
During the April 27 Process, while all kinds of discursive practices on sudden Islamic 
revolution, such as Iran and Algeria were being reproduced, another discourse on moderate 
and creeping Islamization was also circulating. The main reason for the need of adopting the 
moderate and creeping Islamization discourse was the more moderate stance of the ruling 
AKP compared to its ideological successors, such as the RP. Therefore, there was an effort to 
develop a discourse of moderate and creeping Islamization. The moderate and creeping 
Islamization discourse also included global cases like Indonesia: 
 
“The place is the capital of the Banda Aceh state of Indonesia... Shariah law 
has been applied in the state since 2001 and a Muslim woman whose name and 
crime have not been disclosed is awaiting the execution of the punishment of 
caning. ... It is noted that the person who will beat her is also a woman. [...] 
Aceh accepted Shariah four years ago in the aftermath of the civil war.”440 
 
Once an emphasis was placed on Shariah and violence, the other details became so 
unimportant that it enabled the newspaper to give conflicting dates about when Aceh started 
to be ruled by Shariah: both since 2001 at the beginning and for the last four years at the end 
of the paragraph. At first sight the report seemed not to contain any reference to conservative 
politics in Turkey. However, in the agenda of the period, which was occupied by the 
moderate Islam discourse and the presidential elections, Indonesia filled the same space Iran 
had filled in the sudden Islamic revolution discourse.  
 
“Things are turning upside down in Indonesia, which is considered one of the 
examples of the moderate Islam style. In the regions that are affected by the 
fundamentalists, those women who go out on the street at night are punished by 
imprisonment, thieves have their hands cut off.”441 
 
“No women can wear shorts now, one cannot have a meal before iftar in 
Ramadan, people are praying collectively in the Ankara metro in such a way 
that it obstructs human traffic, etc. ... [...] 
In the coming year you are going to see that Turkey will change a lot. 
Especially after the elections you will see that Turkey is going to become a 
“moderate Islamic country.” For example, those people who are close to the 
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AKP and the conservative sections are going to come to the key spots in the 
mainstream media. You’re going to see that our life on the street will change as 
well.”442 
 
The two excerpts quoted above were good examples of the power of discourse in fear-
mongering. The Malaysia and Indonesia cases were compared with the case of Iran and 
identified as a model for the Turkish conservative in the February 28 Process443. At that time, 
as a part of the good and bad Muslim discourse, Malaysia and Indonesia were presented as 
good Muslims because of their moderate tone compared to Iran. However, in 2007 being 
moderate Muslims turned out to be a great danger that may result in the restriction of 
women’s clothing choices; a real fear for urban middle class women.  
 
It was claimed that the moderate and creeping Islamization of Turkey was very similar to the 
pre-revolution period in Iran. Fear mongering with the claim of the “Iranization” of Turkey 
continued, as in the headline of Cumhuriyet: “They Come Gradually”: 
 
“Khazai, who had to flee his country (An Iranian Scholar): The mullahs in Iran 
were also presented as moderates […] Khazai said that Iran should be a lesson 
for Turkey and added, "I am sceptical of moderate Muslims. The mullahs never 
said that they were going to introduce an Islamic model. People thought that 
they would bring democracy."444 
 
The news addressed scholars and academicians, some of whom supported the AKP even 
though they were not traditionally conservative, because of the gradual improvements it had 
made in the field of human rights and democratization. Aside from the fear-mongering effect, 
these grand narratives were also used as a foundation for the good and bad Muslim discourse: 
 
“Islam is a sacred religion... 
but moderate or radical, what is the real name of an ‘Islamic state model’? . 
One word: 
Reaction! 
So what is reaction?.. 
                                                            
442 Milliyet, Ece Temelkuran, 04.04.2007, p.5. 
443 For example, a news report appeared on the 20th page of the November 19 issue of Cumhuriyet defining 
Malaysia as a country with an Islamic, but not fundamentalist, identity. The report also claimed that the Muslim 
identity in Malaysia was not publicly visible. 
444Cumhuriyet, 18.08.2007, p.1. 
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Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedinejad had started to hunt women on the 
streets of Tehran... 
The hair of that woman that spilled over from her headscarf, the bangs of this 
woman that spilled over from her turban; were they in conformity with Islamic 
covering or not? ... 
This is what (political) reaction is!..”445 
 
Constructive structures employed in the above excerpt were the public visibility of Islam and 
the bad Muslims’ treatment of women. Declaring that Islam was a holy religion but that any 
version in the political sphere was the same in terms of reaction was an example of the 
Kemalist positivist understanding of religion, which limited religion within the boundaries of 
conscience and could not accept any further expression. 
 
The dissimulation theme directly associated with the presidential elections and the AKP-
supported potential candidates’ intentions were questioned: 
 
“Those politicians in our country who would like to show that they are ready to 
serve the ‘super power’ who hide their long beards and turbans inside their 
heads, but who reflect their dark mentality in the turbans of their wives […] gave 
the impression that they sent the message ‘I can be your presidential candidate’ 
to the US administration. These cannot go beyond being people of takiyye, 
merchants of faith who have been educated in madrasa-like schools.”446 
 
There were two different implications of dishonesty in the lines quoted above. First, the writer 
claims that the real aim of the president candidacy was to serve a “super power.” Therefore, 
candidates who come from a conservative background hid the real aims of their candidacy for 
the presidential office. The second implication was about the very point of coming from a 
conservative background. As is known, the conservative politicians of the time did not have 
an outlook similar to the stereotype of a reactionary Islamist.447 According to the writer, this 
was because they hid their turbans and long beards in their heads. Apart from the negative 
effect of wearing a turban and having a long beard, dishonesty was also associated with the 
conservative politicians with the help of the claim that they were hiding their real aims and 
their real outlook - read as ideology. In the end, by declaring the conservative politicians as 
                                                            
445 Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 06.05.2007, p.2. 
446 Cumhuriyet, Arif Çavdar, 04.03.2007, p.6. 
447 The fact is that the stereotype of a reactionary Islamist is almost the same as the stereotype of a “muslim 
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nothing but people of takiyye, merchants of faith, the entire story was bound within the 
broader discourse of good and bad Muslims. 
 
The chief of general staff’s “real/fake secularist” explanation was frequently used as an 
element of the dissimulation-hypocrisy theme; 
 
“The imam of the Haci Ahmet Özeltürkay Mosque placed a box like a money-
box in front of the door. Why? So that those citizens who come to the Friday 
prayers and who like giving to charity could donate to the mosque… They did. 
They received prayers for their well-being. The prayer ended. They opened 
the box. They counted the money... And the scandal was revealed. A 100 lira 
note... A 50 lira note... Were counterfeit. Yes, counterfeit. That is, not real 
[özde]... But fake donations [sözde]...”448 
 
The excerpt quoted above is a good example of the transitional capacity of the discourses and 
themes. The honesty theme of the bad Muslim discourse can be articulated by the 
dissimulation discourse and they were both associated with the real/fake explanation of the 
chief of general staff.  
 
Again, the danger came from dissimulating bad Muslims, but this time their treatment of 
women was the subject: 
 
“I watched the May 19449 ceremonies in Ankara on TV…. President Sezer and 
Prime Minister Erdoğan sat next to each other in the VIP box…. 
The eyes of RTE [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] were not visible.. 
He was wearing dark glasses. [...] 
Does RTE, who was wearing dark glasses, deem the May 19 ceremonies a kind 
of blasphemy? ... 
Is he engaged in takiyye?.. 
With which glasses can a mentality that subjects women to covering from her 
hair to her toes look at young women at the May 19 celebrations?  
Dark glasses!..”450 
 
                                                            
448 Sabah, Yılmaz Özdil, 28.04.2007, p.3. 
449 One of the national holidays in Turkey. According to the official history, the date corresponds to Mustafa 
Kemal’s arrival in Samsun to start the National Liberation movement.  
450 Cumhuriyet, İlhan Selçuk, 20.05.2007, 2. 
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The reason the author described sunglasses as “dark glasses,” “kara gözlük,” and the reason 
the name of the cloth that covered the lady’s face in the Cumhuriyet’s advertisement451 was a 
“dark chador,” “kara çarşaf,” were the same: It was Kemalism’s everlasting binary of dark 
and light. That dark, dissimulating womanizer and bad Muslim Erdoğan will replace the 
president sitting next to him in a few months. The current president, Sezer, also emphasized 
the same danger in his speech at the opening ceremony of the Military Academy a few days 
after the chief of general staff’s real/fake explanation: 
 
“President: The dimensions of the reactionary threat that has followed the 
republic like a sneaky shadow are worrying. […] Foreign powers want the 
political regime of Turkey to be transformed into a ‘moderate Islamic republic’ 
under the name of a ‘democratic republic’ so that Turkey can be a model to 
Islamic countries. Moderate Islam means religious rules affecting the social, 
economic and legal order of the state to some extent.”452 
 
An example of the reorganization of social, economic, political and legal spheres according to 
religious norms can be seen in the official May 19 celebrations: 
 
 
Photo Tag: 43 years before, 43 years after 
Picture 15 
 
“Date: May 19, 1964. Venue: Manisa Akhisar. Female students are wearing short-
sleeve shirts and shorts at the ceremonies of the Festival for Commemorating Atatürk, 
Youth and Sports. Date: May 19, 2007. Venue: the same. But the girls are wearing 
long-sleeve track suits.”453 
                                                            
451 Cumhuriyet made a series of advertisements under the slogan, “Are you aware of the danger? Support Your 
Republic” 
452 Akşam, 14.04.2007, p.12. 
453 Milliyet, 22.05.2007, p.19. 
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The photo and the news report ran under the title “From where to where.” The message was 
clear: Under the rule of the AKP, Turkey had gone 43 years back in time and the message 
was transmitted by the amount of the girls’ bodies that were left visible. The reason the girls 
were covered does not change the accuracy of the message: 
 
“This year there were not just gymnastics movements at the May 19 
ceremonies. Various scenes were also displayed. Therefore, girls wore red and 
boys wore white outfits. In order to ensure the integration of the colors in the 
shapes they were going to form in the scenes, the outfits were designed to be 
long-sleeved and with pants.”454 
 
Although the reason for the long-sleeved outfits was the integration of the colors for the show, 
according to the discourse, bad Muslims were libidinous people who could not see women as 
individuals but always focused on their femininity and, as a result, tried to cover their bodies. 
 
The claim that women’s visibility in public life was gradually decreasing was presented as the 
chief indicator of gradual Islamization: 
 
“Today the basic principles of the secular democratic republic and its gains are 
under heavy attack. Secularism has been undermined to a large extent, the social 
structure has broken down completely... 
Today it is impossible to see women on the streets and avenues in Anatolia!..At 
this point, what is the duty that falls upon the Turkish Armed Forces? To protect 
the constitutional order with the authority given by the constitution!..”455 
 
“'The Board of Education indicated that the cream on the cake in the textbook 
seemed similar to Arabic letters and it warned the Provincial Directorate of 
Primary Education. Eğitim-Sen [a trade union in the field of education] said ‘the 
cream brings to mind the ‘basmala’ [the Arabic prayer invoking the name of 
God].”456 
 
The point in the report was not the similarity of the cream filling and the basmala, but rather 
the perception of irreconcilability between religion and modern education. According to the 
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455 Cumhuriyet, Hikmet Çetinkaya, 12.04.2007, p.5. 
456 Milliyet, 06.03.2007, p.16. 
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discourse, through these small and seemingly unimportant threats, moderate Islam exceeds its 
limits and starts to Islamize the public sphere. The same kind of irreconcilability also existed 
for modern consumption patterns, such as going on holiday; 
 
“There used to be six tesettür [Islamic covering] hotels in Turkey in 2002. The 
number of these hotels, where women and men utilize many services in gender-
segregated fashion, and which serve conservative segments of society, went up to 
27 in the last year.”457 
 
At first sight, the report seems not worthy to quote, as it uses a neutral discourse and reports 
the increase in the number of conservative hotels – the type of hotels mostly preferred by 
conservative people because they offer gender segregated beaches and swimming pools and 
do not serve alcohol. The only interesting thing in terms of discourse analysis is the stress on 
the rapid increase in a short time, as this corresponds to the creeping Islamization discourse. 
However, when the report is considered together with another one in the same issue, the link 
with the Islamization discourse becomes clearer: 
 
“[Reporting about a research questionnaire conducted with students in a high 
school] There was also the question of ‘how religious do you describe yourself?’ 
In the 76th question of the survey, which was answered by students between the 
ages of 9 and 17. The students were asked to rank their answers to the 
question.”458 
 
Here the discourse was not reproduced by a single report, but by the conjunction of the two. 
On the one hand there is a neutral report about the increasing number of conservative hotels. 
However, when discourse is concerned, numbers are never just numbers. In this excerpt 
Milliyet addressed the fears of the urban middle class individuals and activated their fear of 
gradual Islamization. Consumption patterns – e.g. going on holiday - were used for to induce 
fear in accordance with the urban middle class character of the reader. Furthermore, in 
combination with the first report, the second report used another example of gradual 
Islamization. Reading both news reports together, it must not have been very difficult for the 
urban middle class reader to connect the two and become worried about his or her children in 
the school who are asked about their religious beliefs.  
 
                                                            
457 Milliyet, 09.06.2007, p.17. 
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The sphere of education was very fruitful for the reproduction of the gradual Islamization 
discourse because, like consumption patterns, education also directly addressed the urban 
middle classes through their children. The message was clear: If you do not want your 
children to be gradually deceived, be aware of the danger: 
 
“A family that started to have suspicions because of the changes in the ideas and 
behavior of their daughter who studies at the Bağcılar High School found that a 
prayer room had been established in the basement of the high school and 
recorded this on camera. In the video, girls and boys come to the prayer room 
separately and pray. The deputy director of the school also participates in the 
prayer of the male students. [...] The father, I.K., who spoke about the changes in 
his daughter, said the following: ‘They brainwashed my daughter. Now she has 
become a child that constantly reads books on religious subjects. Right now she 
is listening to religious devotional songs on TV. She is getting up at five in the 
morning and praying.’”459 
 
The real strength of the report was a quotation from the father of one of the female students, 
as he claimed that his daughter had been brainwashed. The family realized a sudden change in 
their child’s behavior. The story of the student was very similar to the paranoia of the 
Kemalists: Until the last day the reactionaries, i.e. the bad Muslims, will move slowly, i.e. 
gradual Islamization, and once all the necessary conditions are established, they will declare a 
Shariah regime. Again the middle class family notion was activated and parents were 
mobilized for the sake of their children. 
 
However, gradual Islamization was not limited to the educational sphere, but spread to all 
aspects of social life: 
 
“Yüksel street, which is a common spot for demonstrations and press releases, 
almost turned into an open-air prayer room yesterday because of the Friday 
prayer. When there was no more room in the prayer room in the basement of a 
business center that is located at the entrance of the street, the citizens who 
wanted to pray spilled over into the street. The congregation prayed by 
spreading out prayer mats and cardboard on the road used by pedestrians 
instead of going to Kocatepe, which is one of the biggest mosques in Turkey. The 
scene that took place on Yüksel street, where there are cafes and bars and which 
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is the meeting point of university students and young people, surprised those who 
saw it.”460 
 
“The prayer room that the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality opened at the 
Kızılay station has lots of people at each Friday prayer time and these people 
spill over outside in a way that obstructs the pedestrian traffic. [...] While the 
scene that is repeated every Friday affects the pedestrian traffic at the metro, 
Kocatepe Mosque, which is only 600 meters from the Kızılay station, can remain 
empty at the prayer time.”461 
 
It was not the first time the size of a mosque was inadequate for the praying crowds during the 
Friday Prayer and it will not be the last. However, according to the discourse this was 
something new, as the people sitting in the cafes were surprised. That means it was not 
something usual, but just another indication of the gradual and creeping Islamization that had 
started to dominate public life gradually, like the prayer room in a public transport ferry: 
 
“Our reader Ramazan Gezginci describes as follows his proposal regarding the 
news in our newspaper yesterday, which reported that prayer rooms for men and 
women were seen in the plan of the Istanbul city ferries:  
Next to these rooms, a room should be opened for cursing thieves, dishonorable 
people, those who speak differently when in opposition and when in power, those 
who do not fulfill the many promises they make, those who use religion for 
politics, those who cannot account for their assets and properties, those who say 
‘I borrowed from my son,’ those who bully their own citizens and then become 
as meek as a mouse in front of foreigners, those who gift public organizations to 
their supporters under the name of privatization, those who are unfair to the 
orphans and take what is rightfully theirs, those who are engaged in 
embezzlement on a large scale, those who are supporters of Ali Dibo.”462 
 
The reason for the annoyance in the report was the existence of a prayer room on the ferries. 
However, the annoyance was not directly expressed. Instead the attribution of dishonesty, 
together with many other bad characteristics, was used as a discursive method. In the end the 
message that those who reserved a room in the ferry for praying were bad Muslims was made 
very clearly.  
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In the end, when gradual Islamization reached its peak, when Turkey reached the point of no 
return like pre-Revolutionary Iran, the gradual, moderate and creeping Islam would give way 
to guns; 
 
“[Quoting from a reader’s email] Claims that some radical groups have 
acquired weapons are circulating around. It is claimed that years ago some 
people prepared themselves for an environment of armed conflict on the 
streets.”463 
 
Gradual Islamization will give way to Islamic revolution and the time of radical groups that 
have “prepared themselves for an environment of armed conflict on the streets” will come. 
5.2.2.2.3. The Islamic Revolution 
 
Examples of Islamic revolutions from around the world and domestic examples of communal 
violence were frequently stressed to create another grand narrative in this period. According 
to this narrative, there was an ever-present danger of sudden Islamic armed uprising in 
Turkey and conservative actors were the hidden organizers and agents of these potential riots. 
Historicity and specificity were not considered in the reproduction of this discourse, as if Iran 
or Afghanistan could be a model for the Turkish experience. Both historic cases could be 
associated with actual discussions of Turkey: 
 
“[commenting on the Malatya murders] What does the type of killing remind 
you of? Isn’t it exactly the same as the executions broadcast by the al-Jazeera 
channel? …Weren’t the hangmen cutting the throats of the detainees after tying 
them up and making them sit, saying that they had insulted the religion? ... 
[the murderers] are staying in a student dorm...because the students are 
preparing for the university exam…that is, they have “the future” in their minds 
in fact... They are able to go toward death while thinking of their future... 
Students... what does this word remind you of?... 
Taliban!...”464 
 
Not all examples of the Islamic revolution grand narrative were so explicit. Some reproduced 
the discourse without any explicit reference to the Turkish case; 
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“One hundred thousand people demonstrated against the actions of those 
religionists who follow a fanatical imam in Pakistan in order to establish a 
regime similar to that of the Taliban, saying ‘no to extremism.’”465 
 
At first sight, the report seemed to be a normal piece of journalism. However, when it is read 
together with many Republican Rally reports, which were printed in the following pages of 
the same issue, its effectiveness in reproducing the discourse becomes clearer. The number of 
participants in the Republican Rallies and the message that the crowds were “supporting 
neither a military intervention nor Shariah” was the key characteristic of the Republican 
Rallies, according to the media. Therefore, the number of participants in the Pakistan rally 
and the moderate message given by the participants became the connecting elements in the 
reproduction of the discourse in the context of the Turkish Republican Rallies.  
 
The Taliban portion of the grand narrative enabled the drawing of connections with the imam-
hatip schools (as the Taliban’s base is constituted by medrese students), the mistreatment of 
women and any kind of hostility toward art. The sample below did not include all of these 
functions, as it only referenced hostility toward art. Nevertheless, it was noteworthy in the 
way it built a connection with the Saudi regime: 
 
“[The Saudis] mean to say: ‘Here is modernity for you. Here are the latest 
technology, buildings, modern car parks, shopping centers. What else do you 
want?’  
Didn’t they destroy the ‘Ejyad Castle,’ which was a 350-year-old Ottoman 
heritage?  
Just like how the Taliban destroyed the Buddha statues... 
In short, tolerating the destruction of the AKM [Atatürk Culture Center], which 
is ‘one of the most unique symbols of republican architecture’ means being the 
Taliban... 
Allowing such an act by the Taliban in Taksim Square, which is the heart of 
Istanbul, means allowing all kinds of Taliban-style acts from now on, and we 
cannot consent to that.”466 
 
Ejyad castle is one of the Ottoman legacies in the Muslim holy city of Mecca. The castle was 
destroyed by the Saudi regime in 2002 to expand the area for prayer. The destruction was 
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controversial and it was highly criticized among the Turkish public. The reference to the 
destruction of Ejyad Castle operates on the good and bad Muslims discourse: The Saudis, 
who were also Muslims, but bad ones, destroyed the castle with the pretence of doing 
something good for Muslims, just as bad Muslims deceive good Muslims with religion. There 
were two other aspects that should be mentioned in the above sample. The first its holistic 
and, consequently, reductionist character. Similar to the case of the characteristics of good 
and bad Muslims, the Taliban narrative cannot be divided into its components, either. The 
AKM is one of the largest cultural centers in Istanbul and also contains the only opera house 
in the city. However, the destruction of the AKM means more than the destruction of a 
cultural center. Besides being the only opera house in the city, the AKM has a symbolic and 
monumental character, because for some supporters of a modern and European lifestyle, 
going to a Western classical music concert in the AKM is not only about appreciating art, but 
also the reconfirmation of modern and European values.467 If the AKM was demolished, 
which would have been a Taliban-style act, all other Taliban-style acts would also occur, such 
as the forced veiling of women. Second was the stress on Taksim Square, because with the 
Republic Monument, the Square stands as the modern and republican image of Istanbul, 
compared to other squares like Beyazıt and Sultanahmet, which are traditional and Ottoman 
and contain huge mosques.468 
 
Among the domestic narratives that made their appearance, the Menemen Incident, the 
beheading of a young teacher and reserve army officer named Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay by so-
called Nakshibendis in 1930, was one of the most widely used. In the Menemen narrative, the 
relationship was built through a historical identity. In the excerpts quoted below, the 
presidential election was highlighted and, not very surprisingly, Cumhuriyet’s opposition to a 
president with a background in the AKP origin was expressed through the Menemen incident. 
In the first one, Prime Minister Erdoğan was situated against Kubilay and the president and 
chief of general staff were located alongside Kubilay, and naturally against Erdoğan. It was 
very clear that the Kubilay front must not lose the office of the presidency, for which Prime 
Minister Erdoğan was expected to stand as a candidate. Also, the term perverted soul, sapık 
ruhlu, designated the libidinous characteristic of the bad Muslims. In the second example, the 
Kubilay theme was employed again for the presidential elections, but this time through 
Republican Rallies. In this text, besides standing alongside Kubilay and, therefore, belonging 
to the good Muslims, the office of the president was presented as the “castle of science and 
reason”: 
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“A fact appeared when commemorating Third Lieutenant Kubilay, who 
sacrificed his life in order to save our republic from the religion peddlers, 
Shariah supporters, and bigots with perverted souls, along with the watchmen 
Hasan and Şevki, who died with him, in a large ceremony in Menemen... Apart 
from the messages of our president and the chief of general staff, no voice was 
heard from the speaker of the parliament, prime minister or the members of the 
government… I wonder why? Is it because they are afraid of the spirit of 
Kubilay? In order not to confront thousands of Kubilays in Menemen again?”469 
 
“Returning to the nation, which the main opposition will refer to, is somewhere 
else, it is in the social opposition that is developing outside the parliament… it’s 
in the hundreds of thousands who scream ‘Turkey is secular and shall remain 
secular’ at Atatürk’s mausoleum and in the squares, who curse political reaction 
in Menemen…[...] This is no ordinary presidential election. Yes or no to an 
independent, contemporary, secular Atatürk republic? Political reaction is 
climbing up to Çankaya [i.e. the president’s office]. Shariah, whichever 
camouflage it uses, may not enter the castle of science and reason!”470 
 
The Sivas Incident can be cited as another example of domestic themes that were very closely 
related to the violent characteristic of bad Muslims. On July 2, 1993, after an event organized 
by the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi-based NGO, the Madımak Hotel in Sivas, 
which was hosting participants from the conference, was set on fire and 33 people died. The 
people who set the hotel on fire claimed that Aziz Nesin, one of the participants, had insulted 
Islam. The incident was also utilized as a grand narrative in the April 27 Process: 
 
“The Sivas massacre was commemorated in front of the Madımak Hotel, where 
the murder was committed, by a crowded group, even though 14 years have 
passed since then. The crowd, which shouted slogans of ‘the murderers shall be 
held accountable by the people,’ was booed by a group of 50 that was waiting in 
front of the provincial public library. Then the demonstrators gathered in front 
of the Madımak Hotel and shouted ‘alive’ while the names of the deceased were 
read out loudly one by one. Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association head Kazım 
Genç, who spoke here, emphasized that the mentality that created the massacre 
was in power with all its cadres and said, ‘We shall maintain our struggle 
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against imperialism, fascism, racism, reaction and poverty with determination in 
the 14th year of the Sivas massacre.’”471 
 
As a final example of the grand narrative of Islamic revolution, the lines quoted below from 
Akşam’s editor-in-chief and his anger toward the head of the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTÜK) clearly demonstrate the social practices that 
were aimed at the Islamic revolution grand narrative specifically, as well as all other 
discursive practices in general. RTÜK fined SHOW TV, a television channel that was also 
owned by the media conglomerate holding Akşam, because of the violence portrayed in 
Valley of Wolves, Kurtlar Vadisi, an ultra-nationalist TV series, and as a result Turgut wrote 
about the head of RTÜK as follows: 
 
“Those who are close to him say that he really likes being called “mullah” 
anyway. Apart from this, the attribute of "preference mullah" [a mullah that 
does not respect people’s preferences, but decides their preferences for them] 
is a job description that is compatible with the meaning and importance of 
today, because whatever the job description of the head of RTÜK, it might 
sound as if there is a modern perception. The way the present chairman works, 
his behavior and his outlook on life fit the definition of a “mullah” perfectly. 
The man deleted in an instant a series that had become very popular among the 
public. Moreover, he is also telling tons of lies about what he is doing and how 
he is doing it. We would have believed his lies if there were no witnesses. Look 
and see, this “mullah” will not stop, he will constantly interfere with our free 
will, he will take the right of preference from us. [...] ‘The censor mullah’ will 
do his job successfully, if he is approved, this scum can even be promoted to 
‘Ayatullah’ from ‘mullah.’ Turkey has been turned into such a country. [...] If 
you do not want to live in the kind of country that is desired by the mullah, then 
resist these people, protect your legal rights and life choices.”472 
 
Although the decision of RTÜK was not an issue of adult content or protecting the morals of 
the community, but rather a result of the series’ violent content being broadcast in prime time, 
Serdar Turgut preferred to use the ‘mullah’ metaphor that was always functional regardless of 
the topic. In other words, the mullah theme is always aimed at social practices -- protecting 
the interests of the media conglomerate.  
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5.2.2.3. Social Practices 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis of the textual and discursive practices of the newspapers’ 
coverage during the April 27 Process, the picture of the political economy of the period can 
be drawn. The first thing this picture can show us about the political economy of the period 
and the final aim of the textual and discursive practices conducted within it, are the limits of 
the historical hegemonic center of the April 27 crisis. As in the February 28 Process, the main 
actors of the civil and military bureaucracy were very effective during the process: 
 
“At the 139th anniversary of the Council of State, the judiciary criticized 
politics again and a definition of political reaction that will be discussed 
extensively was put forward. Council of State head Sumru Çörtoglu said that 
all actions that are contrary to the principles and revolutions of Atatürk were 
reaction.”473 
 
Seen from the perspective of the social practices of the newspapers’ discourse, the analysis of 
the above-quoted report from Sabah is explanatory in two ways. First, it is a good example 
presenting the hegemonic alliance between the judiciary and the other participants of the 
historic hegemonic center. Furthermore, in terms of this hegemonic alliance, it gives an idea 
about the comprehensiveness of the hegemony of the historic hegemonic center by defining 
every act that is contrary to Kemalist principles and reforms as reaction. Second, Sabah’s 
discourse in reporting the event, which was also reported by all the other newspapers covered 
in the study, is also useful for understanding the failure in the formation of the hegemonic 
bloc. Underlining that judiciary “again” criticized politics and made a “very controversial” 
definition of reaction, Sabah gave the government a tool to use against the historic hegemonic 
bloc. On the other hand, the judiciary’s hand was still powerful against the government thanks 
to other actors of the judicial wing of the historic hegemonic center: 
 
 “Turkish Bar Associations Union head Özdemir Özok said that the AKP was 
the political formation of the ‘sufi order-politics-trade’ relationship, which was 
a product of the September 12 coup d’état.”474 
 
“The deans of the law faculties expressed their reactions to the inability to 
make appointments for the vacant positions in the high judicial organs because 
of the absence of the minister of justice and his representatives at the High 
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Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). In the joint statement made by 11 
deans of law faculties from various universities, the government was criticized 
and it was said that ‘we expect this situation, which interferes with the 
independence of the judiciary, to be brought to an end.’”475 
 
Universities’ support for the historic hegemonic center was not confined to the Faculties of 
Law, either: 
 
“YÖK Chairman Prof. Teziç said that the constitution package, which involves 
the election of the president by the public, was a very serious issue and added 
that ‘this arrangement would lead to an invitation for an authoritarian regime 
in Turkey. It is very dangerous.” 476 
 
“YÖK Chairman Teziç reacted harshly to the constitutional amendment that 
involves the election of the president by the public: the political majority of 
today wants to seize not only the government, but also the state. This would be 
an invitation to an authoritarian regime.”477 
 
The distinction between governmental power and state power in Teziç’s comments is worth 
mentioning, as it overlaps with the Gramscian distinction between civil society and political 
society. What Teziç meant by governmental power corresponds to political society, while 
state power is equivalent to civil society, to the domain of hegemony and consent. According 
to Teziç, the state is something outside the political realm and it is too valuable to be left in 
the hands of politicians. Following the same logic, what Teziç meant by the authoritarian 
regime of the political majority attained by capturing civil society was the creation of a new 
consent, the realization of a new hegemony by a new hegemonic alliance.  
 
Republican Rallies were the mobilization of the existing, but weakening historic hegemonic 
center: 
 
“The rally yesterday is the rebellion of an honorable nation against being 
treated like a ‘flea.’ The psychological operation that the USA, the EU and 
their desks inside tried to apply by spending massive amounts of wealth has 
failed. It went bankrupt, it was defeated... this is its summary. If the funeral of 
                                                            
475 Milliyet, 25.03.2007, p.21. 
476 Cumhuriyet, 12.05.2007, p.1. 
477 Akşam, 12.05.2007, 11. 
 194 
Hrant Dink is broadcast live for eight hours on the TVs and if the fact that two 
million people marching to the Atatürk Mausoleum screaming ‘we are all 
Mustafa Kemal’ is not shown on the same TVs... We had said this. Let us say it 
again... The Turkish press will live with this unforgettable shame from now 
on.”478 
 
A clear statement of traditional Kemalist perceptions, but then, in the very same issue of 
Sabah another columnist had this to say:  
 
“There will be a rally in Ankara next Saturday. It is presented as ‘loyalty to the 
republic’ but everyone knows the truth: to prevent the election of Prime 
Minister Erdoğan as president by provoking the military. To try to use the 
bayonet to make people do what they could not do at the ballot box.”479 
 
 Contrast this with Cumhuriyet’s perception: 
 
“Those who look at the red squares and gnash their teeth are the merchants of 
faith who have equipped society with sufi orders and religious communities, 
they have enormous monetary power… 
What will the citizens, who pay for their own red and white crescent and star 
and participate in the rallies, do in the face of the monetary power of the 
religionists? … 
The elections will be held soon… 
And they have neither a satisfactory organization... 
Nor sufficient money... 
Moreover, they are divided…Those who want to divide Turkey have 
fragmented the organizations that are against the religionist parties.”480 
 
The three examples quoted above explain why the existing historic hegemonic center was 
weakening. The first two are from the same newspaper, but written by different columnists. 
Contradictory comments from the different columnists of a newspaper is a usual practice in 
the press, but in this case the totally opposite perspectives of the two columnists tells us about 
more than the openness of a newspaper, especially considering the monophony of Turkish 
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newspapers in such vital issues. In the transition period of Sabah, which resulted in a total 
change in its ownership and, therefore, in its discourse and stance, on the one hand Yılmaz 
Özdil, who supported the Republican Rallies but complained of the (non)presentation of the 
meetings in the media, represented the previous ownership of the newspaper and, thus, the 
weakening historic hegemonic center. On the other hand Emre Aköz represented the next 
ownership and the new formulation of the historic hegemonic center. The third excerpt was 
from Cumhuriyet and written by İlhan Selçuk, for decades a representative of the existing 
historic hegemonic center. It was as constant as it was decades ago, but not so powerful 
anymore. At that point it should also be noted that Cumhuriyet has always had a very limited 
readership compared to newspapers like Sabah and Akşam that address a wide readership. 
Furthermore, Cumhuriyet’s influence depended on its role as spokesman for the Kemalist 
elite, so with the weakening of the historic hegemonic center, it automatically lost its 
importance.  
 
Similar to the hijacking of the Susurluk Rallies in the February 28 Process, a rally hijacking 
also took place in the April 27 Process. This time the people’s sensitivity against PKK 
violence was hijacked for the sake of the mobilization of the historic hegemonic center. 
Increasing nationalist reaction against terror attacks was channeled against the government 
with the help of public demonstrations that used the same motives and style as the Republican 
Rallies: 
 
“‘Homeland’ rallies will follow the ‘republican’ rallies: the request of the 
Turkish Armed Forces for a massive reflex against terror received a response. 
Some civil society organizations took the decision to organize ‘homeland’ 
rallies. The organizations, which are led by the ÇYDD, will also hold ‘silent 
rallies against terror.’”481 
 
“Approximately 3,000 METU graduates, who came from different parts of the 
world and Turkey, held a march to Atatürk’s mausoleum yesterday on the 
grounds that Atatürk’s principles and the republic are being systematically 
eroded.”482 
 
The role of the TSK as the triggering actor of the nationalist rallies is worth mentioning in 
terms of the hegemonic alliance.  
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The hegemonic alliance was not stable and, in some cases, certain groups in the alliance may 
break off from the alliance and seek a new one. Çukurova Groups seemed to be on the edge, 
but needed some extra motivation for entering into the new hegemonic alliance and 
announced its need for extra motivation through an editorial in its newspaper Akşam: 
 
“Since the government has recently started to give special importance to 
nationalism, I especially wanted to give this example. You know that Turkcell is 
a real national company. It is a company that was created with the 
entrepreneurship of Turkish capitalists and the creativity of Turkish 
infrastructure and a company of which every person who calls himself a 
nationalist should be proud. [...]I am asking those who try to engage in 
nationalism with billboards and vacuous slogans, what kind of nationalism is 
this? Do you have the right to trip up the businessmen and capital of this 
country like this? Would the Turkish people, who have always loved those who 
gave them jobs and food, forgive the people who do this?”483 
 
Akşam offered the government a chance to prove its nationalism over Turkcell, a 
communication company owned by the Çukurova Group and that had some problems with 
the Capital Markets Boards of Turkey during the time when the rallies were organized. As a 
response to the rising nationalism of the period, the ruling AKP put many advertisements on 
billboards in major cities. Through the editorial, Akşam told the AKP that engaging in 
“nationalism with billboards and vacuous slogans” is useless. Instead, the AKP should 
support a national company like Turkcell, if it wants to make use of the increasing 
nationalism of the rallies. Otherwise, Turgut warns the government against losing the support 
of “Turkish people, who have always loved those who gave them jobs and food;” that is, 
Turkcell. 
 
One of the outstanding characteristics of the historic hegemonic center formation of the April 
27 Process was the discord among the media. Unlike in the February 28 Process, the political-
economic interests of the central media outlets were not compatible. The consequences of the 
disharmony among media institutions were reflected in newspapers in the shape of reports 
and columns that were critical of the indifference of some newspapers to the process and the 
Republican Rallies: 
 
“Look at the scenes in our sector outside of the Doğan Media.... 
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 Apart from 1-2 groups that do not have wide access and that are secular, 2 
newspapers and a television channel that have been confiscated by the state (I 
exonerate my colleagues who work there and their journalistic principles)… 
The rest are newspapers, TV channels and radio channels that support the 
AKP.”484 
 
“The president spoke with the journalists at the opening of the Atatürk Museum 
Villa, pointing out that the republican rally was very good and said that "the 
messages at the rally were spot-on. I watched the press in amazement.’ Sezer 
said that the press had managed the presidential election process very 
badly.”485 
 
The economic competition between the newspapers and the conglomerates which owned 
them was the basic reason behind the disharmony among the newspapers in the process: 
 
“A young businessman was standing next to me. He asked a question that 
everybody speaks of but nobody dares to ask to my face: ‘Mr. Altaylı, as far as 
I know, you worked in the Doğan group for 13 years. Now you write articles 
against your former group due to POAŞ [Petrol Office Joint Stock Co.]. There 
is no doubt as to the accuracy of what you write, but still, doesn’t this disturb 
you?’”486 
 
“Aydın Doğan is using his own media as a weapon so that Sabah-ATV, which 
was taken over by the TMSF [Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency], 
will rot in the hands of the state. He is having its reporters write reports that 
will affect the judiciary and it is advising the TMSF through his lawyers.”487 
 
Although not covered by the research of this study, the existence of more powerful alternative 
newspapers and the centrist newspapers’ reaction to these alternative newspapers is also 
worth mentioning in terms of the historic hegemonic center because the coverage of these 
alternative newspapers constituted different resources for the people the center was trying to 
mobilize in the April 27 Process: 
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“It’s unbelievable, the other day we (together with our editor-in-chief İbrahim 
Yıldız) made a list of the religionist newspapers that are distributed free of 
charge... 
The result? 
One million, 200 thousand... 
No, you did not read this wrong, in today’s Turkey one million, 200 thousand 
newspapers are distributed free of charge everyday... 
How big a monetary power is this?... 
Who is providing the money?...”488 
 
“Anavatan party parliamentarian Sarıbaş asked whether there was any takiyye 
in the sale of the Star newspaper during parliamentary questions, and he asked 
for the prime minister and Minister of Energy Güler to respond.”489 
 
Star newspaper, which was previously owned by the Uzan Group, was confiscated by the 
TMSF as a result of the bankruptcy of the Uzan Group’s Imar Bank. Later, the newspaper 
was put to tender by TMSF. At the end of the tender, Star was sold to the Koza Group, which 
is close to the ruling AKP according to many, such as the Cumhuriyet newspaper. 
 






Through this advertisement Cumhuriyet – which literally means republic in Turkish - the 
newspaper called for the support of the people for the Republic, which Cumhuriyet thought 
was under threat. On the other hand, it called for the support of people for itself, for the 
newspaper Cumhuriyet. It should also noted that in the advertisement 1881, the birth date of 
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Mustafa Kemal, was picked as the birth date of Republic of Turkey and 2007, the year that 
presidency elections was held, was picked as its date of death. The message was clear: Once 
an AKP-oriented president was selected, it would be the end for the Republic. Cumhuriyet 
identified itself with the Republic through the identity implied by its name. It asked support 
both for itself and for the Republic. Although the Republic of Turkey continued to live after 
2007, beyond the date of death Cumhuriyet had imagined, Cumhuriyet did not insofar as the 
newspaper and the historic hegemonic alliance it belonged to began to weaken after 2007, a 





On May 31st, 2011, the Commander of the War Colleges, General Bilgin Balanlı, was arrested 
after being accused of planning a coup d’état against the civil government of the country. 
With that decision, for the first time in the republic’s history an on duty member of the TSK 
was arrested for such an act, even though the TSK had made five previous military 
interventions, two of which were coups d’état. Among the many reactions to this 
unaccustomed action, one figure was especially noteworthy concerning the dynamics of the 
historic hegemonic center; Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. As the new leader of the CHP, elected 
approximately one year ago and following a more social-democrat oriented policy, he asked 
the TSK to stay in their barracks and not to make any declarations or take action against this 
decision. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu justified his demands from the TSK by stating: any reaction 
from the TSK has the potential to create an image of victimization for the ruling AKP in the 
eyes of electorate, and therefore may cause an increase in the electoral support of the AKP in 
the June 12th general election that would be held less than two weeks later.491 
  
Analysis of Kılıçdaroğlu’s advice to the TSK concerning the arrest of General Balanlı is 
explanatory from many aspects. First of all, it gives a better understanding of the poor 
democratic standard of Turkey and of the many legal barriers in the way of democratization. 
The leader of the main opposition party regards the army’s inaction against the arrest of a 
high ranked commander not as the norm but as a strategy. Considering the inverse, one can 
question whether Kılıçdaroğlu would have asked the TSK to take action against the AKP if he 
had thought that it would cause a loss in the AKP’s electoral support. The second aspect is 
that it illustrates the nature of the historic hegemonic center of Turkey as well as its 
democratic standards; Kılıçdaroğlu himself automatically assumes the TSK is an ally in his 
opposition to the AKP. Furthermore, the TSK’s silence about Kılıçdaroğlu’s advice is an 
indicator of the fact that the alliance between the CHP and the TSK is not one-way because 
the TSK could be expected to give an explanation and clarify its position – taking no action 
against the arrest of General Balanlı, not as a strategy but as a norm. Finally, this is not the 
first time that the poor democratic standards and historic hegemonic center are mentioned in 
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the scope of this study, but analysis of Kılıçdaroğlu’s advice to the TSK clearly reveals a 
change in hegemonic power; in Gramscian terms the traditional historic center loses its 
trenches one after another, and is forced to adopt a defensive position contrary to its earlier 
aggressive one. Futhermore, in Mardin’s terms this also corresponds to a regression in 
center’s power. The example of the regression of the historic hegemonic center’s hegemony 
covered in this thesis was the government’s response to the TSK’s e-memorandum.   
 
This singular fact  – the court’s decision of arresting of one of the highest ranked commanders 
of the TSK – is an indicator of the split in the historic hegemonic center, and it becomes clear 
that the alliance of the historic hegemonic center is now weaker than it has ever been before 
and may suffer a breakdown as a result of false strategy: Kılıçdaroğlu states that a part of the 
electorate, i.e. the urban middle class, will support the AKP more than usual against the 
TSK’s undemocratic reaction to legal action. That means the historic hegemonic center would 
need more than improper discourse, fear mongering against bad Muslims, Iranization of 
Turkey, creeping Islamization, etc., to secure the urban middle classes’ consent for its action 
against the AKP.  As will be remembered, such a discourse was sufficient to secure the urban 
middle classes’ consent in the Febrary 28 Process.  
 
A comparison of the February 28 and April 27 Processes’ results helps to shed light on the 
weakening ties between the components of the historic hegemonic center. During the 
February 28 Process there was clear media support, not only as a part of capital, but also as a 
practitioner of ideological and moral leadership. It should also be noted that the ideological 
and moral leadership of the media was very effective on the urban middle class during the 
February 28 Process. Key evidence of the effect of the media’s ideological and moral 
leadership in the urban middle class mobilization first occurred in the Susurluk Rallies and 
later in the 1999 general elections.    
 
Besides economic and political interests, intellectual and moral unity was also required for 
hegemonic articulation. The role of intellectuals was critical in the formation and then 
mobilization of the historic hegemonic center. In the February 28 Process, the articulation of 
the RP to the historic center was in conformity with capitalists’ economic interests. However, 
on the other hand, the RP was not a part of the intellectual and moral unity of the historic 
hegemonic center. As a result, contrary to their economic interests, capitalists continued their 
alliance with the historic hegemonic center and did not allow the RP to be a part of the center. 
In the end, they were amply rewarded for their compromises with privatizations and loans 
from public banks after the 1999 elections. However, in the end the February 28 Process was 
just a temporary solution for the hegemonic crises of Kemalist hegemony in Turkey. The 
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economical crises triggered by rewards given to capitalists and the political crises that 
followed were indicators of the fact that the February 28 Process could not cure the Kemalist 
hegemonic crises. 
 
Ultimately, and after five years of continuous political and economic crisis, the February 28 
Process culminated in the landslide victory of the new AKP. As a response, in the middle 
term capitalists and media were compelled to appease the AKP for the continuation of their 
economic interest. This necessity made the media and capitalists sacrifice their intellectual 
and moral unity, culture, way of life, and status, and therefore shifted their support to the 
AKP both before and after the 2002 general elections. Concerning Mardin’s concepts, the 
AKP was still peripheral, but the center unwillingly accepted the AKP into its ranks for its 
own economic interests. However, in the long-term the characteristics that were sacrificed in 
the middle-term – or trench systems that were lost in the war of position in Gramscian terms – 
were still effective and therefore the support of some elements of the historic hegemonic 
center to the AKP were not long-lived. The election of an AKP member president was the last 
exit on the highway for the historic hegemonic center, and the direction of the highway was 
the elimination of the existing historic hegemonic center and the establishment of a new one. 
This fact was best portrayed by the shift in the media that supported the AKP before and after 
the 2002 elections but changed its attitude when the time came for the presidential election.  
 
In the February 28 Process, conservatives embodied in the RP held onto only partial 
parliamentary support. However, a dominant group that aims to build hegemony has to have 
the ability to lead before it grasps governmental power. After the grasp of governmental 
power, if it continues to hold its ability to lead, then it may create its own hegemony. 
Defining the political sphere as an arena of hegemonic struggle between the Kemalists, i.e. 
historic bloc or center, and conservatives, i.e. subaltern groups or periphery, the only weapon 
the RP had in the February 28 Process was limited parliamentary power that meant neither 
leading capacity nor governmental power. However, in the April 27 Process, the AKP held 
the capacity to lead both before and after it grasped governmental power with its electoral and 
parliamentary support. With its capacity to lead, it was able to issue a counter memorandum 
to the TSK. However the critical move of AKP in the Process was not issuing a counter 
memorandum, but using its governmental power dependent upon parliamentary and electoral 
support. With the help of this governmental power, it was able to change the presidential 
election system and shift to election by popular vote instead of parliamentary vote. This 
change created a near guarantee for the election of a conservative president even in the worst 
scenario, which is in continuity with the AKP’s inability to meet the 367 quorum after the 
2007 general election.  Due of this assured outcome, the MHP and the pro-Kurdish Peace and 
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Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP),  had no alternatives but to participate in 
the presidential election meeting of the parliament after the 2007 general elections. 
Comparing this situation to the February 28 Process, we see that due to a lack of leading 
capacity and governmental power the only counteraction of the RP against the February 28 
MGK meeting was an attempt to bring parliament into play. This desperate action was 
eventually rejected even by the DYP, the governing partner of the RP. The different levels of 
leadership capacity and governmental power are best portrayed with the fact that media 
discourse in April 27 process was more positive compared to the February 28 Process. Aside 
from the limited amount of discursive practices in the April 27 Process, the practical results of 
these practices in terns of social practices was also limited.   
 
Besides the story in political society, civil society was also different in the two Processes. The 
masses that were mobilized by the Susurluk Rallies in the February 28 Process were also on 
the streets during the April 27 Process. In both Processes, mobilized masses were given the 
illusion of defending their interests against the government, but in actuality they were 
defending the interests of the historic hegemonic center. In both processes masses were in 
streets, but the quality of their resistance was different. Compared to the higher degree of 
commitment in the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, the disagreement peaked 
between organizers and participants of the Republican Rallies during the April 27 Process. 
The same discourse was adopted by the media in two processes. In the February 28 Process, 
the discourse was so effective that the Susurluk rallies, which originally targeted corrupt 
intra-state relations – something not separate from the historic hegemonic center -- could be 
hijacked and used against the government to support military intervention. On the other hand, 
in the April 27 Process, the masses were again mobilized with the same discourse under the 
name of Republican Rallies. However, this time the pro-military intervention tone of the 
organizers of the rallies was rejected by the participants. This fact shows the declining 
strength of the historic hegemonic center.  
 
The diversity of media available during the April 27 Process favored the increasing 
effectiveness of the conservatives. The shift in media, which is at the same time an indicator 
of peripheral actors moving to the center, resulted in a multifarious stance against the AKP. 
To begin with, Cumhuriyet experienced no change in newspaper’s stance between the 
February 28 and April 27 Processes. However, the rest of the press was not that consistent. 
The ownership structure of Sabah was totally altered during the period between 2000 and 
2005. As a result of the Ciner Group’s attempts to increase its effectiveness in media, the 
group bought all the shares of Sabah from Dinç Bilgin, the former owner and close partner of 
the Doğan Group. However, this was not the only change in Sabah’s ownership, as the TMSF 
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confiscated the newspaper on April 2nd, 2007 – a few weeks before the e-memorandum – as 
payment of the Ciner Group’s debt to the state due to its bankruptcy. In the end, Sabah’s 
moderate discourse, compared to Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, turned out to be more moderate 
still. This discursive stance or transformation to a more moderate discourse shows the 
decisiveness of economic factors on the formation of the historic hegemonic center. The old 
Sabah that allied with the regressing historic hegemonic center went bankrupt, while the new 
Sabah chose to ally with the emerging conservative hegemony and, as a result, its discourse 
changed noticeably. One year later, in 2008, Sabah was sold to the Çalık Group, which was a 
peripheral actor, by the TMSF. Additionally, Akşam’s ownership structure also changed. The 
newspaper, which was held by Erol Aksoy in the heyday of the February 28 Process, was sold 
to the Çukurova Group, a new actor in the media industry. Similarly, this change in the media 
ownership of Akşam can be traced through changes in its discourse between the February 28 
and April 27 processes. Recently, in 2011, the Doğan Group decided to dispose Milliyet and 
signed a contract for the sale. 
 
The reasoning behind the change of ownership of these newspapers, and the reflection of 
ownership to the newspaper discourse, are key to understanding and comparing the results of 
the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Firstly, the former owners’ economic activity in 
sectors other than media is the chief reason for the ownership change. All of these economic 
activities were concentrated in state related economic sectors, especially in banking and 
privatization. For Sabah it was Dinç Bilgin’s banking investments, which were concentrated 
during and after the February 28 Process, that forced him to relinquish his newspaper to the 
Ciner Group. The TMSF confiscated ETİBANK, which was owned by Dinç Bilgin, because 
the bank used most of its loans for other companies of the group, a well known issue from the 
beginning onwards, which was condoned because of the newspapers support to the February 
28 Process.492 Under the rule of the Ciner Group, the newsapers’ discourse was more 
balanced and moderate during the April 27 Process compared to the February 28, as Dinç 
Bilgin’s economic and ideological commitment to the historic hegemonic center was far 
stronger compared to the Ciner Group. Bilgin’s position was already defined with his and his 
group’s close relations to the Doğan Group. On the other hand, the Ciner Group in general, 
and its media investments in particular, were more open to bargains and alliances in its quest 
to establish itself. This resulted in a balanced policy in the newspaper’s stance, and of course, 
balanced discursive practices against the AKP and conservatives. However, as mentioned 
before, this was not the last change in ownership of Sabah. Again in 2007, the newspaper was 
directly confiscated by the TMSF, and again ownership changed due to banking and 
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privatization. The TMSF’s confiscation occurred a few weeks before the e-memorandum and 
affected the discourse of the newspaper. In the end, the Çalık Group bought the newspaper 
from the TMSF, and subsequently the newspaper’s discourse remained more government 
oriented in accordance with the Çalık Group’s rise under the rule of the AKP.  
 
The story of Akşam was also more or less similar to that of with Sabah. Erol Aksoy, the 
former owner of the paper during the February 28 Process, was a banking sector origin 
investor who concentrated his investments in media sector as he observed the 
advantageousness of holding media power while being involved in banking and privatization. 
However, in the end he was also forced to sell his media investments, which at its peak 
included SHOW TV, CINE5, Akşam and %25 of Aydın Doğan’s Hürriyet, to the Çukurova 
Group. The sales could not stop Aksoy’s fall, and the TMSF confiscated İktisat Bank, 
Aksoy’s bank.493 The change of ownership had direct effects in newspaper discourse. As 
noted in the social practices section, the two only extreme examples of Islamic Revolution 
discourse in Akşam’s coverage during the April 27 Process were respectively produced as a 
reaction to two state institutions’ decisions against the Çukurova Group’s Turkcell and 
SHOW TV. That means the newspaper engaged in social practices during the whole April 27 
Process. Its tone in two samples was one that called for reconciliation rather than showing 
hostility. In the discursive change of Akşam, the same dynamics were also in action as in the 
discursive change of Sabah. The Karamehmet Group, as the new owner of the newspaper, 
was more open to, and in need of, cooperating with the government, as can be seen in the 
Turkcell and SHOW TV examples, compared to the more established and committed Erol 
Aksoy. Aksoy’s share in Aydın Doğan’s Hürriyet is a good indicator of his already defined 
position in the historic hegemonic center. This openness to and dependency in the 
government was reflected in a more moderate stance in the newspaper’s discourse, except in 
the cases mentioned above.  
 
In the third case involving the sale of Milliyet by Aydın Doğan, the newspaper owner’s 
investments in the state related sectors and finance were also at the center -- again a clear 
indicator of the media’s relationship with the historic hegemonic center. An incident known 
as the Hilton Case helps to shed light on the Group’s relations to the government. When 
Aydın Doğan bought the land under the old Hilton Hotel for 254 million dollars, this was 
seen as an unprofitable investment. However, observers of the media sector noted that Aydın 
Doğan’s plan was to secure a change in construction plans of the related part of the city and 
create a huge profit for himself.494 Observers were right, and that was the way that the things 
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operated for investments of large media conglomerates in Turkey. However, Aydın Doğan 
could not make his dreams of the Hilton Hotel come true, as the AKP controlled the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality and refused to make any change in construction plans. What is 
more explanatory from the aspect of media discourse is that Turkish public opinion was 
informed about the full details of the Hilton Incident by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his 
2007 election campaign. In many election meetings, Erdoğan told the electorate that Aydın 
Doğan requested an appointment from him in order to discuss the Hilton issue, which he 
always rejected. Erdoğan claimed that the Doğan Group’s newspaper and television reports 
about the gradual Islamization of Turkey increased in number during the election period, as a 
result of his party’s refusal of the Hilton plan.  
 
The Hilton incident was not the only conflict between Aydın Doğan and the government. In 
the period between 2003 and 2010, different state institutions including the Capital Markets 
Board of Turkey and Ministry of Finance issued significant financial penalties against the 
Doğan Group.495 The discharge of Emin Çölaşan and Bekir Coşkun, the two most ardent 
Kemalist columnist of Doğan Newspapers, and then the Hürriyet’s editor in chief Ertuğrul 
Özkök’s leaving his post were regarded as Aydın Doğan’s compromises with the government. 
Çölaşan, the first to be discharged, wrote a book titled “We have been expelled o my people, 
do not forget us!” “Kovulduk Ey Halkım, Unutma Bizi,” and claimed that Doğan fired himself 
as a compromise to the government.496 The name of Çölaşan’s book was further informative 
pertaining to the employment of secularism discourse by media for their economical interests, 
as he used an adaptation of the motto used by the Cumhuriyet when reporting about the Uğur 
Mumcu assassination in 1993, a widely used element of discourse about the violent character 
of bad Muslims: “We have been shot o my people, do not forget us!” “Vurulduk Ey Halkim 
Unutma Bizi.” Çölaşan also utilized the same discourse as Cumhuriyet utilized against the 
conservatives. What is crucial in the change in the ownership structure of Milliyet is that, 
although the change in the ownership structure took place in 2011, which is long after the 
period the study covers, other newspapers whose ownership structures analyzed were not as 
powerful as the Doğan Group. Under the conditions that the Doğan Group partly achieved in 
order to sustain its position in the historic hegemonic center, the other relatively weak media 
institutions that needed cooperation with the government were unable to cover the cost of an 
ardent opposition of the AKP and conservatives. The Doğan Group, in the short term, 
supported the AKP before and after the 2002 elections in accordance with its economic 
                                                            
495 For detailed information about financial penalties against the Dogan Group see; “Maliye’den Doğan Holding’e 
Tek Kalemde 826 Milyon Ceza,” Star, February 19, 2009, accessed June 14, 2011, 
http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/maliye-den-dogan-holding-e-tek-kalemde-826-milyon-ceza-170044.htm; 
“SPK’dan Doğan’a Para Cezası,” Samanyoluhaber, March 04, 2010, accessed June 14, 2011, 
http://finans.samanyoluhaber.com/h_398275_spkdan-dogana-para-cezasi.html. 
496 See Çölaşan’s book: Çölaşan, E. (2008). Kovulduk Ey Halkım Unutma Bizi. Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi.  
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interests. Later, in the middle term, it used the discourse against the prospect of a president 
being elected from the ranks of the AKP because of its alliance with the historic hegemonic 
center. Now it tries to protect itself from the rage of the AKP by adopting a moderate 
discursive stance.  
 
Addressing information about the change in the media ownership structures after the February 
28 Process, it can be argued that (1) the media groups’ relationship with the government have 
become effective in their ownership structures, (2) the change in ownership, which was 
related to the media groups’ relationship with the government, has a direct effect on their 
discourse and finally (3) the diversification of media ownership, and as a result media 
discourse produced a low level of commitment by the urban middle class masses to the April 
27 Process compared to the February 28, even though the media campaign and discourse was 
effective in mobilizing masses during the Susurluk and Republican Rallies.  
 
In addition to the media’s participation in the historic hegemonic center and its discourse as a 
function of intellectual and moral leadership, other elements of civil society should also be 
analyzed for a more accurate comparison of the results of the February 28 and April 27 
Processes. At that point, re-emphasizing the theoretical framework will be more beneficial. 
As aforementioned in the theoretical framework chapter, Gramsci employs the concept of 
minimal hegemony and defines it as a condition of hegemony when the consent of subaltern 
classes to the hegemonic ones decline. According to Gramsci, once a historic bloc enters the 
phase of minimal hegemony, the only way of sustaining its leading role is to incorporate the 
elites of the subaltern classes. Considering the hegemonic crisis of the Turkish historic 
hegemonic center, one would expect the elites of the subaltern classes to be incorporated in 
order to increase its capacity of intellectual and moral leadership as happened in the post-
1980 period, by the incorporation of conservatives into the historic hegemonic center against 
the so called leftist danger. However, as mentioned before, the historic hegemonic center 
during the February 28 crisis did not open its doors to the conservative elites and blocked 
peripheral actors’ moving to the center, and instead tried to overcome the hegemonic crisis by 
totally removing conservative actors from the equation. In contrast, in 2000 the economic and 
social crises left no other alternative other than calling conservatives to action. Although the 
historic hegemonic center tried to put a stop to the incorporation of conservatives into the 
historic hegemonic center through the April 27 Process, by this time a balance had been 
reached in the power struggle between the subaltern and leading classes. The government’s 
counter memorandum to the TSK’s e-memorandum is the embodiment of the balance that 
was reached during the power struggle.  
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Furthermore, the role of the AKP supported\supporting media, bureaucracy, businessmen, and 
NGOs should not be ignored. For example, the majority of the members of the Constitutional 
Court that annulled the first round of the presidential election by legislating a 367 quorum, 
were Kemalist-oriented lawyer’s but the head of the court, Haşim Kılıç, a conservative who 
was appointed by Turgut Özal (after the change in the law of Constitutional Court that 
enabled the appointment of non-jurist bureaucrats as Özal was unable to find any qualified 
and conservative jurist to appoint). Although they were not pro-AKP, other elements of civil 
society were not as committed to mobilization against the AKP as they were in the February 
28 Process. Compared to the Susurluk Rallies of the February 28 Process, the number of 
NGOs that supported and attended Republican Rallies were limited. It was not possible to see 
a joint declaration by the capitalists of TÜSİAD, middle and low scale businessmen of TOBB 
and TESK, or labor unions such as TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK and KESK on the scale that participated 
during the February 28 Process. Therefore, the differentiation that is observed in media 
ownership and media discourse can also be seen in civil society. 
 
While the minimal hegemony of the historic hegemonic center continued to diminish, 
conservatives started to build their “national popular” in the period including the April 27 
Process. In other words, it can be said that the centralization of peripheral actors and the 
marginalization of central actors occurred simultaneously. Thanks to the February 28 
experience, conservatives realized that they were unable to challenge the hegemony with their 
activities in political society that depended on their limited electoral support. Therefore, they 
began to examine various other ways to influence the sphere of civil society. At that point, 
using the Gramscian conceptualization is once again apt. As mentioned before, Gramscian 
theoretical subsets have a mutual and dependent relationship in the course of securing 
hegemony. On the one hand, conservative elites’ and civil society’s affinity increases as a 
result of the party’s influence in the political society. On the other hand, increasing the 
influence of conservative elites, civil society and life styles – or alternative modernities in 
Göle’s terms that were mentioned in the fourth chapter, supplies a base for the political 
society's activities in the second phase. This process also increases conservative credibility as 
well as status, and as a result the capacity of allying with other non-Kemalist actors. The 
counterpart of this trend in the media discourse is that, on the one hand, not all media 
institutions produce discourse like they did in the February 28 Process and, on the other hand, 
the discourse itself is not as credible as it was in the February 28 Process. For example, as a 
result of the discrediting and resultant ineffectiveness of the good vs. bad Muslims discourse, 
the real vs. fake secularists and the real vs. fake nationalists discourse was produced and 
circulated in the April 27 Process.  
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The search for a conservative national popular to replace the Kemalist hegemony or 
centralization of peripheral actors included a quest for increasing their influence in civil 
society, as well as building partnerships with existing civil society actors such as leftists, 
liberals and other social segments that were also unsatisfied with the Kemalist modernization, 
such as Alevis and Kurds. Although these attempts did not produce a result, the AKP’s 
turning a hand to the Kurdish and Alevi problems can be regarded as an indicator of their 
intentions in civil society. At least at the discursive level, the AKP offers much, which was 
not offered by the RP, to other actors. In doing so the AKP offers a conservative hegemony 
against the hegemony and discourse of the historic hegemonic alliance.  
 
The 2011 general election resulted in a landslide victory for the AKP. With almost fifty 
percent of the total vote, and debates on a new constitution during the election campaign 
seeming to be the hot button issue, these are all crucial indicators that verify the dissertation’s 
concluding remarks on the trend that the conservative national popular has been replacing the 
regressive Kemalist hegemony. Another aspect worth mentioning in this context is the “new 
CHP,” as defined by its recently elected leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. According to 
Kılıçdaroğlu and other supporters of the new CHP, the party’s ties with the people weakened 
and the party itself became stuck in a narrow societal base that only included the highest 
income group, as the CHP has nothing but pillars of Kemalism to offer to the people.497 
Therefore, the new CHP needs to broaden its horizons and open communication with 
different segments of society, which is nothing but simply turning its face towards the 
periphery. The new route of the CHP’s conscious and intense effort to dismiss any discussion 
on secularism in the recent election process is thought provoking to say the least. Finally, 
discussions around the new constitution both indicate the regression of existing hegemony 
and the conservatives’ chances of replacing existing hegemony with a conservative national 
popular, which is in other words replacing the central actors with the peripheral ones. In 
political society the new constitution will define new rules that will bind political actors. In 
civil society, considering the AKP’s huge electoral support, a new constitution legislated with 
the initiative of all other political and social actors, but mostly the AKP, will mean a source of 
recognition, prestige, status and acquiescence; something necessary for transforming their 
leadership to a national popular and then to hegemony, for the AKP and conservatives. 
Whether the discussion on a new constitution will come to fruition or not, the quest itself is 
another indicator of the regression of the existing hegemony.  From the perspective of this 
dissertation, in addition to the many examples given and the many analyses made above, 
                                                            
497 For a detailed account of the new CHP see Kılıçdaroğlu’s interview: “ ‘CHP dine karşı’ algısı değişecek” 
Radikal, March 4, 2012, accessed March 15, 2011, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1080639&CategoryID=78 
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another brief indicator of the regression of the existing hegemony is the decline in the 
discursive practices of newspapers, the transformation of media discourse, and the media 
discourse’s loss of influence in the April 27 Process. 
 
In conclusion, the questions that intended to be thought provoking from the aspect of the 
analyses of Turkish politics, with a historical perspective on hegemony and center-periphery, 
are the ones which focus on the conservatives’ attempts to create a new national popular, as 
well as the historical and societal bases of the new potential conservative national popular. In 
light of the conclusions that have been drawn, an alternative reading of Turkish 
modernization from the eyes of the conservative masses can be beneficial in the analyses of 
hegemonic and center-periphery relations in Turkish society. Furthermore, this alternative 
reading of Turkish modernization will in turn become a basis for examining hegemony from 
the perspective of the subaltern groups that once gave consent to hegemony or the ones those 
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De processen van militaire inmenging van 28 februari en 27 april, die de laatste twee schakels 
vormen van Turkije’s lange keten van militaire ingrepen in de politiek, verschillen van de 
voorgaande militaire interventies vanuit het oogpunt van hoe zij werden uitgevoerd, van de 
partijen die erbij betrokken zijn en van de doelen die van hen verwacht werden. Het proces 
van 28 februari ontleent haar naam aan de vergadering van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad van 
28 februari 1997. Hoewel de vergadering normaal was, waren de besluiten en het persbericht 
na afloop ervan bijzonder. De Nationale Veiligheidsraad, die, hoewel bestaand uit zowel 
militaire als burger leden, overheerst werd door militairen, beweerde dat de religieuze reactie 
in het land een steeds groter probleem werd gedurende de regeringstermijn van de 
coalitieregering van die tijd, die bestond uit de religieus conservatieve Welvaartspartij van 
Necmettin Erbakan en de rechtse Partij van het Rechte Pad van Tansu Çiller. Volgend op de 
vergadering van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad van 28 februari vroegen militairen de regering 
in een verklaring maatregelen te nemen tegen het ‘stijgende reactionaire gevaar’. De 
militairen dreigden de regering met ‘sancties’ wanneer deze niets zou ondernemen. 
 
Vele betrokkenen bij het maatschappelijk middenveld namen later deel in de discussies 
omtrent de religieuze reactie, die zijn piek bereikte ten tijde van de vergadering van de 
Nationale Veiligheidsraad. Gaande de ontwikkelingen deden kranten verslag van ‘reactionaire 
gebeurtenissen’ in verschillende uithoeken van het land. Veel instituties uit het 
maatschappelijk middenveld (werkgevers- en werknemersorganisaties, universiteiten, 
advocaten en gerechtelijke instellingen) spraken één voor één hun  steun uit voor de strijd 
tegen het stijgende reactionaire gevaar. Gemobiliseerd door de intensieve mediacampagne 
begon de stedelijke middenklasse met het doven van hun lichten thuis om negen uur ’s 
avonds om te protesteren tegen de regering en om haar aftreden te eisen. De invloed op en 
leiding van het proces door het leger bereikte een hoogtepunt toen tanks de hoofdstraat van de 
wijk Sincan in Ankara inreden. Als gevolg van de toenemende druk trad de regering 
uiteindelijk af op 17 juni 1997.  Dit bracht het proces echter niet ten einde, integendeel: het 
was het startsein voor een nieuwe fase van militaire inmenging. De regeringen die de 
Erbakan-Çiller coalitie opvolgden begonnen een campagne in naam van de strijd tegen de 
religieuze reactie, waarin men ijverde voor een belemmering van sociale mobiliteit voor de 
conservatieven in het onderwijs, in de economie en in de politiek. De inspanningen voor de 
strijd tegen de religieuze reactie heeft zeker gezorgd voor een toename van de invloed van het 
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leger en zijn controle op de politiek. Als gevolg hiervan had Turkije aan het begin van dit 
millennium een geforceerd en kunstmatig politiek klimaat dat vooral werd geleid door 
militairen. 
 
Het geforceerde en kunstmatige klimaat van de politieke arena had ook invloed op de 
economie: Turkije onderging een economische crisis in 2000 en 2001. Het beperkte en 
kunstmatige karakter van het politieke domein barstte met een gesprek tussen president 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer en premier Bülent Ecevit in de MGK vergadering van 19 februari 2001. 
Er werd beweerd dat president Sezer een boekje van de Turkse grondwet in het gezicht van 
premier Ecevit gooide. Zoals Ecevit vermeld in depersconferentie na de mislukte MGK 
vergadering dat dit een "enorme crisis". Als gevolg van economische en politieke crisissen 
besloot Turkije tot vervroegde verkiezingen over te gaan, op 3 november 2002. De Partij voor 
Rechtvaardigheid en Ontwikkeling (AKP), opgericht door en onder leiding van Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, behaalde 34 procent van de stemmen en werd daarmee de winnaar van de 
vervroegde verkiezingen. Voor de tijd van de AKP was Erdoğan lid van de verboden 
Welvaartspartij van Erbakan, en was veroordeeld tot vier maanden cel vanwege een toespraak 
die hij hield in de hoogtijdagen van het proces van 28 februari, toen hij burgemeester van 
Istanbul was. De eerste jaren van de AKP regering kenden relatief weinig problemen. Onder 
het bestuur van deze partij, die een meerderheid in het parlement genoot, vond er een 
ommekeer plaats van het geforceerde en kunstmatige politieke klimaat, hoewel de relaties 
met het leger nog niet volledig genormaliseerd waren. Een grote economische groei was er 
gerealiseerd door de regering van de AKP na de crisis. Echter, aan de vooravond van de 
presidentsverkiezingen in 2007, werden de burgerlijk - militaire verhoudingen weer tot heet 
hangijzer in verband met de door het leger waargenomen stijgende reactionaire dreiging. 
 
De mogelijkheid dat er een president met een AKP achtergrond gekozen zou worden was 
onacceptabel voor Kemalistische kringen, vooral voor het leger, daar de president volgens de 
Turkse Grondwet tevens opperbevelhebber is van het leger. Vanwege hun ongemak begonnen 
de Kemalistische instituties van het maatschappelijk middenveld, die ook aanwezig waren 
tijdens het 28 februari proces,  ‘Republikeinse Bijeenkomsten’ te organiseren, waarvan de 
deelnemers de slogan ‘Noch Sharia, Noch Coup’ scandeerden. 
 
Abdullah Gül, een prominente figuur binnen de AKP, was de enige kandidaat voor het 
presidentschap, die verkiesbaar was door het parlement. De oppositie was van plan om Güls 
presidentschap te verhinderen door de verkiezing te boycotten en de verkiezingsuitslag voor 
te leggen aan het constitutioneel hof. Aan het einde van de eerste verkiezingsronde die rond 
het middaguur op 27 april 2007 gehouden werd, behaalde Gül niet het vereiste aantal 
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stemmen om te worden verkozen en zo kwam de presidentsverkiezing tot een tweede ronde. 
Op dezelfde dag legde de Republikeinse Volkspartij, de voornaamste oppositiepartij, de 
eerste ronde van de verkiezing voor aan het constitutioneel hof met de eis om de eerste ronde 
te annuleren omdat het quorum niet zou zijn behaald. Het leger wachtte de beslissing van het 
hof niet af en verklaarde in een memorandum op haar officiële website dat het ongerust was 
over een verkiezing van een president die het beschouwde als zijnde vijandig tegen de 
basisprincipes van de republiek. Net als het communiqué dat was uitgegeven na de 
vergadering van de Nationale Veiligheidsraad van 28 februari dreigde het leger de regering 
ook dit maal met sancties wanneer een dergelijke president toch zou worden verkozen. Kort 
na het memorandum van het Turkse leger annuleerde het constitutioneel hof de eerste ronde 
van de presidentsverkiezingen en schreef de regering vervroegde verkiezingen uit, zoals 
voorgeschreven door de Turkse grondwet wanneer het parlement niet in staat is een president 
te kiezen. AKP werd wederom de winnaar van de vervroegde verkiezingen van 22 juli 2007 
met 47% van de stemmen. Na de verkiezingen, werd Abdullah Gül, de kandidaat van AKP, 
verkozen als de nieuwe president van Turkije, in tegenstelling tot 28 februari, waar het leger 
niet succesvol was hun wensen in vervulling te laten brengen. 
 
In tegenstelling tot eerdere interventies wendde het Turkse leger tijdens de 
interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april niet direct haar dwingend vermogen aan. In 
plaats daarvan mobiliseerde het de media, het ambtenarenapparaat, de rechtbanken, 
universiteiten, handelsorganisaties en NGO’s en bracht het een indirecte interventie teweeg 
middels het maatschappelijk middenveld. De media was een actieve deelnemer aan deze 
beide processen, zowel als deel van het kapitaal alsmede als een actief instrument dat de 
stedelijke middenklassen mobiliseerde en leidde.  
 
Deze scriptie analyseert de rol van de media in deze twee processen alsmede de praktijk van 
het mobiliseren van de stedelijke middenklassen middels tekstuele, discursieve en sociale 
functies. De analyses van deze twee interventieprocessen, met speciale aandacht voor het 
gedrag van de media, hebben een bijdrage geleverd aan de wetenschappelijke literatuur over 
Turkije, die niet echt overvloedig is wanneer het gaat om mediastudies.  
 
De dissertatie maakt gebruik van de Fairclough’s discourse analyse theorie, welke aandacht 
besteedt aan tekstuele en sociale praktijken, alsmede discursieve praktijken, Antonio 
Gramsci’s hegemonie en civiele samenleving theorue en Şerif Mardin’s toepassing van 
centrum-periferie theorie op de Turkse casus als de voornaamste theoretische kaders voor de 
analyses en het onderzoek. Uit de analyses van het gedrag van de media en zijn discours blijkt 
dat de traditionele Kemalistische kern heeft geprobeerd zijn alleenheerschappij veilig te 
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stellen met behulp van de media, het ambtenarenapparaat, de rechtbanken, universiteiten, 
handelsorganisaties en NGO’s in de interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april. 
 
Een andere bijdrage van deze dissertatie is de observatie van interventieprocessen als 
culturele en politiek-economische conflicten in plaats van als botsingen tussen ‘seculieren’ en 
‘reactionairen’. Verschillende groepen die normaal gesproken tegenstrijdige belangen hebben, 
verenigden zich tijdens de interventieprocessen. Gramsci’s concept van ‘historisch blok’ is 
cruciaal om de motieven, die verschillende sociale groeperingen deden samenkomen in deze 
processen, te doorgronden. Ook Gramsi’s concept van ‘intellectueel en moreel leiderschap’ is 
leerzaam voor het begrijpen van de leidende rol van de media, die werd gerealiseerd middels 
discours, in interventieprocessen. De analyse van het conflict over de alleenheerschappij 
tussen de Kemalisten en de religieus conservatieven is ook nuttig om te kunnen begrijpen dat 
het conflict niet alleen ging over materiële middelen, macht of cultureel domein, maar ook 
over een breder domein dat alles omvat: het domein van de alleenheerschappij. Vanuit dit 
oogpunt was militaire inmenging in de politiek niet alleen beperkt tot het politieke domein, 
maar besloeg het gehele maatschappelijk middenveld – de “civil society” volgens de definitie 
van Gramsci. 
 
Aan de andere kant is Mardin’s toepassing van de centrum-periferie theorie op het Turkse 
voorbeeld bruikbaar om de historische ontwikkeling van het conflict tussen de Kemalisten en 
de conservatieven te kunnen doorgronden. De historische beschrijving door Mardin biedt de 
mogelijkheid om de uitgangspunten van 28 februari en 27 april in het geschiedkundige licht 
van de Turkse modernisering te zien. De laatste functie van Mardin’s theorie is het kunnen 
gebruiken van Gramsci’s theorie, die ontwikkeld is voor het verklaren van andere 
historiciteiten, voor het voorbeeld van Turkije.  
 
Het concept van “Historic Hegemonic Center” dat is opgesteld met behulp van de theorieën 
van Gramsci en Mardin, is een nieuwe conceptualisatie die deze dissertatie biedt. Met behulp 
van deze nieuwe conceptualisatie wordt het mogelijk om de stabiliteit. Door de hulp van de 
nieuwe conceptualisering welke Mardin’s centrum-periferie ondersteunt met het perspectief 
van de hegemonie werd de toepassing van Gramsci’s hegemonistische analyse op de Turkse 
casus mogelijk. 
 
Deze dissertatie beschouwt de media als deel van het  “Historic Hegemonic Center” en 
analyseert haar discours. Het voornaamste betoog is het volgende: De media hebben de 
militaire interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 27 april gesteund als deel van het “Historic 
Hegemonic Center”. Het media discours gebruikte termen als ‘goede’ versus ‘slechte’ 
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moslims, een typisch Kemalistisch discours dat reeds in de jaren ’20 werd gebruikt, om de 
heersende conservatieven als slechte moslims te bestempelen.  Het doel van deze discursieve 
praktijk was het mobiliseren van goede moslims, dat zijn de stedelijke middenklassen, tegen 
de slechte moslims, dat zijn de heersende conservatieve partijen, en uiteindelijk het 
veiligstellen van de steun van het volk voor de interventieprocessen. Deze dissertatie 
onderbouwt dit betoog met de analyses van de discoursen van ‘goede’ versus ‘slechte’ 
moslims, van ‘gematigde en moderne islam’, van ‘sluipende islamisering’ en van 
‘islamitische revolutie’, in de kranten die tijdens de interventieprocessen van 28 februari en 
27 april verschenen.  
 
Alle drie de grote verhalen bestonden uit verschillende subthema's, zoals eerlijkheid, de goede 
vs. slechte moslims discours, de Indonesische manier van geleidelijke en gematigde 
islamisering discours en tot slot Iraanse manier van revolutioinaire islamisering discours. In 
dit onderzoek is getracht de toepassing van deze grote verhalen en thema's weer te geven door 
middel van het discours analyse van vier Turkse kranten. 'Milliyet' van Dogan Groep als 
voorhoede van de mainstream van de Turkse media, 'Cumhuriyet' als de meest prominente 
Kemalistische media, 'Sabah' als een casus welke de mogelijkheid geeft om de effecten van 
verandering van media-eigenaar te onderzoeken en ten slotte 'Akşam' van  Cukurova Groep 
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